Lebanon - EP 1

To assist with the continuing investigation of the 14 February 2005 attack that killed the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 1636 (31 October 2005), authorizing the imposition of a travel ban and assets freeze on all individuals designated by the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) or the Government of Lebanon as suspected of involvement in the terrorist attack. UNSCR 1636 also established a Sanctions Committee and specified that, unless otherwise decided by the Security Council, all sanctions measures would be terminated upon the completion of all investigative and judicial proceedings relating to the attack.

UNSCR 1664 (29 March 2006) requested the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Lebanon to establish an international tribunal. The agreement between the UN and Lebanese government to create the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) was signed on 23 January 2007. However, when the agreement was put before the Lebanese Parliament for ratification, the Speaker of Parliament refused to convene the Parliament for a vote. In response, the majority of the members of Lebanese Parliament signed a petition addressed to the UN Secretary-General requesting that the Security Council form the tribunal. UNSCR 1757, adopted on 30 May 2007, formally established the STL under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and specified its statutes, organization, and formation. After the mandate of the UNIIIC ended on 28 February 2009, jurisdiction was transferred to the STL and the information gathered over the course of its mandate was handed over to the STL’s Office of the Prosecutor.

The STL was an international tribunal operating under Lebanese criminal law. It had jurisdiction “over persons responsible for the attack of 14 February 2005 resulting in the death of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and in the death or injury of other persons” as well as other connected attacks that took place in Lebanon between 1 October 2004 and 12 December 2005 or at a later date if they are connected and of similar nature and gravity (Article 1, STL statute). The tribunal was the first international court to deal with terrorism as a distinct crime. Although the STL statute held that the tribunal shall apply the Lebanese Criminal Code, on 16 February 2011 the tribunal’s appeal chamber adopted a definition of terrorism that drew on both Lebanese criminal law and customary international law. In particular, the judgement, which for the first time defined terrorism as an international crime, specified three key elements of terrorism: (1) the perpetration of a criminal act or a threat thereof, (2) the intent to spread fear among the population or directly or indirectly coerce a national or international authority to take or refrain from an action, and (3) a transnational component.

The STL opened on 1 March 2009 near The Hague. In April 2009, the pre-trial judge ordered the release of four high-ranking Lebanese security officials implicated by the former UNIIIC prosecutor, citing lack of evidence. Detained since September 2005, they were the only suspects in the tribunal’s custody. The court delivered its first indictments in June 2011, naming four members of Hezbollah: Salim Jamil Ayyash, Hussein Hassan Oneissi, Assad Hassan Sabra, and Mustafa Amine Badreddine. Their trial (STL-11-01) began in January 2014 without the accused, as the first international trial in absentia since the 1946 Nuremberg trials, and was based largely on evidence from cellphone records. A fifth suspect, Hassan Habib Mehri, was publicly indicted in October 2013 and added to the trial, also in absentia, in February 2014.

Charges against Mr Badreddine, a senior Hezbollah military commander, were formally dropped in July 2016, following the confirmation of his death in Syria. The trial against the remaining four accused, all low-level Hezbollah members, closed in September 2018. The STL judgment, pronounced on 18 August 2020, found Mr Ayyash guilty on all counts. Part of a six-member “assassination team,” he had a central role in the execution of the 14 February 2005 attack on Hariri and was subsequently sentenced to five concurrent life imprisonment sentences. The three other accused were initially acquitted, but the Appeals Chamber unanimously convicted Mr Mehri and Mr Oneissi on 10 March 2022 and sentenced them to five concurrent life imprisonment sentences on 16 June 2022 (Mr Sabra remained acquitted). All three men remain at large and retain the right to request retrial.

With regard to the broader political responsibility for the 14 February 2005 attack, the tribunal acknowledged that both Syria and Hezbollah might have had motives to eliminate Mr Hariri, but found no evidence of Hezbollah leadership’s involvement in the assassination, nor any direct evidence of Syrian role in the attack. Focused primarily on the technical evidence linked to the attack’s execution, the trial showed that although Mr Hariri – who was planning to run in the May 2005 legislative elections – had been under surveillance for several months, the final decision to assassinate him was probably taken only in the two weeks prior to his death.

In addition to the Ayyash et al. case (STL-11-01) and the January 2014 rulings on contempt and obstruction of justice by two Lebanese journalists (STL-14-05 and STL-14-06), the tribunal was also investigating three connected attacks on Lebanese politicians (STL-11-02), which included a separate case against Mr Ayyash (STL-18-10). The three connected attacks, which the tribunal established were also under its jurisdiction, were the 1 October 2004 assassination attempt on Marwan Hamade, the 21 June 2005 assassination of George Hawi, and the 12 July 2005 assassination attempt on Elias El-Murr. On 2 June 2021, Trial Chamber II cancelled the start of the trial in the Ayyash connected case (STL-18-10), which was to begin on 16 June 2021, due to a lack of funds and suspended the proceedings.

The precarious financial situation led the STL, which was funded 51 percent by voluntary contributions from States and 49 percent by the Government of Lebanon, to enter into a residual phase on 1 July 2022. The mandate of STL President, Judges, Prosecutor, and Head of the Defense Office came to their end on 28 February 2023. In December 2022, the mandate of the Tribunal was extended by the Secretary-General until 31 December 2023, for the limited purpose of completing the non-judicial residual functions and the orderly closure of the STL at the end of 2023.

