Ouattara was inaugurated President in May of 2011, but peace enforcement sanctions remained in place to inhibit potential spoilers. In September 2011 a Truth, Reconciliation and Dialogue Commission was launched, and, in November 2011, Gbagbo was handed over to the International Criminal Court in The Hague to face charges of crimes against humanity. In December 2011, Ouattara and his allies secured a majority in Parliamentary elections following a boycott of the election by Gbagbo supporters. In June of 2012, the Interior Minister declared that a plot by Gbagbo supporters to overthrow the Outtara government was foiled. Gbagbo supporters met with and sought support from members of the military junta that overthrew the government in Mali and also formed a strategic command to destabilize the Outtara government. In September/October 2012, the border with Ghana was closed for two weeks following a deadly attack on an army checkpoint in the border town of Noe.
A sharp increase in banditry in the north was noted during 2013, linked to former fighters not reintegrated in the DDR program, drawing on access to weapons from the Sahel. While there was progress in stabilizing the security situation along the borders with Ghana and Liberia, there were charges from Ghana that the Ivoirian government was sending Liberian mercenaries to kidnap pro-Gbagbo refugees residing in Ghana. Simone Gbagbo was convicted of crimes against the state by an Ivoirian court in March 2015 and a trial against her for charges of crimes against humanity began in Abidjan in May 2016. Her 2012 ICC indictment for war crimes remains open in the pre-trial stage. Proceedings continued against her husband in the Hague.
UNSCR 1980 (28 April 2011) relaxed the arms embargo on government forces (authorizing an exemption, if the UN sanctions committee approves). UNSCR 2045 (26 April 2012) renewed the individual sanctions against Gbagbo and his close supporters, continued the sanctions on diamond exports, and maintained the arms embargo, as relaxed in 2011. UNSCR 2101 (25 April 2013) maintained the existing sanctions regime for another year, but relaxed the notification scheme for non-lethal law enforcement equipment. UNSCR 2112 (30 July 2013) extended the mandate of the UNOCI (UN operations in the country) for an additional year. UNSCR 2153 (29 April 2014) further relaxed the arms embargo (exempting Ivoirian security forces), maintained the travel ban and asset freeze, but terminated the ban on the export of diamonds, noting Kimberley Process Certification Scheme implementation and progress in the governance of the sector. The sanctions were extended for another year (in UNSCR 2219 of 29 April 2015), as was the mandate of the Group of Experts. The UNOCI mandate was reduced on 20 January 2016 (UNSCR 2260) and extended for a final period until June 2017 on 28 April 2016 (UNSCR 2284).
Reports of the Group of Experts indicate that despite progress in DDR and SSR programs as part of the larger peacebuilding process, armed elements linked to the pro-Gbagbo radical wing remained "highly operational" and were involved in cross-border attacks along the Liberian border in February 2014 and January 2015. The final report of the Group of Experts of 17 March 2016 noted that Côte d'Ivoire had made significant process in democratization and stabilization following the post-electoral crisis of 2010-2011. The presidential elections of October 2015 were considered to be free and fair despite the partial boycott by FPI supporters and reduced turnout. The report also noted the partial success of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process, while noting the need to continue the process of security sector reform, to strengthen counter-terrorism efforts, and to protect the borders with Liberia and Guinea from illegal crossings of persons and natural resources. Finally, the report emphasized the positive impact of the sanctions regime in preventing the acquisition of major weapons systems. (S/2015/254).
On 28 April 2016 the UNSC terminated all sanctions measures (partial arms embargo, travel ban, and asset freeze) and dissolved the Sanctions Committee and its Group of Experts (UNSCR 2283).
Coerce Gbagbo supporters to accept electoral results, engage in political processes, and desist from using force to de-stabilize the government.
Constrain Gbagbo forces from using force to challenge the Outtara government.
Signal support for peaceful democratic change of power.
Ongoing arms imports embargo (with conditional security forces exemptions), travel ban, and individual / entity asset freeze.
Rough diamonds exports ban was terminated in April 2014.
Sanctions imposed for a limited time period (1 year) and periodically renewed. Sanctions Committee and Group of Experts in place. Designation criteria were specified and targets designated (maximum number of designees during the episode – 8 individual designees). Enforcement authorities specified, PKO had enforcement role.
Gbagbo supporters boycotted the parliamentary elections in 2011 but participated in the presidential election in October 2015. Turnout was low, and some Gbagbo (FPI) supporters boycotted the election. Some also resisted militarily during the episode (most recently in early 2015 along the Liberian border).
Sanctions were only partially implemented, and other measures (PKO, peacebuilding efforts and ICC referral) were more important in coercing change.
Over the course of the episode, military challenges from Gbago supporters decreased, suggesting Gbagbo supporters were constrained, but still able to engage in occasional activities involving the use of force.
The activities of PKO and peacebuilding efforts were more significant to the outcome.
Gbagbo was strongly stigmatized with the ICC referral, but this may have prompted potential spoilers to try to destabilize the regime early in the episode, and some armed resistance continued along the border.
ICC referral sent a more powerful signal than sanctions (which had been imposed in preceding episode).
Increase in criminality and corruption, harmful effects on neighboring states, increase in the role of the state in the economy, decline in the credibility/legitimacy of the UN Security Council.