Summary
On 18 October 2024, UNSCR 2752 replaced the arms embargo on small arms and light weapons with an embargo on all imports of weapons and related materiel to Haiti, which was adopted for a limited time period (1 year). The change followed a recommendation by the Panel of Experts, which noted increased procurement of larger caliber weapons by Haitian gangs (S/2024/704). The resolution also extended the travel ban and asset freeze for another year and, upon Panel’s recommendation, amended the listing criteria to include engaging in activities that destabilize Haiti through the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources.
The security situation in Haiti began deteriorating again in October 2024, as gangs launched a new wave of coordinated attacks. Violence in the capital, including by the Viv Ansanm gang alliance, spiked in November 2024. The UN began evacuating staff due to increased gang violence and the international airport was closed from mid-November until mid-December 2024 because of shooting on commercial airplanes by the 400 Mawozo and Chyen Mechan gangs.
The political transition in Haiti also continued to face challenges. On 10 November 2024, the divisions between Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) and acting Prime Minister Garry Conille led to the dismissal of Conille, less than 6 months after his appointment. The TPC replaced Conille with Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, despite questions about the legal basis for the change. Amidst an ongoing corruption scandal involving three TPC members, the two remaining members of the Provisional Electoral Council were finally sworn in mid-December 2024 to proceed with the preparation of elections originally set for November 2025.
On 23 December 2024, members of the Security Council issued a press statement condemning the “continued destabilizing criminal activities of armed gangs” and expressing concern about “the ongoing and deteriorating political, economic, security, human rights, humanitarian and acute food insecurity and nutrition crises in Haiti” as well as the “slow progress on Haiti’s road map for restoring democratic institutions” (SC/15954). The statement followed the Security Council’s 24 November 2024 request for the Secretary-General to provide a comprehensive assessment of the context in Haiti and strategic recommendations on the full range of options for possible roles that the UN could play (S/2024/868).
In his February 2025 reply, the Secretary-General recommended that the medium-term focus should be on substantially reducing the gangs’ control of the capital and critical infrastructure and that transitioning MSS to a UN peacekeeping operation (which was requested by Haiti in October 2024, but repeatedly opposed by Russia and China) was “not a feasible option” at the current stage, but could be considered once the gangs’ territorial control decreased (S/2025/122). The Secretary-General also suggested to establish a UN Support Office to provide “comprehensive operational and logistical support” to the MSS mission and to enhance BINUH’s capacity to implement its mandate and assume new responsibilities. Separately, the Secretary-General in July 2025 appointed Carlos Ruiz Massieu as his Special Representative for Haiti and head of BINUH.
Despite the arrival of MSS reinforcements and the formation of a new police force targeting gangs in early 2025, gang violence continued both in the capital and in the surrounding areas, with the situation deteriorating further in March 2025. This led to anti-government protests between April and June 2025, calling for resignation of the transitional authorities due to their failure to increase security in the country. Jimmy “Barbeque” Chérizier, the spokesperson of Viv Ansanm gang coalition who has been sanctioned by the UN since 21 October 2022, also repeatedly called for the overthrow of the government. In May 2025, the US designated the Viv Ansanm gang coalition and the Gran Grif gang as foreign terrorist organizations and the Haiti Sanctions Committee imposed sanctions on the two entities on 8 July 2025. Despite reinforcements, the MSS mission (around 1,000 out of the envisaged 2,500 personnel) remained significantly stretched, understaffed, and underfunded.
On 30 September 2025, amidst concerns about the deteriorating security situation and humanitarian crisis in Haiti, the Security Council authorized the transition of the MSS mission to an up to 5,550-strong Gang Suppression Force (GSF). The GSF was authorized, among other tasks, to conduct independently or in cooperation with Haitian National Police and Haitian armed forces “counter-gang operations to neutralize, isolate, and deter gangs” and to “take all necessary measures to carry out its mandate.” Resolution 2793 also authorized the creation of the UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH) to provide logistical (but not operational) support to the new, significantly strengthened force. China, Russia, and Pakistan abstained from the vote, citing concerns about the mandate, composition, and funding of the force.
On 17 October 2025, the existing sanctions measures (travel ban, asset freeze, and arms imports embargo to Haiti) were renewed for another year and two individuals – the leader of the Les Argentins gang and a former head of National Palace Security Unit who played a key role in enabling the activities of criminal networks and gangs in Haiti, including through facilitating arms trafficking – were added to the UN sanctions list, bringing the total to 9 individuals and 2 entities. Resolution 2794 also urged Member States to strengthen the implementation of the arms embargo and affirmed that the related exemption applied to the newly authorized GSF.
