DRC - EP 3

On 31 March 2008, following comfortable majorities for the Kabila government in two national elections, the UN Security Council lifted the arms embargo restrictions against the armed forces of the DRC, maintaining the prohibitions on all non-governmental entities and individuals operating in the territory of the DRC (UNSCR 1807). The resumption of violence and renewed military challenges to the DRC from the Nkunda faction (CNDP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the eastern DRC persuaded the UNSC of the need to maintain and strengthen individual sanctions against non-integrated parties and against regional actors from Rwanda and Uganda to cease hostilities against the DRC government in the eastern DRC.

A joint DRC/Rwanda offensive was launched against the Nkunda faction (CNDP) in January 2009 (ending in his arrest), followed by an offensive against the FDLR, a general amnesty offered to Congolese armed groups in the east in May 2009, and high profile arrests of FDLR leaders in Germany in November 2009. At the same time, peace processes linked to SSR and DDR were underway (the Goma and Nairobi processes), culminating in the 23 March 2009 agreements (which called for the amnesty offer to Congolese armed groups in May).

While UNSCR 1807 (31 March 2008) lifted the restrictive measures of the arms embargo against the DRC government, UNSCR 1857 (22 December 2008) extended restrictive measures to individuals supporting non-integrated parties through the exploitation of natural resources. UNSCR 1807 also aimed to strengthen UN sanctions implementation by requiring the governments in the region to ensure that no sanctions violations took place via their airports or airfields and DRC and states bordering Ituri and the Kivus to strengthen customs controls and ensure that no means of transportation were violating the arms imports embargo, notifying the Sanctions Committee and MONUC, respectively, of any such violations.

The relationship between the UN and DRC changed following the SG’s report of 30 March 2010, indicating that the DRC had made considerable progress over the preceding fifteen years and was moving into a period of domestic consolidation and peacebuilding (S/2010/164).At the insistence of the Congolese Government, MONUC was replaced by MONUSCO (the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) on 1 July 2010 in UNSCR 1925 (28 May 2010).

Throughout the course of the long episode, the DRC has faced military challenges from armed groups operating in eastern DRC, with varying degrees of foreign backing. These groups committed significant human rights abuses and used access to natural resources to support their activities. In early 2011, the LRA resumed hostilities (operating from territories outside the DRC and the scope of the UN sanctions at the time). They were later designated in the CAR regime. In April 2012, a mutiny within the DRC army led by Bosco Ntaganda, a former Congolese rebel on the ICC list for crimes against humanity, led to the emergence of the March 23 Movement (M23). The group claimed that the DRC had failed to live up to the terms of the 23 March 2009 agreement (between CNDP and the DRC integrating CNDP forces into the DRC army). The conflict escalated throughout the year, culminating in the November 2012 temporary occupation of Goma and strategic mineral-rich regions of eastern Congo. Successive Group of Expert (GoE) reports contended that the M23 fighters were backed by the government of Rwanda (and to a lesser extent, Uganda). Over 1,000 Rwandan troops crossed into the DRC during the Goma operation. In February 2013, an agreement facilitated by Mary Robinson, then serving as the UN Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region, was reached among 11 neighboring countries in a commitment to halt support for armed groups operating in the Congo. Yet, the relationship between Rwanda and the M23 in particular continued to be a challenge and, as a member of the Security Council in 2013 and 2014, Rwanda blocked additional listings of the M23 by the DRC Sanctions Committee.

Shortly after the agreement among neighboring countries was signed, the Security Council unanimously passed resolution 2098 (28 March 2013) which created a specialized “intervention brigade” to strengthen MONUSCO in its efforts to control the activities of rebel groups in the eastern DRC and support the reestablishment of state authority in rebel-controlled areas. This was the first time a peacekeeping operation had the explicit (and exceptional) authorization to engage in offensive military operations. An offensive from the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC or DRC army) forced the M23 to retreat, and at the end of 2013, the group declared an end to its military operations and agreed to demobilize.

