Summary
The passage of UNSCR 2745 on 30 July 2024 formally terminated the arms embargo on the country and established a new arms embargo focused on armed groups and associated individuals operating in the CAR. The shift in the target of the sanctions signified a new focus of the sanctions regime symbolically, even as substantively the change in focus of the arms imports embargo has been in place since the adoption of UNSCR 2693 on 27 July 2023 (during the previous episode). UNSCR 2745 (2024), which was adopted unanimously by the Security Council, was welcomed by the government of CAR and the name of the Sanctions Committee was formally changed from referring to UNSCR 2127 (2013) to UNSCR 2745 (2024), further underlining the shift.
Armed group activities continued to undermine stability in multiple parts of the country following the passage of UNSCR 2745 in July 2024, particularly on the borders with Sudan and Chad, according to the June 2025 Panel of Experts Report. Refugees flowed in from the civil war in Sudan, and there were reports of arms trafficking from Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces aligned with CAR nonstate armed groups in the east, as well as from Chad to other non-state groups in the west of the country. Trafficking in natural resources (gold and diamonds) also continued in late 2024 and the first half of 2025.
On 19 April 2025, the government reached a truce with two major armed groups – the Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC) and Retour, réclamation et rehabilitation (3R) – both of whose leaders had been designated for UN sanctions. This followed negotiations the government held with exiled CPC leaders in Chad to ensure the elections can take place as planned across the country. President Touadéra is running for a third term in Presidential elections currently planned for December 2025 (with a potential run-off in January 2026). The Presidential elections, initially scheduled for October 2024, were postponed in August 2024 due to the instability in the country. The local and municipal elections are scheduled to take place on 30 August 2025. As a follow-up to implement the April 2025 agreement with exiled CPC leaders in Chad, the leaders of two of the armed groups, UPC and 3R, announced their dissolution on 10 July 2025 in Bangui. Others (such as the Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC), Coalition militaire de salut du peuple et de redressement (CMSPR), Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC), and anti-Balaka militias) have not agreed to a truce or their dissolution.
MINUSCA’s mandate was renewed for another year in November 2024, but its forces were attacked in February, March, and June of 2025, indicating the continuing instability within the country. In other developments, a former Wagner Group commander was appointed Touadéra’s top security adviser, following the President’s visit to Moscow in September 2024. OCHA confirmed that there was no evidence that targeted individuals or entities benefitted from humanitarian assistance provided to the country. CAR was formally readmitted to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in November 2024 and, in February 2025, the President announced that the country decided to adopt Bitcoin as legal tender.
In July 2025, France as penholder, in consultation with the government of the CAR, drafted a new resolution consisting of a technical roll-over of the existing sanctions regime for another year. On 29 July 2025, the Security Council unanimously adopted UNSCR 2789, extending the sanctions measures imposed on armed groups operating in the Central African Republic (CAR) for another year until 31 July 2026. The mandate of the Panel of Experts monitoring the implementation of these measures was renewed until 31 August 2026.
Purposes
Coerce
Coerce individuals and groups to cease committing acts of violence and threatening the political process of stabilization and reconciliation.
Constrain
Constrain non-state armed groups from engaging in violence.
Signal
Signal support for regional and UN mediation and peace operations.
Sanctions type
Mandatory
Ongoing travel ban against individuals and assets freeze against individuals or entities undermining peace and stability, threatening transitional agreements, or fueling violence.
Existing arms imports embargo on all parties to the conflict (with conditional Government exemptions, from July 2023 not applying to CAR security forces) replaced with an arms imports embargo on non-governmental entities (non-state armed groups and associated individuals operating in the CAR) at the start of the episode.
Exemptions
Travel ban:
https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/2745/exemptions_measures/travel-ban
Asset freeze:
https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/2745/exemptions_measures/assets-freeze
Carve out provisions for humanitarian actors apply, as specified in UNSCR 2664 (2022).
Arms embargo:
https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/2745/exemptions_measures/arms-embargo
Designation criteria
Current and maximum number of designees during the episode: 14 individuals (former President Bozizé, 3 ex-Séléka leaders, 3 anti-Balaka leaders, 4 heads of armed groups, and 3 LRA members) and 1 entity (LRA).
