DPRK - EP 8

Following the 29 November 2017 intercontinental ballistic missile launch by DPRK, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 2397 on 22 December 2017, expanding the existing sanctions regime to include an unprecedented number of targeted restrictive measures with a scope that approximates a comprehensive sanctions regime (even though it remains technically a targeted one).

The unanimously adopted resolution broadened the existing sanctions by specifying new individuals and entities subject to sanctions measures and tightening the caps on the imports of crude oil and refined petroleum products to DPRK. In order to further restrict DPRK sources of revenue, UNSCR 2397 imposed a mandatory repatriation requirement for all DPRK nationals working abroad and the DPRK government safety oversight attachés monitoring them (to be implemented within 2 years) and banned the export of food and agricultural products, earth and stone, wood, machinery, electrical equipment, and vessels from DPRK. In an effort to restrict the import of items and materials with the potential to be used for prohibited activities, the resolution also banned the import to DPRK of iron, steel, other metals, industrial machinery, transportation vehicles, and used vessels (the procurement of new vessels and helicopters was banned by UNSCR 2321). Specifying the Harmonized System (HS) commodity codes for each banned item to facilitate uniform implementation, as per the Panel of Expert report recommendation, the resolution significantly expanded the number of DPRK sectors affected by UN sanctions. The resolution also extended conditional sanctions measures against DPRK vessels to vessels suspected of sanctions violations and authorized states to seize, inspect, and impound any such vessel in their territorial waters. UNSCR 2397 further expanded the targeted sanctions list by 16 individuals and 1 entity and the Sanctions Committee added 4 vessels on 28 December 2017 (SC/13149). An additional individual, 21 entities, and 27 vessels were designated on 30 March 2018 (SC/13272) and 3 more vessels were listed in October 2018 (SC/13542), but further designations have been prevented by Security Council disagreements.

After an unprecedented expansion of international sanctions, DPRK nuclear and ballistic activity, as well as military tensions throughout 2016 and 2017, the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un declared the North Korean nuclear program complete and signaled his interest in improving inter-Korean relations during his 2018 New Year’s address (the communication channel with the Republic of Korea had been largely suspended since early 2016). US and South Korea subsequently agreed to postpone their joint military exercises until after the conclusion of the Winter Olympic Games in South Korea in mid-March 2018, and DPRK entered into an intense period of bilateral diplomatic activity with South Korea, leading to a de facto détente on the Korean peninsula. A high-level DPRK delegation participated in the opening and closing ceremonies of the Olympic Games, the two countries marched under a unified flag and fielded a joint ice hockey team, and several high-level meetings on a number of issues were held throughout the period, culminating in the joint Kim-Moon summit on 27 April 2018, during which the two leaders pledged a “new history” for the two countries. Two more inter-Korean summits followed and the countries opened a joint liaison office in September 2018, enabling regular communication for the first time since the Korean War. In early 2018, Kim Jong-un also conducted several visits to China and expressed an interest in holding a summit with US President Donald Trump. The DPRK diplomatic outreach initiatives took place in the context of stricter Chinese implementation of UN sanctions against North Korea and an ongoing broadening of US unilateral sanctions against the country.

On 21 April 2018, DPRK announced the suspension of all nuclear and long-range ballistic missile tests and closure of its only nuclear test site. A Chinese study, released shortly after the announcement, reported that the Punggye-ri test site had collapsed following the last DPRK nuclear test on 3 September 2017, effectively precluding further nuclear tests. The site was dismantled on 24 May 2018 in a series of controlled explosions.

A Kim-Trump summit, facilitated by South Korea, was held in Singapore on 12 June 2018, despite temporary setbacks caused by US National Security Advisor John Bolton’s remarks that DPRK denuclearization process could follow the “Libya model” (Qadhafi, who agreed to give up nuclear weapons in 2003 in exchange for sanctions relief and reintegration into the international community, was toppled by a national uprising and NATO intervention in 2011, see Libya I and Libya II respectively). Although the joint declaration lacked any concrete commitments by the two sides, it did contribute to the perceived normalization of relations with DPRK and the summit resulted in DPRK’s reaffirmation of its April 2018 willingness to work towards “complete denuclearization” of the Korean Peninsula and US suspension of large-scale joint military exercises with South Korea, thus effectively resembling a “suspension-for-suspension” process proposed by China since early 2017. In the summit’s aftermath, China and Russia called for the review of UN sanctions, and the Security Council became increasingly divided on the approach to be taken towards DPRK sanctions.

