Lebanon - EP 1

Episode
(1)
Duration: 31-Oct-2005 to Present

To assist with the continuing investigation of the 14 February 2005 attack that killed the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 1636 (31 October 2005), authorized the imposition of a travel ban and assets freeze on all individuals designated by the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) or the Government of Lebanon as suspected of involvement in the terrorist attack. UNSCR 1636 also established a Sanctions Committee and specified that, unless otherwise decided by the Security Council, all sanctions measures would be terminated upon the completion of all investigative and judicial proceedings relating to the attack.

UNSCR 1664 (29 March 2006) requested the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Lebanon to establish an international tribunal. The agreement between the UN and Lebanese government to create the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) was signed on 23 January 2007. However, when the agreement was put before the Lebanese Parliament for ratification, the Speaker of Parliament refused to convene the Parliament for a vote. In response, the majority of the members of Lebanese Parliament signed a petition addressed to the UN Secretary-General requesting that the Security Council form the tribunal. UNSCR 1757, adopted on 30 May 2007, formally established the STL under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and specified its statutes, organization, and formation. After the mandate of the UNIIIC ended on 28 February 2009, jurisdiction was transferred to the STL and the information gathered over the course of its mandate was handed over to the STL’s Office of the Prosecutor.

The STL is an international tribunal operating under Lebanese criminal law. It has jurisdiction “over persons responsible for the attack of 14 February 2005 resulting in the death of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and in the death or injury of other persons” as well as other connected attacks that took place in Lebanon between 1 October 2004 and 12 December 2005 or are agreed by the parties to be connected and of similar nature and gravity (Article 1, STL statue). The tribunal is the first international court to deal with terrorism as a distinct crime. Although the STL statue holds that the tribunal shall apply the Lebanese Criminal Code, on 16 February 2011 the tribunal’s appeal chamber adopted a definition of terrorism that draws on both Lebanese criminal law and customary international law. In particular, the judgement, which for the first time defined terrorism as an international crime, specified three key elements of terrorism: (1) the perpetration of a criminal act or a threat thereof, (2) the intent to spread fear among the population or directly or indirectly coerce a national or international authority to take or refrain from an action, and (3) a transnational component.

The STL opened on 1 March 2009 near The Hague. In April 2009, the pre-trial judge ordered the release of four high-ranking Lebanese security officials implicated by the former UNIIIC prosecutor, citing lack of evidence. Detained since September 2005, they were the only suspects in the tribunal’s custody. The court delivered its first indictments in June 2011, naming four members of Hezbollah: Salim Jamil Ayyash, Hussein Hassan Oneissi, Assad Hassan Sabra, and Mustafa Amine Badreddine. Their trial (STL-11-01) began in January 2014 without the accused, as the first international trial in absentia since the 1946 Nuremberg trials, and was based largely on evidence from cellphone records. A fifth suspect, Hassan Habib Mehri, was publicly indicted in October 2013 and added to the trial, also in absentia, in February 2014.

Charges against Mr Badreddine, a senior Hezbollah military commander, were formally dropped in July 2016, following the confirmation of his death in Syria. The trial against the remaining four accused, all low-level Hezbollah members, closed in September 2018. The STL judgment, pronounced on 18 August 2020, found Mr Ayyash guilty on all counts. Part of a six-member “assassination team,” he had a central role in the execution of the 14 February 2005 attack on Hariri and was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment. The three other accused were initially acquitted, but the Appeals Chamber unanimously convicted Mr Mehri and Mr Oneissi on 10 March 2022 and sentenced them to life imprisonment on 16 June 2022. All three men remain at large and retain the right to request retrial.

With regard to the broader political responsibility for the 14 February 2005 attack, the tribunal acknowledged that both Syria and Hezbollah might have had motives to eliminate Mr Hariri, but found no evidence of Hezbollah leadership’s involvement in the assassination, nor any direct evidence of Syrian role in the attack. Focused primarily on the technical evidence linked to the attack’s execution, the trial showed that although Mr Hariri – who was planning to run in the May 2005 legislative elections – had been under surveillance for several months, the final decision to assassinate him was probably taken only in the two weeks prior to his death.

