AQ / ISIL / A - EP 5

Following a shift in the focus of the 1267/1989 Committee from a principal concern with the core of Al-Qaida to global counter-terrorism in a broader sense, the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the problem of the global recruitment, movement, and activities of foreign terrorist fighters became central to the 1267/1989 regime. On 24 September 2014, UNSCR 2178 significantly expanded the scope of the activities of the Committee to include measures against the flow of foreign terrorist fighters between states and armed conflicts worldwide.

The threat of foreign terrorist fighters is not new. Since at least the 1990s, Al-Qaida maintained a network of training camps that attracted and housed foreign fighters from various countries. Al-Shabaab in Somalia was also able to attract foreign fighters for its campaigns, and Chechen and Central Asian commanders played a key role in the military victories of both ISIL and the Al-Nusrah Front (ANF). Yet, between 2012 and 2015, there was an increase in the threat from foreign terrorist fighters. As of June 2015, it was estimated that over 25,000 foreign terrorist fighters from over 100 countries were active in different conflicts.

As a result, the Security Council decided in UNSCR 2178 (24 September 2014) that member states should prevent and suppress the recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of individuals who travel to a State other than their state of residence for the purposes of engaging in terrorism-related activities. Further, it authorized member-states to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of any individuals about whom they have credible information they might be seeking to participate in terrorist activities.

In spite of these initiatives, ISIL and associated groups continued to expand their activities and global network. In September 2014, members of Jund al-Kiliafah in Algeria swore allegiance to Al Baghdadi and ISIL, and in October 2014 so did militants in Libya who captured the city of Derna. ISIL expanded its presence in Libya through the cooptation of various local leaders and groups, including from the Shura Council of Islamic Youth and Ansar al-Sharia. In March 2015, Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and individual members of the Chechen Caucasus Emirate also swore allegiance to ISIL, effectively giving the group presence in Russia, Uzbekistan, Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. The organization’s recruitment drive competed with that of Al-Qaida’s in both Yemen and Afghanistan.

For several years at the beginning of this episode, ISIL continued to thrive and its activities became the principal preoccupation of the 1267/1989 regime. The organization used alternative sources of value, such as looting, smuggling of historical and cultural heritage, kidnapping and ransom, and oil smuggling (in the case of Iraq, using the same networks through which Saddam Hussein’s regime evaded comprehensive sanctions in the 1990s). In response, UNSCR 2199 (12 February 2015) imposed a ban on the trade of Iraqi and Syrian cultural property and specified that general trade with ISIL, ANF, and other AQ-related individual and entities, especially of oil related products and other natural resources, constituted support for terrorism and could lead to designations.

UNSCR 2253 (17 December 2015) formalized this shift of focus by renaming the Committee the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh)/Al-Qaida (IDAQ) Sanctions Committee. The resolution also clarified that transportation and lodging costs, ransom payment, donations, and funds or services for terrorist recruitment, training, or travel even in the absence of a link to a specific terrorist act are also subject to sanctions. It emphasized the threat posed by Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and decided that states should enhance vigilance over their nationals and individuals under their jurisdiction who engage with materials relevant to the production of IEDs.

Military engagement with ISIL in Iraq and Syria increased from 2014, with Kurdish militias in the north and the Iraqi and Syrian armies, foreign special forces, and local and regional armed groups fighting the group throughout the territory under its control. It was with the arrival of Russian forces in Syria and a US-led coalition in Iraq that, together with a concerted effort on the part of the Iraqi military, major territorial losses for ISIL took place in 2015 and 2016. According to US officials, as of mid-2016, the group had lost 47% of the territory it once controlled in Iraq and 30-35% of its fighters. This loss of fighters was offset by the continued flow of foreign terrorist fighters into the Levant. It is estimated that, as of July 2016, ISIL commanded up to 30,000 fighters.

In part as a result of these developments, ISIL emphasized attacks outside of Syria and Iraq, either through individuals traveling (or returning) on their instructions or through others acting independently but under the inspiration of ISIL. The threat posed by the increasing number of foreign terrorist fighters returning to their countries of origin continued to increase and became a concern for the Security Council. A 2016 Monitoring Team report estimated that between 10-30% of foreign terrorist fighters who had travelled to conflict zones returned, although some of them did so due to disillusion with ISIL, and not to conduct terrorist attacks.

