Summary
On 18 October 2020, five years after the formal adoption of the JCPOA, two of the restrictive measures were lifted as specified in the agreement: the travel ban on designated individuals and the arms imports and exports embargo. Iran hailed the expiration as a “momentous day,” while the US condemned it. In his December 2020 report, the Secretary-General again regretted the decision of the US to withdraw from the agreement in 2018 and the series of steps taken by Iran since July 2019 to cease complying with its commitments under the plan.
Newly elected US President Joseph Biden expressed a willingness to re-enter the JCPOA in December 2020, but in the first few months of 2021, Iran informed the IAEA that it would continue to enrich uranium to 20%, which some analysts viewed as an attempt to strengthen its bargaining position in future negotiations. In April 2021, a covert attack sabotaged activities underway at the Natanz nuclear facility, just as an IAEA temporary inspection agreement with Iran expired.
In June 2021, Ibrahim Raisi was elected President of Iran, and further talks to return to the JCPOA were suspended until a new government could be formed. There was a brief four-month window between the inauguration of President Biden and the Iranian elections during which an agreement to bring the US back into the JCPOA might have been negotiated, but the newly elected government in Tehran was less inclined to agree to nuclear restraints than its predecessor and, by September 2021, the IAEA noted that Iran had enriched uranium up to 60% and that its verification and monitoring activity was severely limited. Talks about returning to the JCPOA resumed in November 2021 and continued throughout the first half of 2022. There were also parallel bilateral talks between the US and Iran, but Iran continued to expand its nuclear activities and there had been no agreement on the return of the US to the JCPOA.
In September 2022, nation-wide protests broke out across Iran over the headscarf issue and the death in detention of Mahsa Amini. The protests continued into October and November 2022, resulting in new autonomous sanctions being applied to Iran by the US, EU, and UK. There was also growing evidence that Iran was supplying Russia with drones, something the US, UK, and France declared violated the restrictions on nuclear weapon delivery systems (including ballistic missiles) still in effect under UNSCR 2231.
IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi expressed “serious concern” over safeguards issues at undeclared nuclear sites in Iran, and its Board passed a censure resolution on Iran over its lack of cooperation on 17 November 2022. In response, Iran continued enriching uranium to 60%, fortified its Forchow facility, and installed more advanced centrifuges at Natanz, while its stockpile of enriched uranium reached 62.3kg.
Talks on a potential return to the JCPOA remained deadlocked at the end of 2022 and the stalemate continued halfway into 2023. Indirect talks with the US resumed in May 2023, but there was no immediate progress. In August 2023, the US and Iran reached an agreement for a prisoner exchange and the unfreezing of USD 6 billion in Iranian assets held in South Korean financial institutions. The funds were transferred to Qatar and restricted to be used only for trade in humanitarian goods.
Iran narrowly avoided IAEA censure in September 2023 after the agency reported a decrease in Iran’s rate of stockpiling uranium, but noted “no further progress” in resolving outstanding safeguards issues. The Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 raised regional tensions to new levels, but on 18 October 2023, UN sanctions entered a new phase with the further relaxation of UN restrictions on Iran’s nuclear weapon delivery systems (including ballistic missiles) and the asset freeze on individuals and entities included in Annex B as stipulated in the JCPOA and UNSCR 2231.
Purposes
Coerce
Constrain
Constrain Iran from accessing sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programs and from supporting armed groups in the region.
Signal
Signal continued support for non-proliferation norms and a partial normalization in relations with Iran on the nuclear issue.
Sanctions type
Mandatory
Ongoing sanctions:
- Individual/entity asset freeze;
- Restrictions on proliferation sensitive goods and technology imports and exports ban (specific items and the related transfer, training, assistance, investment, brokering, and other services, including nuclear weapon delivery systems restrictions) and investment and acquisition of interest in foreign commercial activity involving uranium mining or nuclear material and technology made subject to prior case-by-case Security Council approval (exemptions and the related procedures specified).
Termination of existing sanctions:
- Travel ban, arms exports embargo, and restrictions on arms imports were terminated at the start of the episode.
Designation criteria
Maximum number of designees during the episode: 23 individuals and 61 entities.
Potential scope
Potential scope of impact
UN sanctions can have some non-discriminating impact on the general population, since they include arms embargoes, diplomatic sanctions, and/or restrictions on the conduct of particular activities or the export of specific commodities.
Implementation
Sanctions were imposed for a limited time period and their dates of termination were specified. Proliferation sensitive goods and technology and investment ban restrictions were imposed for 10 years from JCPOA Adoption Day (until 18.10.2025), restrictions related to development of nuclear weapon delivery systems and asset freeze were imposed for 8 years (until 18.10.2023), and restrictions on arms imports and exports and travel were imposed for 5 years (until 18.10.2020).
All UNSCR 2231 restrictions will be terminated earlier if IAEA report confirms the Broader Conclusion of JCPOA or terminated and replaced with provisions of UNSCR 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, and 1929 as a result of significant non-performance of commitments by Iran under the JCPOA and UNSCR 2231 “snapback” mechanism.
No Sanctions Committee or Panel of Experts in place (their functions taken over by other actors – Security Council, UN Secretariat, and the Secretary-General).
Designation criteria were specified and targets designated. Enforcement authorities specified.
Effectiveness
Constraint
Policy outcome
While Iran’s nuclear program was constrained by the IAEA inspection requirements of the JCPOA, it raised its level of enrichment to 60%, continued its ballistic missile program,and made IAEA monitoring more difficult during the episode. Iran continued its policy of incremental non-compliance with the agreement in response to the US decision to withdraw from the JCPOA and re-impose and expand unilateral sanctions.
