Summary
On 2 October 2023, UNSCR 2699 replaced the targeted arms imports embargo on designated individuals and entities with a territorial arms imports embargo to Haiti limited to small arms, light weapons, and ammunition. Arms to be used by the UN, the MSS mission, units under the command of the Government of Haiti, or others to further the objectives of peace and stability in Haiti were exempted from the arms embargo subject to prior Committee approval. The expanded arms embargo, whose imposition was recommended by the Panel of Experts due to violence fueled by continued illicit smuggling of arms into Haiti, was adopted for a limited time period (1 year). The resolution also authorized the deployment of a Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission to support the overwhelmed Haitian National Police, which had proved inadequate to deal with the deteriorating situation caused by armed gangs, criminal networks, and self-protection and vigilante movements in Haiti, especially around the capital, Port-au-Prince, and authorized it to “take all necessary measures” to carry out its mandate.
UNSCR 2700, which was adopted on 19 October 2023, extended for a year the travel ban, asset freeze, and arms imports embargo to Haiti and outlined key benchmarks for reviewing arms embargo measures. To help enhance the implementation of the arms embargo, the resolution also called for the inspection of cargo suspected of breaching the arms embargo and encouraged Member States to ensure adequate marking and recordkeeping to trace arms and the Government of Haiti to reinforce the weapons ammunition management of the Haitian National Police. In response to the regional effects of the deteriorating security situation in Haiti, the resolution also called on Member States to protect Haitian refugees and migrants in their territories.
On 8 December 2023, the Haiti Sanctions Committee added the leaders of four other gangs (5 Segond, Grand Ravine, 400 Mawozo, and Kraze Barye) to the list of designees for travel ban and asset freeze, bringing the total number of listed individuals to five. Information about the destabilizing activity of all four new designees was included in the Panel of Expert’s September 2023 report.
Early 2024 was marked by further deteriorating situation in Haiti, with gang violence reaching “unprecedented levels and geographic spread” according to the Panel of Experts and January 2024 representing “the most violent month in two years.” Internally, the G9 coalition of gangs led by the sanctioned Jimmy Cherizier (AKA “Barbeque”) and the Kraze Barye gang led by sanctioned Vitelhomme Innocent fractured, while the G-Pèp coalition continued to expand its influence. This expansion included the Grand Ravine and 5 Segond gangs, as well as the 400 Mawozo gang, whose leaders were sanctioned in December 2023. According to the Panel of Experts, all sanctioned gang leaders continued to “engage in intense armed violence in spite of their designation” and gangs and other non-state armed groups continued to “procure arms and ammunition illicitly.” In late February 2024, Cherizier claimed responsibility for the coordinated attacks on the airport, government institutions, and police stations, which were followed by a jail break of around 4,000 inmates from Haiti’s overcrowded prisons, to put pressure on Prime Minister Henry to resign. Amid the decreasing number of police officers and increasing territorial operation of gangs in Haiti, the Panel noted in March 2024 that the deployment of the MSS Mission became “critical and urgent.” The Security Council expressed its concern about the security and humanitarian situation in Haiti and its hope for the speedy deployment of the MSS Mission on 11 March 2024 (SC/15620).
To address the political situation in Haiti, CARICOM’s Eminent Persons Group on Haiti proposed a draft framework agreement for a new 18-month electoral transition period in November 2023. The December 2023 talks between the Government and the opposition (including the Montana Group) yielded limited progress and the stalled political transition sparked popular protests ahead of the 7 February 2024 deadline for a newly elected government to take office set by the 2022 “21 December Accord”. Some of the protests were led by Guy Philippe, who led the 2004 coup against President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and was repatriated to Haiti from the US in November 2023.
A breakthrough in the political discussions was announced on 11 March 2024, following the surge in attacks claimed by Cherizier, when a CARICOM-mediated agreement was reached among different Haitian political actors on the formation of a Transitional Presidential Council (TPC), appointment of a new Prime Minister, and organization of the delayed elections. Ariel Henry announced his intent to resign the following day, effective upon the appointment of his successor by the TPC. Concerned about “the illicit flow of arms and ammunition into Haiti that remains a fundamental factor of instability and violence,” the Security Council expressed support for “a Haitian-led, Haitian-owned political process” on 21 March 2024 (SC/15636). The 9-member TPC was formally installed on 25 April 2024, following the formal resignation of Prime Minister Henry. With a vote of 6-to-1, the TPC nominated Garry Conille as Prime Minister on 27 May 2024, taking over from the interim Prime Minister Michel Patrick Boisvert. Conille became the acting Prime Minister of Haiti on 3 June 2024. New government ministers were appointed on 12 June 2024. The 22-month transitional period is set to terminate with the swearing-in of a new President in February 2026, following a democratic election.
Despite being authorized in UNSCR 2699 (2 October 2023), the first contingent of the MSS mission only arrived in Haiti on 25 June 2024. The deployment of the mission by Kenya was delayed due to domestic opposition within Kenya, hold up in the release of funds by the US (the largest donor to the MSS), and the political changes in Haiti. Besides Kenya, a number of other African and Caribbean countries have formally notified the UN Secretary-General of their intention to contribute personnel to the MSS.
Overall, the humanitarian and security situation in Haiti remains dire, despite decrease in gang violence from the levels reported in early 2024.
