CAR - EP 2

The passage of UNSCR 2745 on 30 July 2024 formally terminated the arms embargo on the country and established a new arms embargo focused on non-state armed groups operating in the CAR. The shift in the target of the sanctions signified a new focus of the sanctions regime. The resolution, which was adopted unanimously by the Security Council, was welcomed by the government of CAR. The Security Council subsequently adopted the annual extensions of the regime unanimously on 29 July 2025 in UNSCR 2789 and on 29 July 2026 in UNSCR 2827. This unanimity contrasts with the difficult negotiations and non-unanimous votes in the years prior to UNSCR 2745 that redesigned the sanctions regime.

Armed group activities continued to undermine stability in multiple parts of the country, particularly on the borders with Sudan and Chad, according to the June 2025 Panel of Experts Report. Refugees flowed in from the civil war in Sudan, and there were reports of arms trafficking from RSF forces aligned with CAR non-state armed groups in the east, as well as from Chad to other non-state groups in the west of the country. Trafficking in natural resources (gold and diamonds) continued into 2026, reportedly driven by networks of high-ranking officials, military, and transnational organized crime, according to a 2026 report by the Global Initiative Against Organized Crime.

In April 2025, the government reached a truce with two major armed groups – the UPC and 3R – following AU-facilitated negotiations it held with CPC (Coalition des patriotes pour le changement) leaders in Chad to ensure elections could take place in December 2025. In July 2025, the UPC and 3R formally dissolved themselves through peace agreements signed with the government. A subsequent round of negotiations mediated by Chad in November 2025 brought the remaining faction of the CPC, the Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC), into the agreement. In their June 2026 report, the Panel of Experts estimated that approximately 1,300 combatants were disarmed and demobilized following the agreements. While elements and networks affiliated with 3R, UPC, and MPC continued to commit abuses against civilians to varying degrees, the Panel of Experts concluded that the peace agreements helped reduce armed group activities and enabled the country to conduct elections in December 2025.

Despite the peace agreements with the CPC, armed conflict continued elsewhere in the country, particularly in the south-east and north-east. Among the most active armed groups in 2025 and 2026 was Azande Ani Kpi Gbe (AAKG). The group initially emerged in 2023 to expel one of the factions of the CPC, the UPC, from its strongholds in the north of the country. The AAKG was trained by Wagner forces in 2024 and partially integrated into the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic (FACA). Despite its partial integration with FACA, elements of the AAKG participated in armed clashes targeting Fulani communities in 2025 and even attacked FACA forces during the December 2025 elections. According to the International Crisis Group, the ethnic Azandé militia deepened its shift from government ally to armed challenger with a fresh attack on the CAR military in February 2026. The Panel of Experts reported in June 2026 that the presence of AAKG, along with partially integrated or disarmed actors, local self-defense dynamics, cross-border linkages, and a heavily militarized government response created a complex security environment in the southeast of the country. The LRA has also become active again in the region. Rapid Support Forces (RSF) from Sudan have been active in the north-eastern border area with Sudan. According to the Panel of Experts, weapons continue to be widely available in the country, entering through the north-eastern border as a spillover from the war in Sudan.

The local and presidential elections, originally scheduled for October 2024 but repeatedly postponed due to the ongoing instability in the country, were finally held in December 2025, together with elections for the National Assembly. Touadéra secured a third term, campaigning on the claim to have improved the country’s security, including by employing Russian mercenaries and Rwandan forces, in addition to the successful negotiations with the CPC. The elections remained relatively peaceful, but were characterized by political irregularities, and the strongest opposing candidates were barred from entering the race until a month before the vote. The main opposition coalition boycotted the election and opposition candidates called for the annulment of the election results, but authorities resorted to acts of intimidation and other repressive measures to shut down debate and deter mobilization.

MINUSCA’s mandate was renewed for another year in November 2024 and again in November 2025, but its forces were attacked in February, March and June 2025, indicating the continuing instability within the country. MINUSCA is engaged in a gradual drawdown of its activities in CAR and in August 2026 it closed its Electoral Assistance Division after six years. According to the International Crisis Group, the mission’s gradual drawdown includes also “ongoing transfer of military and temporary operating bases to state control.”

In other developments, a former Wagner Group commander was appointed Touadéra’s top security adviser, following the President’s visit to Moscow in September 2024. Touadéra visited Moscow again in April 2026 after his election, demonstrating continued close ties with Moscow. During early 2026, Russian mercenaries in the CAR began a transition to be subsumed under the command of the Russian Africa Corps instead of Wagner Group, a move Touadéra had previously resisted. Russia put CAR on the agenda for readmission to the Kimberley Process when it was chair of the group in 2020-2021. Russia subsequently added pressure on the UAE Chair of the Kimberley process in 2024 to reconsider CAR’s readmission, who made a personal visit to the country. CAR was formally readmitted to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in November 2024 after reportedly meeting its minimum standards, but disregarding UN and NGO reports about the continued use of diamonds for conflict financing.

Mandatory

Ongoing travel ban against individuals and assets freeze against individuals or entities undermining peace and stability, threatening transitional agreements, or fueling violence.

Existing arms imports embargo on all parties to the conflict (with conditional Government exemptions, from July 2023 not applying to CAR security forces) replaced with an arms imports embargo on non-governmental entities (non-state armed groups and associated individuals operating in the CAR) at the start of the episode.

Travel ban: https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/2745/exemptions_measures/travel-ban

Asset freeze: https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/2745/exemptions_measures/assets-freeze

Carve out provisions for humanitarian actors apply, as specified in UNSCR 2664 (2022).

Arms embargo: https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/2745/exemptions_measures/arms-embargo

Current and maximum number of designees during the episode: 14 individuals (former President Bozizé, 5 Séléka leaders, 3 anti-Balaka leaders, 2 heads of armed groups, and 3 LRA members) and 1 entity (the LRA).

Current list of sanctions designees:

https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/2745/sanctions-list-materials

Sanctions were imposed for a limited time period (1 year) to be renewed periodically. Sanctions Committee and Panel of Experts in place. Designation criteria were specified and targets designated. Enforcement authorities specified, peacekeeping operation (MINUSCA) has enforcement role.

Implementation assistance notices:

• Arms embargo
• Asset freeze humanitarian exemption

Panel of Experts reports:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2127/panel-of-experts/reports