Taking note of the letters and statements of the Government of Libya (29 September and 1 October 1993) indicating the intent to encourage suspects to appear for trial in Scotland and willingness to cooperate with French authorities, the UNSC reiterated its demands that Libya complied fully with UNSCRs 731 and 748. In UNSCR 883 (11 November 1993), the UNSC added a partial government asset freeze (exempting petroleum, petroleum sector equipment and maintenance services, as well as oil services equipment); strengthened enforcement of the aviation ban (which greater details on proscribed activities); and maintained the arms embargo. UNSCR 883 also spelled out explicitly criteria for the suspension of the sanctions, once suspects were handed over. This was reaffirmed in UNSCR 1192 of 27 August 1998.
Evidence of sanctions fatigue emerged later in the episode. The ICJ claimed jurisdiction over the dispute in February 1998 and, in June 1998, the OAU officially allowed its Member States to ignore the aviation ban, unless the US and the UK agreed to a trial for the suspects in a neutral country. In August 1998, the US and UK proposed a trial before a specially created Scottish Court sitting in a neutral territory, the Netherlands. UNSCR 1192 spelled out the terms for the suspension of sanctions, once the Secretary-General reports that the accused have arrived for trial in the Netherlands.
Coerce Libyan authorities to hand over suspects in the Lockerbie and UTA bombings and to renounce the use of terrorism.
Constrain the Government of Libya from engaging in international terrorism.
Signal (reinforce) the norm against state terrorism.
Ongoing aviation ban (strengthened), arms imports embargo (on government forces), and diplomatic sanctions (limit travel and number of diplomatic personnel, limit visas).
Newly imposed government asset freeze (exempting petroleum derived financial resources) and oil services equipment ban (specific items).
Sanctions imposition deliberately delayed by 20 days. Sanctions Committee in place, no sanctions monitoring mechanism. Enforcement authorities not specified.
Given the similarity to a Libyan proposal offered years before (trial before a Scottish court), the central change in behavior came from accommodation on the part of the US and UK, concerned about the decline in support for sanction against Libya.
Sanctions reinforced other measures. They constrained Qadhafi and prompted him to an extensive effort to counter their effects. Growing sanctions fatigue also played a major role.
Clear evidence of economic impact and some evidence of reduction in proscribed activity (state support for terrorism).
UN Aviation ban and cumulative effect of petroleum services sector sanctions appear to have played a major role.
Stigmatization of the regime declined over time. Signal to Libya that by delivering two individuals for trial the sanctions would be suspended; also a signal to Libya's many supporters in the AU and AL that their requests had been taken into consideration.
UN sanctions clearly specified the terms of an agreement, but Qadhafi's diplomatic counter-offensive reduced his stigmatization.
Increase in corruption and criminality, strengthening of authoritarian rule, rally round the flag effect, resource diversion, humanitarian consequences, decline in the credibility and/or legitimacy of UN Security Council.