Current list of sanctions designees:
https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/2745/sanctions-list-materials
Potential scope
Potential scope of impact
UN sanctions can have some non-discriminating impact on the general population, since they include arms embargoes, diplomatic sanctions, and/or restrictions on the conduct of particular activities or the export of specific commodities.
Implementation
Sanctions were imposed for a limited time period (1 year) to be renewed periodically. Sanctions Committee and Panel of Experts in place. Designation criteria were specified and targets designated. Enforcement authorities specified, peacekeeping operation (MINUSCA) has enforcement role.
Implementation assistance notice:
Arms embargo:
Panel of Experts reports:
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2127/panel-of-experts/reports
Effectiveness
Coercion
Policy outcome
Two significant armed groups, UPC and 3R, agreed to a truce and have begun to disarm. Other groups have not agreed to a truce and continue to engage in open hostilities with the government and Russian private military forces in the country.
Sanctions contribution
Sanctions were limited to a modest number of leaders and were not fully enforced, but included the leaders of UPC and 3R who began to disarm in July 2025. Regional (AU) and bilateral (Russia, Sudan, Chad) diplomatic negotiations and the presence of military forces on the ground (MINUSCA and Russian private military company Wagner Group) were also significant to the outcome.
Constraint
Policy outcome
Although UPC and 3R officially dissolved themselves in July 2025 and began to disarm, the ex-Séléka, anti-Balaka, and other non-state armed groups (including MPC, CMSPR, FPRC, and anti-balaka factions) continue violent activities and arms and ammunition are widely available from neighboring countries, particularly from Sudan.
Sanctions contribution
Region is awash in arms, particularly from conflicts in neighboring countries. Presence of military forces on the ground is more significant to the outcome.
Signaling
Policy outcome
Unanimous passage of UNSCR 2745 in 2024 and UNSCR 2789 in 2025 sent a strong signal to non-state actors disrupting the political process of stabilization and reconciliation, while the continued deployment of African-led UN peace operation (MINUSCA) signaled support for transitional and peace agreements. Specific naming of militias and designation of their leaders provided some stigmatization.
Sanctions contribution
The re-focusing of the arms embargo on armed groups and associated individuals operating in CAR reinforced other measures (such as UN peace operation and AU and bilateral negotiation efforts).
Overall
Unintended consequences
Increases in criminality (particularly with regard to illicit arms and natural resource trafficking).
UN sanctions resolutions guide
Substantive
- Condemns attacks and human rights abuses committed by armed groups
Existing sanctions
- Terminates UNSCR 2127, 2399, 2488, 2648 and 2693 arms imports embargo to CAR
- Renews UNSCR 2399 travel ban, asset freeze, and related provisions (until 31.07.2025)
- Reaffirms UNSCR 2399 and 2693 designation criteria
New sanctions
- Imposes arms imports embargo, including assistance and training related to military activities, on armed groups and associated individuals operating in the CAR (until 31.07.2025)
Enhanced implementation measures
- Authorizes MS to seize, register and dispose of items prohibited under arms embargo to CAR upon discovery and specifies sample disposal methods
- Decides that MS that seizes and disposes items under UNSCR 2745 authorization must notify the Committee of such disposal (within 30 days), providing details of all items disposed of and the precise manner in which they were disposed of
Procedural
- Modifies the Sanctions Committee reference from “pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013)” to “pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)”
- Extends Panel of Experts mandate (until 31.08.2025), requesting it to devote special attention to the analysis of illicit transnational trafficking networks that fund armed groups in the CAR and explosive ordnances-related threats
- Calls for MS reporting
- Requests Secretary General to provide benchmarks for assessing the arms embargo (within 6 months)
Substantive
- Renews UNSCR 2745 arms imports embargo to CAR (until 31.07.2026)
- Renews UNSCR 2399 travel ban, asset freeze, and related provisions (until 31.07.2026)
- Reaffirms UNSCR 2399, 2693 and 2745 designation criteria
Procedural
- Extends Panel of Experts mandate (until 31.08.2026)
- Calls for MS reporting