In addition to the Ayyash et al. case and January 2014 rulings on contempt and obstruction of justice by two Lebanese journalists, the tribunal is also investigating three connected attacks on Lebanese politicians (STL-11-02), which include a separate case against Mr Ayyash (STL-18-10). The connected attacks, which are also under the court’s jurisdiction, include the 1 October 2004 assassination attempt on Marwan Hamade, the 21 June 2005 assassination of George Hawi, and the 12 July 2005 assassination attempt on Elias El-Murr. On 2 June 2021, Trial Chamber II cancelled the start of the trial in the Ayyash connected case (STL-18-10), which was to begin on 16 June 2021, due to a lack of funds and suspended the proceedings.

The severe financial situation has led the STL, which is funded 51 percent by voluntary contributions from States and 49 percent by the Government of Lebanon, to enter into a residual phase on 1 July 2022. The mandate of STL President, Judges, Prosecutor, and Head of the Defense Office came to their end on 28 February 2023. In December 2022, the mandate of the Tribunal was extended by the Secretary-General until 31 December 2023, for the limited purpose of completing the non-judicial residual functions and the orderly closure of the STL at the end of 2023.

The work of the court has been highly politically sensitive. In particular, the tribunal has faced opposition from Hezbollah, whose members were accused of participating in the Hariri assassination. In January 2011, the pending indictments of Hezbollah members by the STL led to the fall of the Lebanese government, with Hezbollah-led pro-Syrian March 8 alliance forming a new ruling coalition. Hezbollah, whose military and political power has increased significantly since 2006, repeatedly denounced the tribunal as a political tool of its enemies, called on Lebanon to withdraw its judges and end its financial contributions to the STL, and threatened anyone cooperating with it. In 2018, the Hezbollah-led alliance won the elections for the first time since the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon in 2005, but its popular support decreased after it opposed the popular protests that erupted in October 2019.

The STL was prevented from completing its core mandate by lack of funds. The funding shortfall was caused by insufficient voluntary contributions following the sentencing in the main case (STL-11-01) and the inability of Lebanon to meet its financial obligations in the wake of its 2021 economic and financial crisis. In September 2021, the UN and the government of Lebanon have agreed on a framework for the performance of residual functions at the STL, which would preserve its legal framework, but suspend STL’s judicial and investigative activity. The tribunal’s work would instead be limited mainly to the management and preservation of STL’s records and archives, assistance to national authorities, responses to requests for information, and protection and support of victims and witnesses. It was also agreed that upon the closure of the tribunal, the UN would become the custodian of its records and archives (S/2021/796).

Despite the completion of the judicial activity by the STL, no individuals have been designated by the Committee since the authorization of sanctions in 2005.


Coerce

Coerce the government of Syria to cooperate with the Commission’s investigation and cease interference in Lebanon.

Constrain

N/A.

Signal

Signal support for the criminal investigation of the Hariri assassination and subsequent judicial processes.


Mandatory

Travel ban and assets freeze on individuals designated by the Commission or the Government of Lebanon (upon Sanctions Committee agreement) as suspected of involvement in the terrorist attack on Rafiq Hariri.


No individual targets have been specified.


Potential scope of impact

Low

UN sanctions should have little impact on the general population since they are focused exclusively on specific individuals and entities.


Sanctions Committee created, no sanctions monitoring mechanism in place. Designation criteria were specified but targets were not designated. Enforcement authorities not specified.

International Independent Investigation Commission reports:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1636/investigation-commission

Special Tribunal for Lebanon proceedings:

https://www.stl-tsl.org/en


Coercion

Ineffective

Policy outcome

After the passing of UNSCR 1636, Syrian cooperation with the Commission regarding access to individuals, sites, and information improved, but became less significant following the transfer of the jurisdiction to the STL in 2009. Although Syria withdrew its military forces from Lebanon in April 2005, it did not cease to interfere in Lebanese political life, mainly through the support of Hezbollah. However, the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 forced it to focus primarily on its domestic affairs.

Sanctions contribution

No individual designations were made by UN; UNIIIC investigation and reports and bilateral diplomatic pressure were more significant to the outcome, as was the domestic challenge faced by the Syrian regime.

