Following the obstruction of the arrival of UN peacekeepers (UNMIH) on 11 October 1993 (mentioned in UNSCR 873), and the assassination of Aristide government officials in Haiti (mentioned in UNSCR 875), the UN terminated the suspension of sanctions. UNSCR 873 reapplied the oil and arms embargos, but allowed the frozen government funds to be released at the request of President Aristide or Prime Minister Malval for use by the legitimately elected government. UNSCR 875 legitimated interdiction on the high seas, as necessary to enforce the sanctions. (It was not a UN-authorized naval blockade, as widely reported in the secondary literature).
The Haitian Parliament proposed ways to break the impasse in implementing the GIA in February 1994 (the mini-plan), but the proposals were rejected by Aristide. Aristide gave a six-month notice of termination of Haiti's repatriation treaty with the US (which would make it more difficult for the US return political refugees) and the Clinton administration was subject to increased pressure on from the Congressional Black Caucus during the period.
Coerce the military to restore the legitimate government of Aristide; comply with the Governor's Island Agreement; allow the deployment of UNMIH.
Constrain the government leadership (the de factos) from committing acts of violence against Aristide government representatives and from being able to govern the country (through the financial and oil sanctions).
Signal the Cédras regime and the rest of the world about the importance of the norm of democratic governance.
Re-imposition of previously suspended arms imports embargo on government forces, petroleum imports ban, and government asset freeze (on the de factos).
Newly imposed asset transfer authorization with regards to the frozen funds at the request of President Aristide or Prime Minister Malval.
Sanctions (re-)imposition was deliberately delayed by 5 days. Sanctions Committee in place, no sanctions monitoring mechanism. Enforcement authorities not specified.
Cédras agreed to Parliamentary proposal for resolving the impasse between the de factos and the Aristide government on February 19, but his motives were suspect.
Re-imposition of sanctions is important but not the only major initiative during the period (Friends of the SG on Haiti, SG involvement (3 reports), and unilateral measures from the US.
The de factos were not prevented from committing violence against their opponents in Haiti, but the increasing costs of sanctions overall affected the ability of the Cédras regime to constitute a viable government; the regime was able to use sanctions to insulate themselves and pass costs on to the population.
Sanctions appear to have been the principal source of constraint on the ability to govern.
Norm was articulated about the return of Aristide and strong stigmatization due to re-imposition of sanctions.
Diplomatic initiatives underway at this time also conveyed a strong signal to the regime.
Strengthening of authoritarian rule, rally round the flag effect, increase in human rights violations, strengthening of political factions, widespread harmful economic consequences, increase in corruption and criminality, humanitarian consequences, reduction of local institutional capacity.