Following the invasion and occupation of Iraq, the occupying forces led by the United States established a de-facto regime (the Coalition Provisional Authority, or the “Authority”) and launched a de-Baathification policy. On 22 May 2003, the Security Council passed UNSCR 1483 recognizing the regime, lifting the comprehensive sanctions against Iraq (the UNSCR 661 sanctions regime), and initiating targeted sanctions to support the country’s stability, security and reconstruction under the occupation. In UNSCR 1518, passed on 24 November 2003, a new Iraq Sanctions Committee was created to replace the 661 Committee (which made the initial designations until its mandate lapsed, 6 months after UNSCR 1483). The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) was established in August 2003 to support the fulfilment of UNSCR 1483.
At the time of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, it is estimated that at least 400,000 Baath members were serving in the army and the total number of members and sympathizers ranged between 1 and 2 million. The Authority oversaw the process of de-Baathification throughout the episode, issuing orders focusing on the removal of Baath-affiliated individuals from different public institutions, including the army, government ministries, hospitals, and universities. It also established an Iraqi De-Baathification Council to help identify Baath property, assets, officials, and members. The process of de-Baathification was particularly intensive at the end of 2003 and the beginning of 2004.
Constrain members of the former Iraqi regime and their supporters from establishing a credible opposition to the occupation.
Signal the illegitimacy of the former regime.
Ongoing arms imports embargo (on all Iraqi parties), as well as weapons of mass destruction, missile, and civil nuclear-related restrictions, and provisions for the return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq and return or repatriation of Kuwaiti and third-country nationals.
Newly imposed Iraqi cultural property trade or transfer ban, asset freeze (individual/entity and former regime), and asset transfer requiring all frozen assets to be transferred to the Development Fund for Iraq, mandatory depositions of proceeds from petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas exports to the Kuwait Compensation Fund and the Development Fund for Iraq, and related UN-like privileges.
The “Oil-for-Food” Program, petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas exports ban, as well as all other trade, financial, and economic sanctions previously imposed under the comprehensive sanctions regime were terminated at the beginning of the episode.
Maximum number of designees during the episode: 82 individuals and 206 entities.
UN sanctions can have some non-discriminating impact on the general population, since they include arms embargoes, diplomatic sanctions, and/or restrictions on the conduct of particular activities or the export of specific commodities.
Sanctions Committee existing from the previous comprehensive sanctions was replaced by a new Sanctions Committee 6 months after the imposition of targeted measures, no sanctions monitoring mechanism in place. Designation criteria were specified and targets designated. Enforcement authorities specified.
Baathist government forces never mounted a significant counter campaign during the episode, and most of its key officials were arrested, killed or captured after the 2003 invasion, while Baath members were targeted by the de-Baathification of the public sector. Saddam Hussein’s sons were killed in a firefight with the occupying coalition forces in July, and Saddam Hussein was captured in December of 2003.
The military occupation forces played a far more significant role in constraining remnants of the Baathist regime.
Norms were not clearly articulated in the targeted financial measures against former members of the Baathist regime (more concern about the private appropriation of government funds), UNSCR 1483 was focused on end of the 661 regime, oil for food, and recognition of the authority of the occupying regime, re-engaging the UN with a request for an SRSG.
Targeted sanctions stigmatized more sharply than comprehensive sanctions (which these replaced), but the overthrow of the Baathist regime and the de-Baathification program were more important in stigmatizing individuals associated with the former government.
Insufficient information available at present.