Although MONUSCO and the DRC army controlled much of the territory and all the main roads in the eastern part of the country, other rebel groups emerged and many still remain active in the region. In January 2014, elements of the M23 began to regroup under a new banner and MONUSCO and the DRC army started to conduct offensive operations against other rebel groups, including the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR, a Hutu rebel group), the Allied Democratic Forces-National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF, an Islamist rebel group in North Kivu), the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), and the Patriotic Resistance Front of Ituri (FRPI, from the Ngiti ethnic group in Orientale Province). The Sanctions Committee added the ADF to the sanctions list on 30 June 2014 for violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law, including the recruitment of child soldiers, and attacks on MONUSCO peacekeepers.

The FDLR increasingly became the main focus of MONUSCO and DRC army in 2014, and the group was given an ultimatum to surrender by the end of the year. Although a small number (300) of FDLR combatants surrendered by January 2015, a Presidential statement of the Council indicated that renewed military action was needed to neutralize the group (S/PRST/2015/1).

Maintaining a productive working relationship between MONUSCO and the government became a challenge in 2015. MONUSCO refused to work with DRC army generals who were accused of major human rights violations, which is one reason why the army operated independently from MONUSCO in operations against the FDLR. Although the army operation against the FDLR in May 2016 disrupted channels of financing, led to the surrender of 1,000 FDLR fighters, and a temporary retreat from some positions, the FDLR’s military capacity remained intact, and there were questions about the effectiveness of the army operations.

MONUSCO and the DRC army signed a memorandum of understanding and resumed cooperation in February 2016, a development that appeared to affect the situation on the ground favorably. The FDLR remained the largest armed group operating in the eastern DRC, but the ADF showed signs of fracturing, and there was less activity from the LRA, as it moved its operations into South Sudan and the CAR. There was a noticeable increase in criminal activity associated with access to conflict finance from gold and rare metals, however. By the end of 2016, the FDLR was seriously weakened by military action and the ADF activity appeared to be limited to the Beni territory of North Kivu, across the border from Uganda.

The fragmentation of armed groups operating in the eastern provinces continued in 2017. While they remained a threat to civilian populations residing in the area, the GoE reported that non-state armed groups had become more decentralized and reliant on networks, particularly with foreign-based groups. By the end of 2017, while the FDLR continued to weaken, there were reports of new ADF recruitment from Uganda and new local armed groups began to emerge, some coalescing into larger groups. By 2018, one of these groups, the Nduma defense du Congo – Rénové (NDC-R) increased the amount of territory under its control and employed forms of taxation on the local population to support its activities.

Legal referrals to the International Criminal Court (ICC) by the government of the DRC have been important throughout the episode. In July 2012, Thomas Lubanga, founder and former leader of the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) and a key player in the Ituri conflict (1999-2007), became the first person convicted by the ICC. He was sentenced to 14 years in prison for using child soldiers in his rebel army in 2002 and 2003. The chief of operations of the military wing of the UPC, Bosco Ntaganda, went on trial before the ICC in August 2015, accused of war crimes including the rape of child soldiers by his own rebel army and was eventually found guilty in 2021. In June 2018, the ICC’s Appeals Chamber acquitted Jean-Pierre Bemba of his 2016 conviction for war crimes, which contributed to domestic political uncertainty following his return to DRC, but the DRC electoral commission thwarted his attempt to run in the 2018 presidential election.

Political uncertainty over President Kabila’s interest in staying in office for a third term after the 2016 conclusion of his second term led to protests from opposition groups that began in 2015 and continued until the election was finally held on 30 December 2018. Kabila’s choice to succeed him was defeated and one of the opposition candidates, Felix Tshisekedi, won with 38.6% of the vote. Although there were some charges of electoral irregularities, the results were accepted domestically and recognized by the AU and countries in the region. Following his election, President Tshisekedi embarked on an effort to strengthen relations with DRC’s eastern neighbors, addressing long-standing concerns about external intervention from Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. Tensions between Kinshasa and Kigali have proven particularly challenging; Rwanda continued to support incursions and rebel groups in DRC and efforts for improved high-level diplomatic relations delivered less progress than with other neighbors. The GoE reports of December 2023 and June 2024 documented the presence of Rwandan forces operating in DRC territory.

Despite concerns about the conduct of elections ahead of the vote in December 2023, the elections took place as scheduled. Election observers from the DRC’s Protestant and Catholic churches reported “numerous cases of irregularities,” but the Electoral Commission rejected two legal challenges to its provisional results and declared Tshisekedi the winner with 73% of the vote. He was inaugurated in January 2024.