Purposes
Coerce
Coerce armed groups and criminal networks to cease violence, criminal activities, and human rights abuses in the country.
Constrain
Constrain armed groups and criminal networks from having access to financial resources and arms and related materiel of all types.
Signal
Signal support for meaningful negotiations to overcome the political stalemate in the country and to hold free and fair legislative and presidential elections when the security situation permits.
Sanctions type
Ongoing travel ban against individuals and asset freeze against individuals or entities engaging in violence, criminal activities, and human rights abuses.
Existing targeted arms imports embargo on designated individuals / entities replaced with a territorial arms imports embargo to Haiti on small arms, light weapons, and ammunition (with conditional Government exemptions) at the start of the episode.
Designation criteria
Maximum number of designees during the episode: 5 individual designees (leaders of five different Haitian gangs – G9 Family and Allies coalition and 5 Segond, Grand Ravine, 400 Mawazo, and Kraze Barye gangs).
Potential scope
Potential scope of impact
UN sanctions should have little impact on the general population since they are focused exclusively on specific individuals and entities.
Implementation
Sanctions were imposed for a limited time period (1 year) to be renewed periodically. Sanctions Committee and Panel of Experts in place. Designation criteria were specified and targets designated. Enforcement authorities not specified.
Effectiveness
Coercion
Policy outcome
Sanctioned gang leaders continued to engage in violence and interfered in the political process, with G9-leader Cherizier encouraging anti-government protests and orchestrating coordinated attacks to force Henry’s resignation. Although the level of violence decreased following the resignation of Prime Minister Henry and two of the five targeted gangs experienced fragmentation, the first two months of 2024 were the most violent since the start of the sanctions regime.
Sanctions contribution
There was no discernible effect of sanctions and the behavior of gangs, as well as the sanctioned gang leaders, did not change.
Constraint
Policy outcome
Haitian gangs remained unconstrained in their access to arms, despite the broadening of the arms imports embargo to the territory of Haiti. According to the Panel of Experts, gangs intensified their extortion activities and maintained diverse sources of revenue.
Sanctions contribution
In addition to the largely ineffective arms embargo, weak Haitian security institutions, delay in the deployment of the MSS mission, and interdependency between gangs, economic actors, and politicians in Haiti were the main reasons for the limited constraint.
Signaling
Policy outcome
The expansion of the arms embargo at the start of the episode and the sanctioning of four additional gang members in December 2023, which according to the March 2024 Panel of Experts report enjoyed broad support among the Haitian population, sent a strong signal regarding the unacceptability of criminal activities and human rights abuses in the country and the importance of pursuing a political solution to the situation. This signal was weakened by the reported lack of awareness about the expanded arms imports prohibition by Haitian police and customs authorities.
Sanctions contribution
UN sanctions were an important source of the signal, but unilateral sanctions, internal political dynamics, and CARICOM diplomacy were more important in facilitating the political agreement reached in March 2024.
Overall
Unintended consequences
No unintended consequences of sanctions observed.
UN sanctions resolutions guide
Substantive
- Replaces UNSCR 2653 targeted arms imports embargo on all arms to designated individuals and entities with an arms imports embargo on small arms, light weapons and ammunition to Haiti (1 year).
- Specifies exemptions for furthering the objectives of peace and stability in Haiti by UN, UN-authorized missions, units operating under the command of the Government of Haiti, or those coordinating with them or (pending prior Committee approval) by others.
Procedural
- Authorizes the deployment of a Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission to support the Haitian National Police (1 year) and specifies its mandate.
- Authorizes the MS participating in the MSS mission to take all necessary measures to carry out its mandate.
- Requests SG to establish a trust fund to facilitate voluntary contributions to the MSS mission.
- Requests SG reporting.
Substantive
- Calls on MS to protect Haitian refugees and migrants in their territories.
Existing sanctions
- Renews UNSCR 2653 financial asset freeze and travel ban (1 year).
- Extends UNSCR 2699 arms imports embargo to Haiti and the related exemptions (1 year).
Enhanced implementation measures
- Encourages regional land, air and maritime cooperation to detect and prevent arms imports embargo violations.
Recommended additional measures
- Encourages MS to ensure adequate marking and recordkeeping to trace arms.
- Calls on MS to inspect all cargo to Haiti if reasonable grounds for sanctions violation.
- Encourages the Government of Haiti to reinforce the weapons ammunition management of the Haitian National Police.
- Calls on MSS mission to cooperate with the Government of Haiti’s efforts to reinforce their weapons and ammunition management.
Procedural
- Modifies Sanctions Committee mandate.
- Extends and modifies Panel of Experts mandate (13 months).
- Outlines key benchmarks for reviewing arms embargo measures.
- Requests SG to conduct an assessment on the progress achieved on the key arms embargo benchmarks (until 01.10.2024).
- Calls for MS reporting following cargo inspection.
- Encourages reporting on detected and prevented arms imports embargo violations.
Procedural
[not adopted under Chapter VII]
- Adopts a new Focal Point delisting procedure (specified in Annex I), replacing the procedure set out in UNSCR 1970 (2006).
- Establishes an informal working group of the Security Council to examine general issues on the subject of UN sanctions and specifies its mandate and terms of reference (Annex II).
Procedural
- Extends MSS mandate (until 2 October 2025).
- Encourages acceleration of MSS mission deployment and additional voluntary contributions and support.