Despite the general decrease in tensions, spur of diplomatic activity, and some unilateral DPRK concessions, the 2018 Panel of Experts report concluded that DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs remained “intact” and that the country continued to “defy Security Council resolutions through a massive increase in illicit ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum products and coal,” which “render the latest United Nations sanctions ineffective.” The report also stressed the ongoing ineffectiveness of the UN financial sanctions measures, including due to the role of DPRK diplomats in sanctions evasion, increasing sophistication and scale of DPRK cyberattacks, and attempts to supply arms to Libya, Yemen, and Sudan by DPRK in violation of the UN arms exports embargo. Amidst the rising tensions within the Security Council, the US call for declaring that the cap on refined petroleum products had been reached was blocked by Russia and China.

Diplomatic efforts began to stall in 2019, following the failed February 2019 summit between Kim and Trump in Hanoi. In mid-2019, DPRK resumed short-range ballistic missile activity after more than a year of voluntary suspension. Kim and Trump held a brief meeting at the demilitarized zone on 30 June 2019, agreeing to continue their discussion on demilitarization. However, the working-level negotiations in Sweden broke down in October 2019 over disagreements on the steps to be taken by the two sides with regards to sanctions relief and denuclearization. On 16 December 2019, Russia and China presented a draft resolution calling for partial sanctions relief, citing concerns over the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions measures. Faced with opposition from the other three permanent Security Council members, the draft was shelved following two rounds of expert negotiations. Kim Jong-un, who gave the US until the end of 2019 to make concessions to move the stalled talks forward, announced during a ruling party conference in late December 2019 that the country was no longer bound by its unilateral moratorium on nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missiles tests and threatened to demonstrate a “new strategic weapon” in the near future.

With growing divisions within the Security Council, UN sanctions implementation became less effective. The 2019 Panel of Experts report stressed ongoing deficiencies in sanctions implementation as well as increased evasion capacity of the DPRK, especially with regards to maritime evasion and procurement of currency through cyberattacks and cryptocurrency mining. The report also highlighted the ongoing access of the country to international banking channels, continued violations of the luxury goods ban, limited information on the implementation of DPRK worker restrictions, and related repatriation (which was to become fully operational on 22 December 2019). It described a significant increase in the illicit export of coal by DPRK in 2019 (including through direct deliveries to China using self-propelled barges) and the illicit imports of refined petroleum products (which took place though direct deliveries by foreign-flagged vessels to DPRK ports, rather than illicit ship-to-ship transfers).

Within the Security Council, there were ongoing disagreements overwhether caps on petroleum imports had been exceeded. After their failure to secure sanctions relief for DPRK in December 2019, Russia and China signaled their dissatisfaction with the UN sanctions regime by both tolerating and openly engaging in sanctions violations (especially with regards to trade in prohibited commodities and the provision of visas for DPRK nationals), weakening the constraint and stigma experienced by North Korea. UN Panel of Experts reports noted a significant increase in the illicit export of coal by the DPRK in 2019, including exports to China, and the direct import of refined petroleum products to the country in excess of the caps established by UN sanctions. The 2020 mid-term Panel of Experts report noted that several member states believed DPRK “has probably developed miniaturized nuclear devices to fit into the warheads of its ballistic missiles.”

With the outbreak of the Covid-19 epidemic in China, DPRK resorted to the closure of its borders at the end of January 2020, which had a significant negative impact on both the economy and the humanitarian situation in the country. Amidst the increasingly dire humanitarian situation in the country, the Sanctions Committee accelerated the humanitarian exemptions process by shortening the decision-making period from 5 to 2 working days. The UN Secretariat also began exploring ways of using cash couriers and other means to fund the activities of UN agencies operating in the country unable to utilize normal banking channels due to the financial sanctions in place.

