In response to extremely high levels of gang violence, other criminal activities, kidnappings, trafficking in persons, homicides, and sexual and gender-based violence, as well as the blocking of access to and illegal occupation of ports and fuel terminals by armed gangs operating in Haiti, the Security Council unanimously adopted UNSCR 2653 on 21 October 2022. The resolution authorized, for an initial period of one year, the imposition of a travel ban, asset freeze, and a targeted arms imports embargo on those who engage in or support criminal activities and violence involving armed groups and criminal networks that promote violence, support illicit trafficking, finance those activities, violate the arms embargo or human rights, engage in sexual or gender-based violence, obstruct delivery of humanitarian assistance, or attack UN personnel. One of Haiti’s most influential gang leaders, Jimmy Cherizier, was listed in the annex of the resolution for his role in conducting attacks against civilians and actions that directly contributed to the economic paralysis and humanitarian crisis in Haiti, including the occupation of the Varreux Terminal in Port-au-Prince. The resolution also specifically identified key benchmarks for sanctions review, including adequate judicial and rule of law capacity to handle armed groups and criminal-related activities, progressive reduction in violence and incidents of illicit trafficking and diversion of arms within one year, as well as progress on violence reduction, security and the rule of law, and human rights benchmarks identified in S/2022/481. It also called on Member States to inspect all cargo to Haiti if they have reasonable grounds to suspect arms imports embargo violation.
This was the first time the UN Security Council declared the activities of criminal networks a threat to international peace and security. The resolution was also notable because of its sweeping humanitarian carve-out and expression of intent “to consider authorizing the Ombudsperson to receive delisting requests,” potentially extending the Ombudsperson's mandate to sanctions regimes other than the Al-Qaida/ISIL/Associates regime.
In November 2022, Haitian police regained control of the Varreux Terminal, which had been held by the G9 alliance of gangs that was led by the designated gang leader, but new roadblocks were set up by armed gangs elsewhere in the country that continued to disrupt delivery of humanitarian assistance. In a December 2022 briefing, the health situation in Haiti was described as “dire,” as reports of up 14,000 cases of cholera emerged. These estimates increased to 24,000 the following month. The Haitian government appealed for an international specialized force to reinforce its police, but no Member States stepped forward to offer assistance.
An interim agreement for a political transition, the National Consensus for an Inclusive Transition and Transparent Elections, was reached between Prime Minister Henry and some members of the Montana Group on 21 December 2022, but by April 2023, there were signs that the consensus was fraying (due to criticisms from other members of the Montana Group). The agreement envisaged constitutional revisions, as well as the organization of elections in 2023 (as all previous political mandates expired), followed by the formation of a new Government in February 2024. According to the 2023 Panel of Experts report, its implementation remained slow, but two milestones were achieved and efforts were made by CARICOM in May 2023 to broaden political support for the agreement. Skepticism remained about the ability to hold elections given the deteriorating security situation in the country.
The Security Council expressed its concern over illicit flows of arms and the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in Haiti on 8 May 2023, condemning the increasing violence, criminal activities, and human rights abuses and violations that undermine the peace, stability, and security of Haiti and the region, and calling for progress on restoring the country’s democratic institutions (SC/15277). The July 2023 Secretary-General report stated that gang activity continued and that the levels of insecurity and violence were approaching levels associated with countries in armed conflicts. Vigilante groups formed to counter gang violence, most prominently the “Bwa Kale” movement in April 2023, and the level of homicides perpetrated by both gangs and vigilante groups increased across the country.
The Haitian government repeated its appeal for an international force in June 2023, but given Haiti’s difficult experience with UN peacekeeping operations in the past, disagreements over the nature and mandate of such a force emerged both within the Security Council (from China and Russia) and from within Haiti itself (from some civil society organizations). The political mission (BINUH) was renewed for another year on 14 July 2023, with the unanimous adoption of UNSCR 2692 (not adopted under Chapter VII), in which the Security Council also urged Member States to prevent the sale, supply, or transfer of small arms, light weapons, and ammunition to non-state actors engaged in or supporting gang violence, criminal activities or human rights abuses in Haiti, and prevent their illicit trafficking and diversion. In August 2023, Kenya offered to provide forces and a number of Caribbean countries announced their intention to consider their participation. A Kenyan reconnaissance mission arrived in Port-au-Prince to follow up on the offer. The sole designee of sanctions, Jimmy Cherizier (AKA “Barbeque”), condemned the idea and threatened to fight any foreign forces deployed in the country.
Human Rights Watch reported in late August 2023 that 150 criminal gangs were operating in Port-au-Prince and that 80% of the capital was under gang control. The latter percentage was confirmed by the Haiti Panel of Experts, which identified 23 primary gangs operating in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, clustered into two main coalitions – G9 Family and Allies, led by “Barbeque”, and the G-Pèp, led by Gabriel Jean-Pierre (AKA “Ti Gabriel”).