According to the Panel of Experts June 2025 report, there continued to be a “general lack of awareness of the sanctions regime” among Haitian authorities, poor enforcement of the arms embargo due to lack of resources within Haitian customs and other law enforcement agencies, and the asset freeze and travel ban were “not being effectively enforced” in Haiti (S/2025/356). Prophane Victor, a former member of Parliament sanctioned in September 2024 for supporting and arming gangs, was arrested in January 2025 for colluding with gangs, while Chérizier (“Barbeque”) launched a Viv Ansanm political party and continued to justify the violence perpetrated by the gangs, calling for the overthrow of the TPC. Gangs – including Viv Ansanm coalition and Gran Grif, 400 Mawozo, and Les Argentins – continued to perpetrate indiscriminate attacks against the population. The September 2025 report noted the significantly worsened security situation, expansion of gang-controlled territory, and escalation of violence to “unprecedented levels” (S/2025/597). Despite a large number of security operations by the Haitian national police, supported by the MSS mission, which together with self-defense forces and new task force supported by a private military company helped “slow down gang offensives” in the capital (especially by Delmas 6, Grand Ravine and 5 Segond gangs), the Viv Ansanm alliance made significant gains in other parts of the country. The Panel also highlighted the continued “limited” enforcement of the arms embargo and “record-breaking” drug seizures documenting the generation of significant gang revenue through cocaine and cannabis smuggling. An October 2025 UNODC report (S/2025/642) estimated that up to 90% of the capital was controlled by criminal groups, while the IOM estimated that over 1.4 million persons (12% of the population) were internally displaced and the International Crisis Group estimated that 16,000 had been killed since 2022.
The overall levels of violence in Haiti remained high in 2026, with anti-gang security operations responsible for more than double the share of casualties caused by gangs, according to recent BINUH reports. While anti-gang operations succeeded in pushing back gangs in several locations, including through reliance on drones and foreign private military contractors, such gains “remain fragile” according to the March 2026 Panel of Experts report. Moreover, despite intensification of security operations and internal infighting, the report notes that the Viv Ansanm gang coalition “demonstrated sustained resilience and adaptability” and that “gangs are adopting new ways of collecting revenues,” including through impersonating police, extorting remittances, and collecting payments at checkpoints. The GSF, which is expected to boost the anti-gang operations in Haiti, began deployment in April 2026 and conducted its first operations in June 2026, at a fifth of its authorized size. On the political front, following an unsuccessful attempt to dismiss Prime Minister Fils-Aimé, the TPC was dissolved on 7 February 2026 at the end of its mandate and executive power was transferred to the Council of Ministers led by Fils-Aimé. As with the TPC, which was established following the March 2024 CARICOM-mediated agreement, the mandate of the Council of Ministers is set to conclude with the election of a new President. The elections, which would be the first since 2016, are currently planned to take place by the end of 2026 but their timing remains uncertain.
Purposes
Coerce
Coerce armed groups and criminal networks to cease violence, criminal activities, and human rights abuses in the country.
Constrain
Constrain armed groups and criminal networks from having access to financial resources and arms and related materiel of all types.
Signal
Signal support for the agreed political transition seeking to restore democratic institutions through holding of free and fair elections.
Sanctions type
Ongoing travel ban against individuals and asset freeze against individuals or entities engaging in violence, criminal activities, and human rights abuses.
Existing arms imports embargo on small arms and light weapons replaced with a general arms imports embargo on all arms and related materiel (with conditional Government exemptions) at the start of the episode.
Exemptions
Travel ban: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/testing/exemption-measures/travel-ban
Asset freeze: https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/assets-freeze-0
Carve out provisions for humanitarian actors apply, as specified in UNSCR 2664 (2022).
Arms embargo: https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/2653/exemptions/arms-embargo
Designations
Current and maximum number of designees during the episode: 9 individual designees (leaders of seven different Haitian gangs – G9 Family and Allies gang coalition and 5 Segond, Grand Ravine, 400 Mawazo, Kraze Barye, Gran Grif, and Les Argentins gangs – and two others, a former member of the Haitian Parliament involved in weapons trafficking and using violence to secure political gain and a former head of the National Palace General Security Unit who played key role in enabling the activities of criminal networks and gangs, including facilitating the trafficking of arms and ammunition) and 2 entities (Gran Grif gang and Viv Ensanm gang coalition).
Current list of sanctions designees:
https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/2653/sanctions-list-materials
Potential scope
Potential scope of impact
UN sanctions can have some non-discriminating impact on the general population, since they include arms embargoes, diplomatic sanctions, and/or restrictions on the conduct of particular activities or the export of specific commodities.
Implementation
Sanctions imposed for a limited time period (1 year) and renewed periodically. Sanctions Committee and Panel of Experts in place. Designation criteria were specified and targets designated. Enforcement authorities specified (GSF).
Panel of Experts reports:
https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/2653/PoE/Reports
Effectiveness
Coercion
Policy outcome
Gangs continued to engage in violence, attacking security forces and critical infrastructure as well as the civilian population. Violence increased in late 2024 and early 2025, with gangs becoming “increasingly aggressive” and “brutal,” expanding their territorial control, perpetrating massacres, and conducting coordinated and simultaneous attacks according to the Panel of Experts. Political backing for gang activities also continued.