The divisions within the Security Council deepened further with the cumulative effects of the “maximum pressure strategy” by the US during the first Trump administration (and its de facto continuation under the Biden administration) and the failure of resolutions calling for sanction relief. These divisions resulted in the failure to agree on any new designations, despite increasing sanctions violations and multiple listing suggestions by the Panel of Experts. These trends have continued to the present. A total of 78 entries were amended between 2020 and 2025 (primarily for keeping identifying information up to date), but no new listings or delistings have been made since October 2018 and the UN sanctions measures have remained unchanged since UNSCR 2397 passed in December 2017. The dissatisfaction of Russia and China with the maintenance of extensive sanctions on the DPRK, repeated calls for additional sanctions on the DPRK by the US following DPRK missile launches, and US, UK, and French opposition to sanctions relief has resulted in Permanent Members of the Council openly engaging in UN sanction violations.

The broad UN sanctions on DPRK are not subject to periodic renewal, but elements of the resolutions authorizing them are, such as the mandates of the panels of experts. In April 2024, Russia attempted to transform the DPRK sanctions regime from an open-ended regime to a regime with periodic annual renewals. It agreed to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts for another year, provided that the full regime come up for review and renewal at the beginning of 2025. The US opposed the idea, Russia vetoed the renewal of the Panel of Experts, and the Panel concluded its activities at the end of April 2024. This development in the wake of disagreements over sanctions relief illustrates how the Security Council has thus been effectively deadlocked on the issue of how to adapt the sanctions on the DPRK since 2019.

North Korea’s sanctions circumvention capacity increased (using front companies and disguises of vessels), and its procurement of currency through cyberattacks and cryptocurrency mining contributed to decreased constraint on the country in spite of the continuation of the broad UN sanctions restrictions. Oil import caps have been exceeded every year since 2018. Despite the humanitarian situation, the DPRK continued its ballistic missile testing with 25 launches in 2019, 11 in 2020, 6 in 2021, 73 in 2022, and 33 in 2023, according to the Panel of Experts report of March 2024. Although the country has not conducted a nuclear test since 2017, the Panel reported in March 2024 that the DPRK continued to develop nuclear fissile material in Yongbyon and that construction was underway at its former testing site in Punggye-ri (which collapsed following the sixth, latest and largest, DPRK nuclear test on 3 September 2017). The final Panel of Experts report also documented that the DPRK continued to import refined petroleum above the cap set by the sanctions, imported luxury goods, exported conventional arms and munitions, and engaged in 58 suspected cyberattacks yielding an estimated USD 3 billion in revenues in 2023 (above its 2022 level of USD 1.7 billion). DPRK workers were also still operating outside the country and providing remittances to the government according to the report.

Following the Putin-Kim summit in Russia in September 2023, Russia significantly increased its violations of the DPRK arms exports embargo, importing arms and ammunition from the DPRK for its war effort against Ukraine. Following the termination of Panel of Experts activities in April 2024, the US and a coalition of like-minded states have subsequently created a new multilateral monitoring mechanism outside of the UN framework, the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) to monitor the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions regarding the DPRK. It was jointly announced by the US, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, and the UK on 16 October 2024.The first MSMT report, which was published on 29 May 2025, contends that there have been “flagrant” violations of core UN sanctions by Russia, including transfers of arms, training for DPRK forces in Russia, the supply of petroleum “far above” the oil cap, and the operation of correspondent banking relationships with DPRK (including designated DPRK financial institutions), all in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. The report claims that Russia provided DPRK with resources to fund its military programs and further develop its ballistic missile programs. The report also documents violations of UN travel bans for two senior military officials who traveled to Russia, as well as the use of Russian flagged ships and aircraft to transport arms exports. Finally, the report claims that more than 100,000 DPRK workers are still employed in 40 countries worldwide, with many working in construction and forestry in Russia.