The work of the court was highly politically sensitive. In particular, the tribunal faced opposition from Hezbollah, whose members were accused of participating in the Hariri assassination. In January 2011, the pending indictments of Hezbollah members by the STL led to the fall of the Lebanese government, with Hezbollah-led pro-Syrian March 8 alliance forming a new ruling coalition. Hezbollah, whose military and political power increased significantly after 2006, repeatedly denounced the tribunal as a political tool of its enemies, called on Lebanon to withdraw its judges and end its financial contributions to the STL, and threatened anyone cooperating with it. In 2018, the Hezbollah-led alliance won the elections for the first time since the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon in 2005, but its popular support decreased after it opposed the popular protests that erupted in October 2019. Hezbollah’s military and political power declined further following the October 2023 outbreak of war with Israel and the December 2024 ousting of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria.

Ultimately, however, the STL was prevented from completing its core mandate by lack of funds. The funding shortfall was caused by insufficient voluntary contributions following the sentencing in the main case (STL-11-01) and the inability of Lebanon to meet its financial obligations in the wake of its 2021 economic and financial crisis. In September 2021, the UN and the government of Lebanon agreed on a framework for the performance of residual functions at the STL, which preserved its legal framework, but suspended STL’s judicial and investigative activity. The tribunal’s work was thereafter limited mainly to the management and preservation of STL’s records and archives, assistance to national authorities, responses to requests for information, and protection and support of victims and witnesses. It was also agreed that upon the closure of the tribunal, the UN would become the custodian of its records and archives (S/2021/796).

The STL closed on 31 December 2023, leaving the three connected attacks on Lebanese politicians to which the tribunal’s jurisdiction was extended unresolved. Following the termination of the mandate of the UNIIIC in 2009 and the STL in 2023, there are currently no active investigative or judicial proceedings related to the 14 February 2005 terrorist attack that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others.

Despite the completion of the judicial activity by the STL, no individuals have been designated by the Sanctions Committee since the UN sanctions authorization in 2005. Given the termination of STL’s work for financial reasons, “all investigative and judicial proceedings relating to [the 2005 Hariri] terrorist attack” have not been completed and the sanctions regime continues to be active, albeit inoperative.

A separate Security Council workstream concerning Lebanon relates to UNSCR 1559 (2 September 2004) and UNSCR 1701 (11 August 2006), which are not related to the 2005 Hariri assassination and related attacks. UNSCR 1559 called for: (1) the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout Lebanon; (2) all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon; and (3) the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. UNSCR 1701 called for a full cessation of hostilities and for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution based on a number of principles and elements, including full respect for the Blue Line, a 120km long "line of withdrawal” between Lebanon, Israel and the Golan Heights set by the UN in 2000 to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, monitored by United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). UNSCR 1701 also authorized a voluntary arms imports embargo to Lebanon (not adopted under Chapter VII), exempting arms and related materiel, training, or assistance authorized by the Government of Lebanon or UNIFIL. UNIFIL, which was originally established on 19 March 1978 with UNSCR 425 and 426, was tasked with monitoring and reporting violations of UNSCR 1701.

Most elements of both resolutions remain unimplemented. Most notably, Lebanese and non-Lebanese armed groups continue to operate in Lebanon outside the control of the state and the hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah flare-up sporadically, with the most significant incidents following the 7 October 2023 outbreak of war between Hamas and Israel. Among others, these included airstrikes and missile/rocket launches, the September 2024 pager attacks on Hezbollah members and assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, and the October 2024 Israeli incursion into Lebanon to carry out ground operations against Hezbollah. However, the levels of violence decreased dramatically after the 26 November 2024 cessation of hostilities agreement between Israel and Lebanon mediated by France and the US, which was welcomed by the Security Council in S/PRST/2025/1. In accordance with the agreement, Lebanese Armed Forces increased their deployments between the Blue Line and the Litani River (which, in line with UNSCR 1701, should be free of any armed personnel, assets, and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and, as authorized, UNIFIL), but Israeli forces have not withdrawn fully beyond the Blue Line.

Mandatory

Travel ban and assets freeze on individuals designated by the Commission or the Government of Lebanon (upon Sanctions Committee agreement) as suspected of involvement in the terrorist attack on Rafiq Hariri.

Voluntary

A voluntary arms imports embargo to Lebanon is in place under UNSCR 1701 (exempting arms and related materiel, training, or assistance authorized by the Government of Lebanon or UNIFIL), which is not related to the work of the UNSCR 1636 Sanctions Committee. There is no Sanctions Committee or Panel of Experts for UNSCR 1701; the Secretary-General undertakes reporting on the implementation of UNSCR 1701.

Sanctions Committee created, no sanctions monitoring mechanism in place. Designation criteria were specified but targets were not designated. Enforcement authorities not specified.

International Independent Investigation Commission reports:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1636/investigation-commission

Special Tribunal for Lebanon proceedings:

https://www.stl-tsl.org/en