Sanctions contribution
Sanctions did not change the behavior of sanctioned gangs or gang leaders, who continued to attack both civilians and Haitian security forces, engage in criminal activities and human rights abuses, and call for the overthrow of the transitional government. The presence and behavior of Haitian gangs was affected primarily by anti-gang operations.
Constraint
Policy outcome
A large number of firearms circulate illegally in the country and gangs continue to procure weapons and pose serious challenge to the transitional government. Despite support provided by the MSS and subsequently GSF and multiple anti-gang security operations which had limited successes, the capacity of the Haitian national police and their arms management remain weak, and gangs continue to engage in criminal activities, arms smuggling, and looting of national stockpiles, as well as lucrative generation of revenues through exploitation of natural resources, in particular elvers (baby eels), and the smuggling of cannabis and cocaine.
Sanctions contribution
Security operations and the actions and capacities of Haitian police and military, international security forces (MSS, then GSF), local self-defense groups, and foreign military contractors played a more important role in constraining gangs and changing their tactics than sanctions.
Signaling
Policy outcome
The expansion of the arms embargo at the start of the episode, the sanctioning of gangs and additional individuals in July and October 2025, respectively, and the transition of MSS mission into larger GSF with UN logistical support in September 2025 sent a strong signal of support to the political transition and of the unacceptability of the deteriorating security situation, stigmatizing gangs and their activities.
Sanctions contribution
While sanctions and the creation of the GSF had an important signaling role, progress on the agreed roadmap for Haiti’s political transition has been limited due to internal divisions within the transitional government, electoral delays, and ongoing gang violence.
Overall
Unintended consequences
Increase in corruption and/or criminality, harmful effects on neighboring states.
UN sanctions resolutions guide
Substantive
Existing sanctions
- Renews UNSCR 2653 financial asset freeze and travel ban (1 year).
- Replaces UNSCR 2699 arms imports embargo on small arms, light weapons and ammunition with a territorial arms imports embargo to Haiti (1 year).
- Specifies exemptions for furthering the objectives of peace and stability in Haiti for UN, UN-authorized mission or security units operating under the command of the Government of Haiti or by them, non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use and related technical assistance or training, and (pending prior Committee approval) other supply, sale, transfer, assistance, training or personnel.
- Modifies UNSCR 2653 listing criteria.
Enhanced implementation measures
- Decides that MS shall take appropriate steps to prevent illicit trafficking and diversion of arms and related materiel in Haiti.
Recommended additional measures
- Encourages greater coordination on the implementation of sanctions and support to strengthen the capacity of Haitian National Police.
- Encourages the Government of Haiti to reinforce the weapons ammunition management capacity of the Haitian National Police and strengthen border and customs control to curb illicit trafficking and diversion.
Procedural
- Modifies Sanctions Committee mandate and directs it to consider updating the list of individuals and entities subject to travel ban and asset freeze.
- Extends and modifies Panel of Experts mandate (13 months).
- Urges all parties, MS, organizations and MSS mission cooperation with the Panel of Experts.
- Outlines key benchmarks for reviewing the existing sanctions measures.
- Requests SG to conduct an assessment on the progress achieved on the key sanctions benchmarks (until 01.10.2025).
- Encourages MS reporting.
Substantive
- Expresses grave concern about the deterioration of the security situation and humanitarian crisis in Haiti.
Procedural
- Authorizes the transition of Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission into the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) and specifies its mandate and troop levels (1 year).
- Authorizes the MS participating in the GSF to take all necessary measures to carry out its mandate.
- Requests establishment of UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH) to provide support to GSF, BINUH, the Haitian National Police and Haitian armed forces on any joint operations with the GSF, as well as technical support to the OAS, and specifies its mandate.
- Requests SG reporting.
Substantive
- Expresses concern about the extremely high levels of gang violence and other criminal activities and illicit trafficking of arms and ammunition to armed gangs in Haiti.
Existing sanctions
- Renews UNSCR 2653 financial asset freeze and travel ban (1 year).
- Imposes financial asset freeze and travel ban on new designees (listed in Annex).
- Renews the UNSCR 2752 imports embargo on all arms and related materiel, including small arms and light weapons and their ammunition, to Haiti (1 year).
- Affirms that arms imports embargo exemption for UN or UN-authorized mission applies to the UN, BINUH, GSF (inclusive of the transitioning MSS mission), UNSOH, Haitian National Police, and Haitian armed forces.
Enhanced implementation measures
- Urges MS to strengthen implementation of the arms embargo.
Procedural
- Modifies Sanctions Committee mandate and directs it to consider updating the list of individuals and entities subject to travel ban and asset freeze.
- Extends and modifies Panel of Experts mandate (13 months).
- Requests all parties, MS, organizations, BINUH, UNSOH and GSF cooperation and information sharing with the Panel of Experts.
- Reiterates key benchmarks for reviewing the existing sanctions measures.
- Requests SG to conduct an assessment on the progress achieved on the key sanctions benchmarks (until 01.09.2026) and related periodic Haitian authorities reporting.
- Requests MS reporting.
