Guinea-Bissau - EP 1

In accordance with the Constitution, following the death of President Malam Bacai Sanhá, an interim government and electoral process were established within 90 days. On 12 April 2012 (a day before the second round of the Presidential election), the army arrested the interim President and the Prime Minister (both of whom were Presidential candidates) and occupied the offices of the incumbent party. The New York Times called this a “cocaine coup,” referring to the close ties between the Bissau-Guinean army and the drug cartels dominating the country’s economy. On 18 May 2012, the UN Security Council in UNSCR 2048 imposed sanctions in the form of a travel ban on five members of the "Military Command," who took responsibility for the coup. Six additional military officers associated with the "Military Command" were listed on 18 June 2012 (SC/10721).

In January 2013, José Ramos-Horta was appointed Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) for Guinea-Bissau and played a pivotal role in the transition process and in strengthening UN peacebuilding activities in the country. In May 2013, the Security Council extended and expanded the mandate of UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea Bissau (UNIOGBIS). The Secretary-General had recommended the imposition of further sanctions and the establishment of a Panel of Experts targeting drug traffickers and organized crime, but the Council did not take the idea forward.

A transitional government was established and elections were planned for November 2013, but were delayed several times until they took place successfully in April 2014, with a presidential run-off in May 2014. Ramos-Horta completed his tenure as SRSG following the elections in June 2014, and Miguel Trovoada took over the role in July 2014. With the election, Guinea-Bissau normalized its relationships with the African Union and aid from the European Union was resumed. In the months that followed, with ECOWAS presence on the ground remaining in place (ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau, ECOMIB), the situation in Guinea-Bissau progressed overall and peacebuilding activities were carried out under the auspices of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the SRSG.

While the military did not interfere in the 2014 elections, a power struggle emerged between the elected President José Mario Vaz and Prime Minister Domingos Simões Pereira, who disagreed about the power distribution in the Bissau-Guinean semi-presidential constitutional system. On 13 August 2015, President Vaz dissolved the government of Prime Minister Simões Pereira, intensifying the rift between himself and the ruling PAIGC party, which was a source of political instability in the years that followed. The immediate reappointment of Simões Pereira as Prime Minister by his party was rejected by Vaz, who then unilaterally appointed Baciro Djá to the position of Prime Minister – a decision later cancelled by the Supreme Court. On 17 September 2015, following intense diplomatic activity from ECOWAS and states in the region, Carlos Correia was appointed and sworn into office as Prime Minister. Correia successfully formed a government, but Vaz dismissed it in May 2016 – the fourth cabinet to be dissolved since the elections in May 2014.

This situation weakened state institutions, caused a delay in the implementation of reforms agreed upon since the 2014 presidential elections, and significantly harmed the provision of public services. Due to the political situation, international donors were reluctant to honor pledges made at a March 2015 roundtable, a significant fact given that 80% of the country’s regular budget depended on external financial support. In 2016, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the European Union and the International Monetary Fund suspended financial support to the country to encourage progress in political negotiations.

In spite of the profound political instability (which reduced the momentum for military demobilization), the security situation remained stable largely due to the presence of ECOMIB in the country. While the army stopped intervening in the country’s politics, questions began to reemerge about how long the situation would last, given the endemic political instability and purported links between some of the sanctioned individuals and the trade in cocaine.

In September 2016, ECOWAS negotiated an agreement to end the political crisis. The Conakry Agreement focused on the appointment of a consensual Prime Minister and government, and the promotion of an inclusive national dialogue towards constitutional reform. In November 2016, Prime Minister Djá (who had been unable to pass a program of work and national budget) was dismissed and Umaro Sissoco Embaló was appointed Prime Minister instead. Mr Embaló, however, had not been a consensual candidate – a key condition established in the Conakry Agreement – leading to numerous protests and the continuation of the political crisis.

The violation of the Conakry Agreement provoked a strong reaction from ECOWAS. Following a new round of talks in April 2017, ECOWAS threatened sanctions on those who would impede progress of the Conakry Agreement, and reiterated plans to withdraw ECOMIB, a move deplored by national civil and political leaders who feared the consequences for the country’s political situation. The Security Council issued a Presidential statement on 13 September 2017, communicating the Council’s readiness, following ECOWAS, to consider additional measures in support of the political process (S/PRST/2017/17).

In February 2018, ECOWAS imposed targeted sanctions on 19 individuals close to President Vaz, including political associates and his son. The ECOWAS sanctions triggered a new round of mediation in which President Vaz agreed to appoint Aristides Gomes as Prime Minister and set 18 November 2018 as the date for new legislative elections. ECOMIB’s mandate was renewed for an additional 3 months to support the process. The legislative elections were ultimately held on 10 March 2019, but President Vaz refused to appoint the cabinet selected by Gomes, who remained Prime Minister with the support of ECOWAS.