In spite of the ongoing strategic competition between ISIL and Al-Qaida, the organizations collaborated at times on a tactical level and both took advantage of the deteriorating political and security situations in Libya and Yemen at the time to establish or broaden their presence in those countries and gain access to new sources of arms and funding. In 2015, ISIL in Libya continued to be seen as an outsider and was unable to extend its territorial presence significantly due to military setbacks. In Yemen, AQAP (one of the most effective AQ franchises) was able to establish control over a substantial amount of territory, but the country remained an attractive area for ISIL expansion as well. In West Africa, Boko Haram struggled to maintain territory due to pressure from Nigerian forces. In Somalia, Al-Shabaab maintained its allegiance to Al-Qaida, but detained and killed perceived ISIL sympathizers within its own ranks and continued to concentrate on a national and regional agenda (through attacks on AMISOM-contributing countries) as opposed to ISIL’s more global Islamist ambitions.

In 2016, ISIL’s financial situation deteriorated, largely due to airstrikes on oil-related infrastructure and actions taken by the Government of Iraq to decrease liquidity in the banking sector in areas controlled by the group. According to a 2016 Monitoring Team report, this led to a decline in the group’s production of oil (by 30-50% since 2015) and salary cuts for its fighters. Although the group was able to obtain substantial income from taxation/extortion, its allocation of resources between governing controlled areas and funding its war effort became more difficult. The group thus sought to decentralize, providing start-up capital to some of its affiliates to ensure continuity of the group in case of a military defeat in Iraq and Syria. The ANF, which announced its split from AQ in July 2016, continued to rely on external donations for funding.

In 2016 and 2017, under sustained military pressure and facing a decline in the inflow of foreign fighters, ISIL lost control over much of its territory (including all urban areas in Iraq and Syria), and shifted its strategy towards operating in more concealed networks. Between 2015 and 2018, the total revenue of ISIL fell by more than 90%. As a result of no longer being able to promote itself as a welcoming “State,” according to the Monitoring Team, ISIL saw its recruitment pool reduced to individuals highly motivated to fight and conduct terror attacks. While the group continued to operate in some recaptured cities in Iraq and Syria, the military defeat led many fighters to join other groups or leave the region. This was the case also in Yemen, where a significant portion of ISIL fighters appeared to defect to Al-Qaida after 2016, further weakening the group vis-à-vis its counterpart.

Despite these difficulties, ISIL in Syria and Iraq continued to send funds to affiliates worldwide through informal value transfer services and the transport of cash in small amounts between 2016 and 2018. In this period, ISIL continued its transition into an “organization with a flat hierarchy, with cells and affiliates increasingly acting autonomously,” as described by the Monitoring Team. ISIL claimed several attacks in Europe, remained active in Afghanistan, sustained an underground presence in several states in North Africa, and maintained links with Boko Haram and other organizations in West Africa. As former foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria became scattered around the world, the level of threat increased in regions such as South-East Asia, while also prompting the group to reestablish its operations in Libya.

According to the Monitoring Team, the fall of Baghuz (Syria), in March 2019 marked the end of the caliphate as a territorial unit able to function and systematically support affiliates abroad. The death of ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in October 2019 also foreshadowed its gradual decline. Yet, ISIL remained resilient for several years, transforming into a rural insurgency in Iraq and Syria, with sporadic operations in Baghdad and other large cities. It utilized asymmetric warfare tactics to target security forces, political actors, and other communities. Foreign terrorist fighter returnees and ISIL affiliates around the globe also continued to pose a significant threat. Both major terrorist attacks (such as the Easter bombings in Sri Lanka, in April 2019) and smaller operations continued to occur, often inspired by – and with few operational connections to – ISIL. ISIL’s resilience extended to its financial operations. While the loss of territory meant the loss of revenue, it again adapted its means of raising and moving funds and, as with other extremist groups, sought to leverage the COVID-19 pandemic for propaganda purposes.

Al-Qaida and its affiliates continued to pose a significant threat in various regions, especially Somalia and Yemen. Although it lost part of the captured territory in Yemen, partly as a result of the increased US air and drone strikes attack against the group, AQAP increasingly served as a communications hub for the entire group. In North and West Africa and South Asia, Al-Qaida remained the dominant threat. In the Sahel and West Africa, fighters aligned with Al-Qaida and ISIL sometimes collaborated to undermine vulnerable state authorities, although more broadly the relationship between the two groups continued to vary between competition and collaboration, depending on the local strategic scenario. As with ISIL, Al-Qaida lost key leaders between 2017 and 2020. For example, Hamza bin Laden (Usama's son and an emerging leader) was declared dead in September 2019 (his death was likely much earlier), and the commanders of AQAP and AQIM were both killed in 2020.