Rebel groups, some of which have ties to neighboring countries, continue to destabilize the DRC. An October 2019 FARDC offensive against the ADF led to reprisals by the group against civilians, leading to further internal displacement and a backlash of protests directed against MONUSCO for its failure to protect civilians. FDLR attacks increased, and the NDC-R remained active. Since then, the GoE reported that additional conflict groups emerged, including the Rwanda-based CNRD (Conseil national pour la renouveau et la démocratie (CNDR), RNC (the armed branch of the Rwanda National Congress (RNC, also known as “P5”), the Mai-Mai Malaika, and the Cooperative for the Development of the Congo (CODECO). To improve civilian protection, curb armed groups and restore state authority, the DRC government imposed an emergency state of siege in North Kivu and Ituri in 2021. M23 subsequently made a significant comeback in 2022, with mass displacements and numerous documented atrocities against civilians. In September 2023, M23 went on the offensive, and large-scale fighting between government forces and M23 were reported in October. By November, M23 threatened key cities in North Kivu (near Goma), and by February 2024 surrounded a key town (Sake) just 25 km northwest of Goma.

In January 2025, the M23 seized Goma, triggering mass displacement and the collapse of basic services in the city. In February 2025, they expanded their military operations to include the capture of Bukavu on the southern edge of Lake Kivu, prompting the UN Security Council to demand an end to hostilities, withdrawal from Goma, Bukavu and all controlled areas, and full reversal of “the establishment of illegitimate parallel administrations in the DRC territory” (UNSCR 2773 of 21 February 2025)

The GoE attributed significant support to M23 from the Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF) in their July 2025 report. The fall of the city followed a prolonged siege, despite international support to the Congolese army and ongoing MONUSCO operations. MONUSCO evacuated non-essential staff despite thousands of civilians seeking refuge in its bases, while Congolese troops mostly retreated or surrendered. Humanitarian corridors, called for by the Security Council in UNSCR 2773, failed to materialise as Goma’s airport and border crossings remained closed, compounding the eastern DRC’s humanitarian and displacement crisis. Uganda unilaterally doubled its military presence in the DRC, deploying additional troops to North Kivu and Ituri Provinces without the prior approval of the DRC government.

In addition to the expanded activities of M23, ADF and CODECO also engaged in numerous attacks in recent years. They had inflicted significant civilian casualties in 2023, and two new UN Sanctions Committee designations were targeted against M23 and FDLR leaders in October 2023. Six additional designations were made in February 2024, including leaders of M23, FDLR, ADF, Mai Mai, and a new group linked to M23, Twirwaneho. The Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), a political-military coalition announced in late 2023, emerged as a central actor in the conflict, with the M23 as its military backbone and Corneille Nangaa as its political front. The AFC quickly expanded its territorial control in North Kivu and established parallel administrations. It also issued ultimatums to FARDC forces, including a 48-hour deadline to surrender Goma in January 2025. The United States and EU sanctioned AFC leaders in July 2024.

While discussions about the progressive transition of MONUSCO, with benchmarks for its withdrawal, had been underway for several years, the UN’s peacekeeping presence came under popular and government critique in 2023. Following unrest and government-inflicted civilian casualties surrounding anti-MONUSCO protests in August 2023 in Goma, the DRC government requested accelerating the mission’s withdrawal as foreseen in the 2021 Joint Transition Plan by one year to December 2023. The UN Secretary-General proposed options for a reconfigured UN presence after MONUSCO’s drawdown in his August 2023 report (S/2023/574). Due to the increased levels of violence in the eastern DRC, the UN and the DRC government agreed in July 2024 to slow the withdrawal of MONUSCO from North Kivu and Ituri Provinces. Resolution 2765 (20 December 2024) renewed MONUSCO’s mandate until December 2025.

The DRC joined the East African Community (EAC) in 2022 and regional and cross-border cooperation in peacekeeping approaches gained traction, for example between the DRC army and the Burundi National Defense Force and with the Republic of Congo. The accelerated drawdown of MONUSCO put additional strain on the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) in Eastern DRC. President Tshisekedi criticized a “lack of effectiveness of the regional force” and the renewal of its deployment authorization in Kinshasa was uncertain. Following the DRC government’s decision to withdraw host state consent to the EAC regional force in late 2023, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) became the primary regional military partner on the ground. Deployed since December 2023, SAMIDRC has operated alongside FARDC and MONUSCO, with its mandate extended in November 2024 following an extraordinary SADC summit. MONUSCO was authorised to provide logistical and operational support to SAMIDRC under Resolution 2746 (6 August 2024).