During Vladimir Putin’s visit to Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang on 19 June 2024, the two leaders declared a “comprehensive strategic partnership” and reestablished a 1961 mutual defense agreement, paving the way for the provision of 11,000 troops from the DPRK for Russia’s war effort against Ukraine beginning in October 2024, with an additional 3,000 deployed in early 2025. South Korea’s defense minister Kim Yong-hyun reported in early November 2024 that there was a “high chance” the DPRK was seeking Russian defense technologies in exchange for its troop deployment, further weakening the impacts of the UN sanctions regime, and the MSMT report stated that Russia has been providing DPRK with air defense systems since then. DPRK’s Yongbyon nuclear facility was also operating throughout 2024. In March 2025, the DPRK’s Foreign Minister vowed to “steadily update and strengthen” the country’s nuclear capabilities, and in April 2025, the IAEA’s Director-General, Rafael Grossi, warned that the DPRK’s nuclear programs have grown “exponentially” in recent years.

Mandatory

Ongoing sanctions:

• Arms imports and exports embargo;
• Proliferation sensitive goods and technology imports and exports ban (specific items);
• Luxury goods imports ban;
• Asset freeze;
• Travel ban;
• Financial sector restrictions (ban on joint ventures and operation of DPRK banks abroad; ban on new foreign financial institutions activity in DPRK; closure of existing representative offices, subsidiaries, or banking accounts in DPRK; and prohibition of public and private financial support for trade with DPRK);
• Commodity imports bans (aviation fuel; condensates and natural gas liquids; refined petroleum products; crude oil);
• Commodity exports bans (coal, iron, iron ore; gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore, rare earth elements; copper, nickel, silver, zinc; statues; lead, lead ore; seafood; textiles);
• Diplomatic sanctions (limit use of DPRK territory abroad for other than diplomatic/consular activity; limit number of bank accounts for DPRK diplomatic/consular missions and staff; suspension of scientific and technical cooperation with DPRK representatives or sponsored groups/individuals);
• Transportation-related prohibitions (ban on leasing or chartering of vessels and aircraft and related provision of crew services to DPRK; use or servicing of DPRK registered or flagged vessels; import of new vessels and helicopters; procurement of vessels and aircraft services; insurance, reinsurance, and registration of DPRK vessels; and their mandatory de-registration; port entry ban; ship-to-ship transfers).

Adjustments to ongoing sanctions:

• General economic restriction on work authorizations for DPRK nationals working abroad expanded by a mandatory repatriation of DPRK workers and supervisors.

Newly imposed sanctions:

• Commodity exports bans (food and agricultural products; earth and stone; wood; machinery; electrical equipment; and vessels);
• Commodity imports bans (iron, steel, other metals; industrial machinery; transportation vehicles; and used vessels).

Conditional

Ongoing conditional restrictions:

• Bunkering ban;
• Expulsion/repatriation;
• Financial sector restrictions (financial services, asset and resource transfers);
• Vessels port entry ban;
• Aviation ban;
• Provision of specialized teaching and training to DPRK nationals;
• Asset freeze on DPRK government and party officials;
• Arms and proliferation sensitive good and technology ban;
• Transportation-related restrictions (vessels de-flagging, redirection, and inclusion in asset freeze);
• Travel ban.

Newly imposed conditional restrictions:

• Ban on insurance and re-insurance and registration and de-registration of vessels involved in sanctions violation.

Travel ban:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/exemptions-measures/travel-ban

Asset freeze:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/exemptions-measures/assets-freeze

Carve out provisions for humanitarian actors apply, as specified in UNSCR 2664 (2022).

Correspondent account approvals in effect:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/correspondent-account-approvals

Arms embargo:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/exemptions-measures/arms-embargo

Refined petroleum products:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/exemptions-measures/arms-embargo/refined-petroleum-products

Humanitarian exemption requests:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/exemptions-measures/humanitarian-exemption-requests

Current and maximum number of designees during the episode: 80 individuals, 75 entities, and 59 vessels.

Current list of sanctions designees:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/materials

Sanctions Committee in place, Panel of Experts in place until April 2024. Designation criteria were specified and targets designated, including vessels. Enforcement authorities specified.

Implementation assistance notices:

• General clarifications
• Preparation and submission of national implementation reports
• Luxury goods
• Paragraphs 8 and 27 of UNSCR 2270 (2016)
• The M/V Chong Chon Gang Incident
• Diplomatic missions in DPRK
• Humanitarian assistance exemptions
• General fact sheet

Panel of Experts reports:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/panel_experts/reports