The 15 September 2023 assessment by the Secretary-General found no progress on any of the key sanctions benchmarks (S/2023/677). The report noted significant increase in serious crimes and gang-related violence, which expanded beyond the capital and increased in both intensity and brutality, as well as declining number of police officers (officially around 14,000) and low police-to-population ratio (1.2 police office officers per 1,000 inhabitants). In terms of members and equipment, the report stated that “armed gangs outnumber and outgun the police,” while the illicit trafficking of weapons and ammunition “continued unabated,” sourced primarily from the US. Overall, the report concluded that the multifaceted crisis in Haiti “further deepened since the establishment of the Haiti sanctions regime.”
The first Panel of Experts report, which was published on the same day, highlighted the deteriorating situation in the country and the unprecedented “levels of violence and depth of cruelty that the gangs go to in violating human rights.” It further specified that the sole designee of UN sanctions, Jimmy Cherizier (AKA “Barbeque”), “continued to lead the G9 alliance into major bloody offensives against neighborhoods under the control of rival gangs.” It also pointed to the increasingly influential role of Johnson André (AKA “Izo”), the leader of 5 Segond, in the G-Pèp alliance of gangs and its allies, which represented the other main coalition of gangs in Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, as well as number of other gang leaders. Overall, the Panel concluded that the targeted arms embargo remained “ineffectual”, with trafficking even in small amounts being lucrative, and recommended the expansion of its scope to all non-state actors in Haiti, as the trafficking of arms and ammunition constituted the “primary driver for the expansion of gang control and the extreme levels of armed violence in the country.” The security crisis in Haiti was also found to have a negative influence on the region, increasing migration, violence, insecurity, and arms and drug trafficking.
Coerce armed groups and criminal networks to cease violence, criminal activities, and human rights abuses in the country.
Constrain armed groups and criminal networks from having access to financial resources and arms and related materiel of all types.
Signal support for meaningful negotiations to overcome the political stalemate in the country and to hold free and fair legislative and presidential elections when the security situation permits.
Travel ban against individuals, asset freeze against individuals or entities engaging in violence, criminal activities, and human rights abuses, and a targeted arms imports embargo on designated individuals / entities.
Voluntary arms imports embargo on small arms, light weapons, and ammunition (not adopted under Chapter VII) since July 2023.
Maximum number of designees during the episode: 1 individual designee (leader of an alliance of Haitian gangs, G9 Family and Allies).
Current list of sanctions designees:
UN sanctions should have little impact on the general population since they are focused exclusively on specific individuals and entities.
Sanctions were imposed for a limited time period (1 year) to be renewed periodically. Sanctions Committee and Panel of Experts created. Designation criteria were specified and targets designated. Enforcement authorities not specified.
Panel of Experts reports:
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/testing/work-and-mandate-0/reports
G9 gang blockade of the Varreux Terminal led by the designated individual was terminated, but armed gang activity (including of the G9 gang coalition) was redeployed to other locations, and levels of violence increased. The security and humanitarian situations in the country remained dire, with armed gangs controlling more than 80% of Port-au-Prince and criminal groups reported also in other areas of Haiti.
Only one sanctions designation was made, and he remained defiant, threatening to fight any foreign forces to address the situation; police intervention was more important in retaking the fuel terminal than sanctions. The Panel of Experts reported some impact of international sanctions on the change of behavior of political and economic actors, but not on the levels of violence in the country.
The increase in violence and criminal activity overwhelmed the already weak national institutions. No discernible constraints were observed on the gangs, which were getting “stronger, richer, better armed and more autonomous” according to the Panel of Experts, diversifying their revenue (including through kidnapping for ransom) and becoming more independent of their historical links with political and economic actors. In Secretary-General’s assessment, no progress was achieved against any of the sanctions benchmarks during the episode.
Single designation indicates a focus on gang leadership, but only at the highest level and covering only some of the country’s many gangs (the other main coalition of gangs was not targeted). Inter-gang conflict, police activities, “Bwa Kale” vigilante movement, and local initiatives to facilitate rapprochement between gangs (although short-lived and limited), were more important in constraining armed groups and criminal networks.
An interim transitional political agreement was reached between major political factions in December 2022 and some elements were implemented, but there was evidence of fraying support by April 2023 and the holding of elections remained unlikely given the deteriorating security situation in the country. The designation of only one armed group leader, and the voluntary-only arms imports embargo on small arms, light weapons and ammunition, diminished the signal sent by UN sanctions.
The adoption of sanctions by the UN Security Council played a role in encouraging political actors to overcome the political stalemate, but other factors, such as internal political dynamics and CARICOM diplomacy were also important in facilitating the political agreement.
No unintended consequences of sanctions observed.
[not adopted under Chapter VII]