Following the dissolution of the Governing Council of Iraq and in preparation for the establishment of an interim government on 28 June 2004, the Security Council lifted the arms embargo on the government of Iraq (UNSCR 1546) and added an exemption for the multilateral force operating in Iraq authorized in October 2003 by UNSCR 1511, maintaining all other measures. More broadly, the resolution recognized the legitimate role of the Interim Government of Iraq in assuming the primary role in the coordination of international assistance to Iraq, including the review by that government, of all assets directed to the Iraq Development Fund. The mandate of UNAMI, which has been on the ground since 2003, has been significantly expanded by UNSCR 1770 (2007) to support, advise, and assist the Government of Iraq in a number of areas, including the advancement of inclusive, political dialogue and national reconciliation, reintegration programs for former members of illegal armed groups, development of essential services, and promotion of economic and legal reform. UNAMI’s mandate has not changed significantly since.
On 15 December 2010, The Security Council in UNSCR 1958 terminated all residual activities under the “Oil-for-Food” Program and authorized the transfer of the remaining funds to the Development Fund of Iraq except for $131 million retained for UN Program termination-related expenses and indemnification (until 31 December 2016, subsequently extended to 30 June 2017 by UNSCR 2335). The full implementation of the UNSCR 1958 and 2335, and thus the transfer of remaining $138,424,160 to the government of Iraq, was acknowledged on 8 December 2017 by UNSCR 2390. The other two 15 December 2010 resolutions terminated the UNSCR 1783 requirement for the deposition of all proceeds from petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas sales to the Development Fund for Iraq (UNSCR 1956) and the UNSCR 687 and 707 weapons of mass destruction, missile, and civil nuclear-related measures (UNSCR 1957). Further terminations came in June 2013 regarding the UNSCR 686 provisions for return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq and the UNSCR 686 and 687 provisions for repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains (UNSCR 2107).
While the former Baathist regime has shown no evidence of resurgence, a number of high ranking military officers from the former regime have participated in insurgencies against the government and some have joined the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh). 2014 witnessed a surge of ISIL activity in Iraq that resulted in the takeover of significant portions of the Iraqi territory, including Mosul, challenging the authority of the Iraqi government. At the height of its power in 2015, ISIL controlled about a third of the Iraqi territory. On 9 December 2017, three years after the beginning of fighting, the Iraqi Prime Minister declared victory over ISIL, announcing that all Iraqi lands were liberated from the group’s control. A subsequent donor conference seeking to raise funds for post-ISIL reconstruction of the country which took place in February 2018 in Kuwait, fell well below the amount sought by the Iraqi government.
The Iraq Sanctions Committee has been largely dormant since 2011, with the last designations taking place in May 2006 and no delisting activity between December 2011 and August 2016. Although 40 entities have been delisted since August 2016, most of Council’s recent engagements on Iraq have been Al-Qaida and ISIL-related and managed by the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee. Due to destabilizing ISIL activity, costly counter-ISIL operations, disagreements over oil exports and revenue sharing with Iraqi Kurds, and plummeting global oil prices the Iraqi government requested a postponement on its final reparation payment of $4.6 billion to Kuwait, originally due in 2015. Suspended since October 2014, Iraq resumed compensation payments to Kuwait in April 2018. Paid out quarterly based on a percentage of Iraqi oil proceeds, the total sum of $52.4 billion is expected to be paid off by the UN Compensation Commission by the end of 2021.
Constrain remnants of the former Iraqi regime from challenging the Government of Iraq.
Signal the legitimacy and authority of the Iraqi Government.
Ongoing Iraqi cultural property trade or transfer ban and asset freeze (individual/entity and former regime).
Change in the target of arms imports embargo from all parties to the conflict to non-governmental forces in Iraq (occupying forces and the Government were exempted).
Asset transfer to the Development Fund for Iraq was terminated in December 2017.
Sanctions Committee in place, no sanctions monitoring mechanism in place. Designation criteria were specified and targets designated (maximum number of designees during the episode – 89 individual designees, 208 entities; currently remaining on 86 individual designees, 168 entities).
Baathist government forces never became a serious threat to the regime, but former Iraqi military officials participated in multiple insurgencies that challenged the regime and some have joined ISIL.
Only 9 additional individuals and entities were added to the list during this long episode (all before 2007; recent counter-terrorism related designations were made via the Al-Qaida sanction regime). Foreign military engagements (pre-2011 as well as post-2014) have been more important in containing the former regime elements.
UNSCR 1546 (2004) focused primarily on the legitimacy and the transfer of authority to the new Iraqi-led government but occupying forces, which remained to provide core security until 2011, qualified the terms of the regime’s authority. The surge in violence between 2013 and 2017, especially by ISIL, challenged the regime’s authority.
Lifting the arms embargo on the regime and maintaining targeted measures on remnants of the Baathist regime contributed to reinforcing the signal, but targeted sanctions did not focus on the main threats to the regime during the episode until 2014 (after which designations of individuals and organizations associated with the insurgencies were made under the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee), and diplomatic recognition and state building efforts were more significant to the outcome. The Iraq Sanctions Committee has remained largely silent since 2011, further weakening the signal.
Insufficient information available at present.