AQ / ISIL / A - EP 3

Duration: 11-Sep-2001 to 17-Jun-2011

Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, the UNSC passed several important resolutions (all unanimous) significantly enhancing its efforts to counter terrorism. UNSCR 1368 (12 September 2001) broadly authorized military intervention (“expresses its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001”), UNSCR 1373 (28 September 2001) established the global counter-terrorism regime (with innovative new monitoring and enforcement measures), UNSCR 1386 (20 December 2001) legitimized ISAF intervention, and UNSCR 1390 (28 January 2002) added an indefinite travel ban targeted (individual/entity) arms imports embargo on Usama Bin Laden, Al-Qaida, Taliban, and associates. There was a significant increase in the number of individuals and entities designated during this period from 156 to more than 500 at one point during the episode, beginning with the first round of new designations made on 8 October 2001(SC/7166).

Following litigation in a number of key implementing states over due process violations associated with the individual designation process, the UNSC passed a series of resolutions introducing procedural reforms and increasing the transparency of its operations. UNSCR 1617 (29 July 2005) spelled out explicit criteria for listing, UNSCR 1730 (19 December 2006) created a focal point mechanism within the Secretariat to receive petitions for de-listing, UNSCR 1822 (30 June 2008) mandated periodic reviews of all designations, and UNSCR 1904 (17 December 2009) created an Office of Ombudsperson to review petitions for de-listing. Each of these resolutions was adopted unanimously. This episode represented an attempt to focus the targeting of the regime and increase/maintain its legitimacy. There was also evidence of an emerging differentiation between Al-Qaida and the Taliban that picked up pace toward the end of the episode.

Targeted assassination campaigns through drone attacks by the United States became more prominent in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border (especially toward the end of the episode), considerably harming the senior leadership of Al-Qaida. On 2 May 2011, Usama bin Laden was killed in Pakistan in an attack by US Special Forces.


Coerce

N/A.

Constrain

Constrain AQ from being able to commit additional acts of terrorism.

Signal

Signal AQ and the global community about the unacceptability of acts of terrorism and, at the same time, reassure domestic constituencies that something was being done about global terrorism, and address domestic human rights communities that adequate due process measures were in place.


Mandatory

Continuation of previously imposed asset freeze on Usama bin Laden, Al-Qaida, Taliban, and associates.

Ongoing arms imports embargo on areas controlled by Taliban replaced by a targeted arms imports embargo (on designated individuals and entities).

Diplomatic sanctions (closure of Taliban offices in MS territories and withdrawal of any officials, agents, advisers, and military personnel advising Taliban) and ban on chemical used in heroin processing (acetic anhydride) expired in January 2002.

Aviation ban was lifted in January 2002 (following Taliban overthrow in November 2001).

Newly imposed travel ban on Usama bin Laden, Al-Qaida, Taliban, and associates.


Arms imports embargo, asset freeze, and travel ban sanctions were (re-)imposed for an indefinite time period. Sanctions Committee and Monitoring Group/Team in place (Monitoring Team replaces Monitoring Group in January 2004). Designation criteria were specified and targets designated (maximum number of designees during the episode – 400 individual designees, 111 entities; Taliban designations included 142 individuals, Al-Qaida 258 individuals and 111 entities). Enforcement authorities specified.


Coercion

N/A

Policy outcome

Individuals and supporters became the principal focus of coercion, but they were coerced in order to constrain AQ and associates. Individuals designated became unable to access their funds in some countries, others were deterred from providing continuing support.

Sanctions contribution

N/A.

Constraint

Effective

Policy outcome

AQ had very limited access to formal sector financial institutions; had limited funds to transfer; complained of limits on funds; moved to decentralized, locally sourced financing; change of strategy of Al-Qaida, both in its sources of financing (toward crime and local sources) and in the location of many of its attacks (increasingly against soft targets in the developing world); at the beginning of the episode, AQ was still directing and financing attacks (Bali 1); by the middle, there was no evidence of direct command and control or financing from AQ central (Bali 2, Madrid, London); there was evidence of disruption of plots due to financial intelligence; AQ central virtually disappeared as a command and control center during this episode.

Sanctions contribution

Other factors, such as the NATO military intervention, played a key role in the disruption of the organization and its change of strategy (at least at the outset); use of drones played a key role in the disruption of the organization; support of military operations in various parts of the world increasingly important against affiliated entities (Somalia, Yemen).

Signaling

Effective

Policy outcome

AQ was strongly stigmatized and isolated, as were its principal financial supporters; strong reinforcement of norm against terrorism.