Constraint

N/A

Policy outcome

Neither the Commission (whose mandate ended in 2009) nor the Government of Lebanon have ever notified the UNSC to apply the sanctions.

Sanctions contribution

N/A.

Signaling

Ineffective

Policy outcome

Creation of a special Commission and Tribunal sent a strong signal in support of an international judicial process early in the episode, internationalizing the case. However, the court has faced significant political opposition from Hezbollah, whose members were accused, and its focus on low-level Hezbollah-members executing the terrorist attack, rather than probing the motive for the assassination and identifying those responsible for taking the decision to kill Rafik Hariri (including the possible role played by Syria and Hezbollah’s leadership), weakened the signal over time.The sentencing of three suspects in the main case in 2022 brought the investigative and judicial processes connected to the 2005 assassination of Rafik Hariri to a close. However, bringing the judicial proceedings of the connected cases to a close following the inability to secure sufficient funding for the continued operation of the Tribunal diminished the signal, as well as the perceived commitment of the UN Security Council to reach the inoperative sanctions regime’s objectives in full.

Sanctions contribution

Although sanctions have been threatened, their lack of use has weakened the signal. The investigative and judicial processes under UNIIIC and STL present the most significant sources of signaling.

Overall

Ineffective

Decline in the credibility and/or legitimacy of UN Security Council.


31-10-2005

Substantive

  • Imposes travel ban and financial asset freeze (designations by Commission or Government of Lebanon).
  • Specifies designation criteria.
  • Decides that sanctions will terminate when all investigative and judicial proceedings relating to the 14 February 2005 terrorist attack have been completed (unless otherwise decided by the UN Security Council).

Procedural

  • Establishes Sanctions Committee and specifies its mandate.

15-12-2005

Procedural

  • Extends Commission mandate (6 months).

29-03-2006

Substantive

  • Requests Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Lebanon to establish an international tribunal.

15-06-2006

Procedural

  • Extends Commission mandate (1 year).

27-03-2007

Substantive

  • Extends Commission mandate (until 15.06.2008).

30-05-2007

Procedural

  • Establishes Special Tribunal for Lebanon (entry into force on 10.06.2007 for 3 years) and specifies the details of its statutes, organization, and formation.

02-06-2008

Procedural

  • Extends Commission mandate (until 31.12.2008).

17-12-2008

Procedural

  • Extends Commission mandate (until 28.02.2009) [Jurisdiction was subsequently transferred to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which opened on 1 March 2009].

09-12-2022

Substantive

  • Decides that the provision, processing or payment of funds, other financial assets, or economic resources, or the provision of goods and services necessary to ensure the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance or to support other activities that support basic human needs is permitted and not in violation of asset freeze imposed by the UNSC or its Sanctions Committees
  • The exception applies to the United Nations, including its Programmes, Funds and Other Entities and Bodies, as well as its Specialized Agencies and Related Organizations, international organizations, humanitarian organizations having observer status with the United Nations General Assembly and members of those humanitarian organizations, or bilaterally or multilaterally funded non-governmental organizations participating in the United Nations Humanitarian Response Plans, Refugee Response Plans, other United Nations appeals, or OCHA-coordinated humanitarian “clusters,” or their employees, grantees, subsidiaries, or implementing partners while and to the extent that they are acting in those capacities, or by appropriate others as added by any individual Committees established by the UNSC within and with respect to their respective mandates
  • Requests providers relying on the above exception to use reasonable efforts to minimize the accrual of any benefits prohibited by sanctions, including by strengthening risk management and due diligence strategies and processes
  • Decides that the above exception will apply to all future asset freezes imposed or renewed by the UNSC in the absence of an explicit decision to the contrary

Procedural

  • Clarifies that the above exception supersedes previous resolutions in case of conflict
  • Requests annual briefing by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator for each relevant Sanctions Committee, including on the provision of funds or resources to designated individuals or entities
  • Directs Sanctions Committees to issue context-specific Implementation Assistance Notices and monitor the implementation of the exception
  • Requests the Secretary-General to issue a written report on the unintended adverse humanitarian consequences of UNSC sanctions measures (within 9 months)