The UNSC made an implicit threat to impose UN sanctions, in UNSCR 731 (21 January 1992). Two months later, after little substantive response from the Libyan government, the Council passed UNSCR 748 (31 March 1992), imposing targeted sanctions.
Coerce Libyan authorities to cooperate with investigations of Lockerbie and UTA bombings (provide a full and effective response to requests for information from 3 Permanent Member of the UNSC) and to renounce the use of terrorism.
Constrain the Government of Libya from engaging in international terrorism.
Signal (reinforce) the norm against state terrorism.
Aviation ban (including maintenance servicing and insurance), arms imports embargo on the government forces, and diplomatic sanctions (reductions of personnel and limits on the mobility of those remaining, denial of entry or expulsion of previously denied or expelled Libyan nationals suspected of involvement in terrorism).
No individual sanctions imposed.
UN sanctions are likely to have significant impacts on the general population, since they include restrictions on the import of widely used commodities (such as oil), major commodity exports, and/or the transportation or financial sectors that affect the entire economy.
Sanctions imposition deliberately delayed by 15 days. Sanctions Committee created, no sanctions monitoring mechanism in place. Enforcement authorities not specified.
Libya initially offered to turn over suspects to a court monitored by the Arab League or the UN in June 1992, a move rejected by the US and the UK; later, in late September early October 1993, the Government of Libya stated its intent to encourage those charged in the Lockerbie bombing to appear for trial in Scotland and expressed willingness to cooperate with French authorities.
US and UK sanctions were also present, but UN Targeted Sanctions appear to have been necessary for Libya counter-proposals.
Statements of Libyan official regarding costs of sanctions and decision to offer suspects indicated a change of strategy away from previous non-response.
Sanctions were probably necessary for the outcome, but co-existed with unilateral sanctions.
Norm was well-articulated, but target's ability to mobilize external support (from Morocco and Zimbabwe, both UNSC members at the time) limited its degree of stigmatization.
UN sanctions were the primary mechanism through which the norm is being enforced.
Resource diversion, humanitarian consequences.