Sanctions contribution

Creation of a global sanctions regime was critical for signaling AQ, its associates, and the global community about the norm against terrorism, but AQ actions and their repercussions played an increasingly important role in stigmatizing the group over the course of the episode (attacks on Muslims, attacks on soft targets in the developing world, diffuseness of attacks, i.e. not focused on the US).


Increase in corruption and criminality, strengthening of authoritarian rule, increase in human rights violations, humanitarian consequences, strengthening instruments of the security apparatus of senders, harmful effects on neighboring states, increase in international regulatory capacity in different issue domains, increase in international enforcement capacity in different issue domains, resource diversion, significant administrative burden on implementing states, human rights implications for sending states, decline in the credibility and/or legitimacy of UN Security Council, reduction in Islamic charitable giving.


08-10-2001

Substantive

  • Adds new individual and entity designations to the consolidated list (two more rounds of designations followed within a month, in SC 7180 and 7206) [following the 9/11 terrorist attacks].

20-12-2001

Procedural

  • Establishes International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to maintain security in Kabul and surrounding areas (6 months).

15-01-2002

Substantive

  • Terminates the closure of Ariana Afghan Airlines and exempts them from UNSCR 1267 aviation ban and financial asset freeze.

16-01-2002

Substantive

  • Continues UNSCR 1267 and 1333 financial asset freeze (new wording).
  • Imposes arms imports embargo on Usama bin Laden, Al-Qaida, Taliban, and associates (individuals and entities).
  • Imposes travel ban on Usama bin Laden, Al-Qaida, Taliban, and associates (individuals).
  • Terminates UNSCR 1267 aviation ban.

Procedural

  • Modifies Sanctions Committee mandate (cooperation with the UNSCR 1373 Counter Terrorism Committee).
  • Extends Monitoring Group mandate (1 year).
  • Sets sanctions review (1 year).
  • Requests MS reporting.

20-12-2002

Substantive

  • Terminates the UNSCR 1267 humanitarian exemption to asset freeze.
  • Adds UNSCR 1267 and 1390 financial asset freeze exemptions for basic expenses (absence of a negative decision within 48 hours) and extraordinary expenses (pending Committee approval).

Procedural

  • Specifies criteria for optional additions of account payments and interests.
  • Modifies Sanctions Committee mandate.

17-01-2003

Substantive

  • Decides to improve the implementation of UNSCR 1267, 1333 and 1390 measures.

Procedural

  • Extends Monitoring Group mandate (1 year).
  • Requests Committee to communicate the designations list to MS every 3 months.

13-10-2003

Procedural

  • Extends and expands mandate of ISAF beyond Kabul and its environs (1 year).

30-01-2004

Substantive

  • Decides to improve the implementation of UNSCR 1267, 1333 and 1390 measures.

Procedural

  • Strengthens Sanctions Committee mandate.
  • Establishes Monitoring Team (18 months) and specifies its mandate.
  • Requests MS reporting.

29-07-2005

Substantive

  • Specifies indicators for "association" (i.e. designation).

Procedural

  • Extends Monitoring Team mandate (17 months).
  • Requests relevant MS informing of those designated.
  • Requires statement of case from MS for designation.
  • Sets sanctions review (17 months).

22-12-2006

Substantive

  • Clarifies that UNSCR 1267, 1333 and 1390 asset freeze applies to all economic resources.

Procedural

  • Specifies information to be provided by MS for the statement of case.
  • Presents cover sheet for listing and specifies criteria for delisting.
  • Allows public release of listing information (MS identification of such parts requested).
  • Extends and modifies Monitoring Team mandate (18 months).
  • Extends consideration time for financial exemptions (from 48h to 3 days).
  • Sets sanctions review (18 months).

30-06-2008

Procedural

  • Decides Secretariat shall inform relevant MS Permanent missions of delisting within 1 week.
  • Directs the Committee to review all names on the List (2 years) and sets up annual review of names not reviewed in 3 or more years.
  • Extends and modifies Monitoring Team mandate (18 months).
  • Decides MS shall identify information from statement of case for public release.
  • Sets sanctions review (18 months).

17-12-2009

Procedural

  • Establishes Ombudsperson and specifies his/her mandate (replacing UNSCR 1730 Focal Point mechanism in receiving delisting requests).
  • Requires Secretariat to inform permanent mission of a country where designee is (believed to be) located within 3 working days of designation.
  • Directs Committee to make accessible on its website narrative summary of reasons for listing (based on the publicly releasable part of MS statement of case).
  • Requests Monitoring Team circulation of list of reportedly deceased designees (every 6 months).
  • Extends Monitoring Team mandate (18 months).
  • Sets sanctions review (18 months).