Sanctions contribution
While UN restrictive measures remain in place, constraints on the development of Iran’s nuclear program came chiefly from the enhanced monitoring and verification mechanisms established in the JCPOA and from the April 2021 sabotage of Iran’s Natanz centrifuge facility. The addition of new unilateral sanctions by the US, EU and UK for reasons other than Iran’s nuclear program (human rights and drone exports to Russia) complicated efforts to restore the JCPOA.
Signaling
Policy outcome
Support for nuclear non-proliferation norms were articulated by the Secretary-General and IAEA Board meetings, but the inability to agree on how to get the US back into the JCPOA along with Russia’s purchase of drones from Iran undermined a unified Security Council message on Iran, despite the other parties’ verbal commitment to the agreement.
Sanctions contribution
UN sanctions were a critical mechanism through which the normalization of diplomatic relations with Iran took place, although unilateral sanctions and broader diplomatic and commercial activities were more important to determine Iran’s standing in the world.
Overall
Unintended consequences
Humanitarian consequences (but due to unilateral sanctions, not UN restrictive measures).
UN sanctions resolutions guide
Substantive
- Provisions of UNSCR 2231 entered into force on 16.01.2016 [JCPOA Implementation Day]
- Permits, upon prior case-by-case approval by the Security Council, imports to Iran of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or development of nuclear weapon delivery systems (10 years after JCPOA Adoption Day – 18.10.2025, earlier if IAEA report confirms the Broader Conclusion)
- Specifies such items, materials, equipment, goods and technology (INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1, INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2, or their most recent versions, and any items states determine could contribute to reprocessing or enrichment-related or heavy water-related activities inconsistent with the JCPOA)
- Permits, upon prior case-by-case approval by the Security Council, technical training, technical or financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and transfer of financial resources or services, related to supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods and technology (10 years after JCPOA Adoption Day – 18.10.2025, earlier if IAEA report confirms the Broader Conclusion)
- Permits, upon prior case-by-case approval by the Security Council, investment and acquisition of an interest in foreign commercial activity involving uranium mining or production or use of nuclear material and technology listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 by Iran, its nationals, entities under its jurisdiction, or individuals and entities owned or controlled by them, acting on their behalf, or at their direction (10 years after JCPOA Adoption Day – 18.10.2025, earlier if IAEA report confirms the Broader Conclusion)
- Specifies exemptions from prior Security Council approval and the related exemption procedures for (1) items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2; (2) equipment covered by B.1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 when such equipment is for light water reactors, low-enriched uranium covered by A.1.2 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 when it is incorporated in assembled nuclear fuel elements for such reactors; and (3) items, materials, equipment, goods, technology, and related technical training, technical and financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services directly related to (a) necessary modification of two cascades at the Fordow facility for stable isotope production, (b) export of Iran’s enriched uranium in excess of 300kg in return for natural uranium, and (c) modernization of the Arak reactor based on agreed design
- Specifies that in case of IAEA report confirming the Broader Conclusion before 18.10.2025, prior Security Council approval requirements will be suspended immediately and the related exemptions will continue to apply, permitting such activities upon prior case-by-case Security Council and Joint Commission notification
- Permits, upon prior case-by-case approval by the Security Council and specified conditions, imports to and exports from Iran of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, as well as related technology or technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, transfer of financial resources or services, and Iran’s acquisition of an interest in foreign commercial activity regarding their supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, or use (8 years after JCPOA Adoption Day – 18.10.2023, earlier if IAEA report confirms the Broader Conclusion)
- Decides that states shall prevent and prohibit any activities inconsistent with the specified nuclear and arms imports restrictions until the Termination Day (10 years after JCPOA Adoption day – 18.10.2025, provided sanctions have not been reinstated under the “snapback” mechanism) or earlier if IAEA report confirms the Broader Conclusion
- Imposes asset freeze on individuals and entities on UNSCR 1737 sanctions list on the date of the adoption of UNSCR 2231 except those specified in Attachment (8 years after JCPOA Adoption Day – 18.10.2023, earlier if IAEA report confirms the Broader Conclusion)
- Specifies asset freeze exemptions and exemption procedure for funds, financial assets, or economic resources for (a) necessary basic expenses, (b) necessary extraordinary expenses, (c) necessary for civil nuclear cooperation projects described in Annex III of the JCPOA, (d) subject to judicial, administrative, or arbitral lien or judgment, and (e) necessary for activities directly related to permitted proliferation sensitive items or required for the implementation of the JCPOA
- Specifies designation criteria
- Calls for inspection of cargo to and from Iran if reasonable grounds for UNSCR 2231 or JCPOA violation
Procedural
- Specifies a “snapback” mechanism for reintroduction of provisions of UNSCR 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, and 1929 and termination of provisions in paragraphs 7, 8, 16, and 20 of UNSCR 2231 if the UNSC fails to adopt a resolution to continue the termination of previous resolutions within 30 days of notification of an issue constituting significant non-performance of commitments under JCPOA by a JCPOA participant State [paragraphs 11 and 12 of UNSCR 2231 and 36 and 37 of JCPOA], unless the notifying state informs the UNSC that the issue has been resolved before the end of the 30-day period [paragraph 13 of UNSCR 2231]
- Specifies criteria for optional additions of account payments and interests
- Specifies that the Security Council will directly undertake the tasks related to UNSCR 2231, including monitoring and improvement of implementation, answering of inquiries, provision of support and guidance, review of proposals for nuclear, ballistic missile, and arms-related transfers to and activities with Iran, examination of alleged inconsistencies with the resolution, and granting of exemptions to the restrictions
- Asks for Secretary-General reports on restrictions implementation (every 6 months)