Major geopolitical developments in recent years have affected the distribution of ISIL and Al-Qaida linked groups globally, as well as the prospects for sanctions effectiveness. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 paved the way for the Taliban to return to power, giving rise to the concern that the country may once again be hospitable to extremists. While attacks outside of the region have become rarer, the ability of ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) to kill 137 people at a music hall in Moscow in March 2024 underscored that concern. The collapse of the Assad regime (December 2024) yielded an interim government in Syria that is led by a listed group (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, QDe.137) and headed by a listed individual (Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, QDi.317). The sudden transition prompted instability, as several factions active in the Syrian civil war remained mobilized, while Al-Qaida and ISIL linked groups plundered government weapons caches in the first days after the fall of the Assad regime. The new Syrian regime has since called on the population to return the looted weapons, began removing weapons from militias and former Assad regime military personnel, and seized a large number of the weapons back in security sweeps.

Nonetheless, the signature trend over this period – reflected in Monitoring Team reports and underscored by other analysts – has been the migration of jihadist violence to the Global South, and especially across the African continent. In North, West, East and Central Africa, groups claiming affiliation to ISIL and Al-Qaida have become a permanent feature on the regional security agenda. Leveraging local grievances and often controlling territory, such groups pose a particular challenge for the efficacy of the sanctions regime. Given the relative recency of concern for their actions, many of the entities and individuals involved in these conflicts have not been listed. The environments in which they operate are often quite permissive in terms of raising and moving resources, gaining access to weapons, and traveling across international borders. African governments face significant challenges in terms of implementing and enforcing sanctions and, in so far as they have been effective in countering extremists, they have done so through the use of military and law enforcement measures rather than sanctions.

Between 2018 and 2020, there have been no substantive changes to the sanctions regime. Several resolutions have consolidated the various measures, including UNSCR 2462 (28 March 2019), UNSCR 2610 (17 December 2021), and UNSCR 2734 (10 June 2024). These resolutions bear strong resemblance to each other – although the latter incorporates original language on sexual and gender-based violence as a basis for listing when undertaken by Al-Qaida and ISIL linked groups for terrorist purposes. The “humanitarian carve-out” from asset freeze that was introduced in UNSCR 2664 (9 December 2022) across sanctions regimes was initially applied to the IDAQ measures for two years only before being extended for an indefinite period in UNSCR 2761 (6 December 2024). Despite the Council emphasizing the importance of adding names to the list (e.g. UNSCR 2560 of 29 December 2020), the listing activity has been modest. Underscoring this point, the Monitoring Team’s 2025 report included a bar graph demonstrating that the number of entities and individuals that are mentioned in their reports – but are nonetheless not listed – has increased over time (S/2025/482, p.27). Under these circumstances, evidence of effectiveness is ad hoc, with modest amounts of funds frozen and very little to suggest that the arms embargo or travel ban are impeding Al-Qaida and ISIL linked extremists today.

Mandatory

Continuation of ongoing asset freeze, arms imports embargo, and travel ban sanctions measures on ISIL, Al-Qaida, and Associates.

Newly imposed ban on foreign terrorist recruiting, organizing, transporting, or equipping ban and (from February 2015) ban on trade in Iraqi and Syrian cultural property.

Specifies that trade in oil, oil products, modular refineries and related products, and other natural resources, as well as ransom payment and internet hosting to designated groups and individuals, also constitute sanctions violations.

Conditional

Conditional travel ban on foreign terrorist fighters (if reasonable grounds to believe they are seeking entry or transit to participate in terrorist acts).

Travel ban:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/travel-ban

Travel ban exemptions in effect:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/travel-ban/travel-exemptions-in-effect

Asset freeze:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/exemptions/assetsfreeze

Carve out provisions for humanitarian actors apply until 9 December 2024, as specified in UNSCR 2664 (2022).

Maximum number of designees during the episode: 263 individuals and 90 entities, currently remaining on 254 individuals and 89 entities.

Current list of sanctions designees: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list

Sanctions Committee and Monitoring Team in place. Designation criteria were specified and targets designated. Enforcement authorities specified.

Explanations of terms:

Asset freeze: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/eot_assets_freeze_-_english.pdf

Travel ban: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/eot_travel_ban_english.pdf

Arms embargo: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/eot_arms_embargo_english.pdf

Monitoring Team reports:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/monitoring-team/reports