After Angola initiated diplomatic negotiations between the DRC and Rwanda in March 2024, a ceasefire agreement was reached between “parties to the conflict in the east” in July 2024 (signed by the Foreign Ministers of DRC and Rwanda), but the M23 (backed by Rwanda) was not a direct signatory of the agreement, and the agreement collapsed amidst M23’s resumed offensives. Subsequent talks focused on neutralizing the FDLR and sequencing Rwanda’s disengagement, but disagreements over M23’s role stalled progress. In early 2025, the United States and Qatar brokered a bilateral peace agreement between Kigali and Kinshasa, without the formal participation of M23. The agreement was signed in June 2025, committing both sides to withdraw support from armed proxies and establishing monitoring arrangements involving Angola and the UN. To date, implementation on both sides remains uncertain.A separate negotiation between Kinshasa and M23 is being brokered by Qatar.

The Sanctions Committee placed renewed emphasis on the challenges associated with the “illegal exploitation and trade of natural resources” in 2019, and on the effect of the conflict on supply chains in 2023. GoE reports indicate that although problems persist with illegal gold and mineral exports (most notably of tin, tungsten and tantalum), there has been some progress in traceability and due diligence concerning minerals following the enhanced enforcement measures first recommended in 2015. The DRC achieved EITI (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative) certification in 2014, but gold and metals smuggling to support armed groups continued to firms in Rwanda and Uganda, at times with the complicity of corrupt FARDC commanders. Primera Gold DRC, a partnership between the United Arab Emirates and the DRC aimed at combating gold smuggling launched in January 2023, boosted official gold exports, according to the mid-term GoE report in December 2023, but problems with due diligence about sourcing and gold smuggling continues.

Humanitarian access and easier arms shipments to the DRC government have been incrementally prioritized in renewals of the sanctions regime. UNSCR 2582 (29 June 2021) expanded sanctions designation criteria to include the planning, directing, sponsoring or participating in attacks against medical or humanitarian personnel. On arms imports, the 2022 GoE report noted regular violations of the notification requirement of weapons supplies to the DRC government and the deliberate concealing of military goods as “agricultural goods.” In June 2022, the arms imports embargo notification requirements were modified to no longer include non-military equipment intended for humanitarian and protective use, as well as arms shipments to the DRC government, with some exceptions (UNSCR 2641). In December 2022, the Security Council in UNSCR 2667 completely terminated notification requirements. Violations of the arms embargo were common, in particular concerning the M23 group, according to the June 2023 GoE report, but also from the FARDC to the local armed groups it supports in the east (the Wazalendo coalition), described as “proxies” of the FADRC in the December 2023 GoE report.

The Security Council in UNSCR 2783 (30 June 2025) reiterated that the DRC Government is exempt from the embargo on the supply of military equipment and assistance, as indicated in SC/15689 agreed on 2 May 2024, and from any notification procedure. It also renewed the sanctions measures until 1 July 2026 and extended the mandate of the GoE to 1 August 2026.

Mandatory

Ongoing travel ban and asset freeze.

Arms imports embargo on the entire country was modified to non-governmental entities at the start of the episode, exempting government forces.

Travel ban:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1533/exemptions/travel-ban

Travel ban exemptions in effect:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1533/exemptions/arms-embargo/travel-ban-exemptions-effect

Asset freeze:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1533/exemptions/assets-freeze

Carve out provisions for humanitarian actors apply, as specified in UNSCR 2664 (2022).

Arms embargo:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1533/exemptions/arms-embargo

Current and maximum number of designees during the episode: 44 individuals and 9 entities (5 firms, 3 rebel groups, and 1 NGO).

Current list of sanctions designees:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1533/materials

Sanctions were imposed for a limited time period (between 1 year and 17 months) and renewed periodically. Sanctions Committee and Group of Experts in place. Designation criteria were specified and targets designated. Enforcement authorities specified, peacekeeping operation (MONUC) has enforcement role.

Due diligence guidelines:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1533/due-diligence-guidelines

Group of Experts reports:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1533/panel-of-experts/expert-reports