A Presidential election was finally held on 24 November 2019, but the political situation remained unstable. President Vaz received only 12% of the vote and Sissoco Embaló (a former Prime Minister) was announced the winner, following a runoff with Simões Pereira. This result was disputed and, as the votes were being recounted, both the UN and the National Assembly refrained from recognizing Embaló's victory. The standoff resulted in the National Assembly attempting to install an interim president, while Sissoco Embaló was sworn in at his own initiative at a hotel in Bissau on 27 February 2020, bypassing the Supreme Court as well as the National Assembly. The event was attended by his political allies, former President Vaz, and senior members of the military (including retired general Antonio Indjai, an individual sanctioned by the UN). The military also surrounded key government buildings (including the Supreme Court of Justice) in support of Embaló.

In the following months, Embaló succeeded in consolidating his power as President and obtained recognition from ECOWAS and the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), which were supported by other international partners such as the EU and UN. Domestically, however, the political situation continued to be unstable, as the divergence between the opposition-dominated National Assembly and the Presidency remained, and the country was heavily affected by both the COVID-19 pandemic and an increase in violence following the government transition.

In July 2020, the Security Council expressed its concern over the “ongoing political and institutional crisis,” urged all Bissau-Guineans to respect the ECOWAS road map, and called on Guinea-Bissau’s defence and security forces not to interfere in the political process in Guinea-Bissau (SC/14240). In August 2020, SRSG Rosine Sovi-Coulibaly warned that the mandate of the UN Political Mission in Guinea-Bissau would likely not be achieved before the conclusion of the mission on 31 December 2020 (as per UNSCR 2512 of 28 February 2020). The UNODC also reported a resurgence of the cocaine trade passing through the country.

In his August 2020 report, the Secretary-General lamented the fact that political tensions were continuing and noted that while the defense and security forces had remained largely apolitical during the 2014 and 2019 elections, “the involvement of the military in the post-presidential election period represents a major setback in their professionalization efforts of recent years.” As a result, he recommended the continuation of the individual sanctions and the possible formation of a Panel of Experts to monitor the situation, echoing his recommendation from 2013. More than a decade after the imposition of UN sanctions, no UN sanctions monitoring mechanism is in place.

In September 2020, the Supreme Court formally confirmed Emboló’s 2019 election victory, but the house arrest of former Prime Minister Aristides Gomes in October 2020 and the international arrest warrant issued against the leader of the opposition and runner-up in the 2019 Presidential election, Domingos Simões Pereira, in December 2020 (that led to some communal violence) indicated continuing political instability. The government suppressed dissent from human rights activists in 2021. In February 2022, a failed coup involving at least two of the 11 individuals originally sanctioned by the UN was triggered by the government’s fight against drug trafficking. The new ECOWAS stabilization mission that arrived in April 2022 was described by the head of the opposition PAIGC party as an “invasion,” and President Emboló dissolved the Parliament in May 2022.

Following yet another failed coup in December 2023, President Emboló again dissolved the Parliament. Both Parliamentary and Presidential elections were scheduled to take place in November of 2024, but on 4 November 2024, the President announced their indefinite suspension. In February 2025, President Emboló announced that both Parliamentary and Presidential elections would be held on 30 November 2025. Concerns remain about potential military interference in the elections, including by sanctioned individuals. President Emboló sacked his Prime Minister in early August 2025, allegedly to consolidate power in advance of his bid for a second five-year term later in the year.

UN sanctions have remained in place to constrain potential spoilers of the political process and the Conakry Agreement, especially within the military. They appear to have worked at least until 2020, when elements of the military and security forces began to interfere again with political processes. Although political instability has continued and efforts to stabilize and restore the constitutional order have faltered, the Security Council has taken no subsequent action in terms of Presidential statements, substantive press statements, adjustment to the sanctions, the creation of a Panel of Experts, or other actions with regard to the situation in the country.

Mandatory

Travel ban against individuals preventing the restoration of the constitutional order, undermining stability and rule of law, curtailing the primacy of civilian power, and furthering impunity and instability in Guinea-Bissau, as well as those acting on their behalf or otherwise supporting such individuals.

Travel ban:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2048/exemptions-measures/travel-ban

Maximum number of designees during the episode: 11 individuals, currently remaining on 10 individuals (a deceased individual was delisted in 2017).

Current list of sanctions designees:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2048/sanctions-list-materials