Libya II - EP 4

After a DPRK-flagged vessel exporting Libyan oil from a rebel-held port of Sidra in eastern Libya was intercepted off the coast of Cyprus on 8 March 2014 upon the request of the internationally-recognized Libyan government, the General National Congress (GNC), UNSCR 2146 (19 March 2014) imposed a ban on illicit crude oil exports from Libya, as well as related financial transactions, vessels port entry, and provision of bunkering services, in an effort to thwart the financing of non-state actors. To this end, it requested the establishment of a Government focal point to identify vessels for designation and authorized MS inspections of those vessels.

In May 2014, General Haftar, operating with the backing of Zintana-based militias, launched Operation Dignity (Karama), challenging the authority of the GNC and targeting “terrorist” groups in the country. Islamist and Misrata-based militias reacted with the launch of Operation Libya Dawn (Fajr) in July 2014. Initial clashes over control of Tripoli, which fell into the hands of the Libya Dawn coalition in August 2014, later spread to other parts of the country. Both coalitions faced challenges from more radical, Al-Qaida and ISIL-affiliated Islamist groups operating around the country, which were increasingly becoming prominent actors on their own. The warring factions were fighting for control over the country’s oil infrastructure and financial institutions and by mid-2014, Libya descended into a civil war. UN staff, including UNSMIL, was evacuated in mid-July and Ansar al-Sharia, Al-Qaida affiliate whose Derna and Benghazi branches were designated by the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee on 19 November 2014, proclaimed the establishment of an emirate in Benghazi on 31 July 2014.

The situation was complicated further after the Operation Dignity and Libya Dawn coalitions took sides in the institutional crisis that erupted between the GNC and its elected successor, the House of Representatives (HoR), in August 2014. The GNC refused to hand over power to HoR after the body decided to convene in the eastern city of Tobruk instead of Benghazi. The two parliaments appointed rival governments and accused each other of procedural irregularities and illegality. The Tripoli-based GNC was supported by the Libya Dawn coalition, while the Tobruk-based HoR was backed by General Haftar’s forces which were subsequently integrated into the Libyan national army. In the fighting that erupted between the two rival governments, the GNC took over a number of administrative buildings, oil facilities, ports, and airports. Despite its limited control over much of Libya’s territory and borders, the newly elected HoR became internationally recognized as the legitimate government of Libya. Regionally, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Chad, and Saudi Arabia supported the HoR, while Qatar, Turkey, Algeria, Sudan, and Niger supported the GNC.

On 27 August 2014, the Security Council reacted to the situation by re-imposing the requirement for Committee approval of arms imports to the Libyan government (UNSCR 2174). The resolution also broadened the sanctions designation criteria to include those “engaging in or providing support for other acts that threaten the peace, stability or security of Libya, or obstruct or undermine the successful completion of its political transition.” The Special Representative (SR) and head of UNSMIL, Bernardino León, subsequently launched mediation efforts to bring both parties to engage in a political dialogue and reach a consensus about the next steps in Libya’s political transition.

Although UNSCR 2174 allowed for designations of leaders of militias from both sides of the conflict and León repeatedly stressed their potential usefulness in containing spoilers to the political process, balanced designations were blocked by disagreements among the P5, most notably in June 2015. Although the HoR was implicitly recognized by the Security Council as the de facto legitimate Government of Libya, no government arms imports embargo exemptions were authorized by the Sanctions Committee (despite numerous calls by HoR, the Arab League, and Jordan). A two-way arms embargo notwithstanding, Libya remained not only the destination but also the main source of illicit arms in the region. The Panel of Experts stressed that post-2011 transfers of arms to Libya, as well as the widespread practice of hiring militias by the two rival governments, further exacerbated the internal security problem and urged suspension of all military materiel transfers rather than lifting of the restrictions. Disagreement between Libya and the ICC persisted over the case of Saif al-Islam Qadhafi whom Libya refused to hand over to the ICC, proceeding instead with its own in absentia trial in which he was sentenced to death in July 2015. Responding to the ICC’s demands, Libyan authorities stressed that Qadhafi’s sentence was not yet final and he could not be surrendered because he was not in the Government’s custody.

UN-brokered talks between representatives of HoR and GNC, as well as a broad range of other domestic actors, continued throughout 2015. Although local conflicts with tribal, criminal, and terrorist groups continued and ISIL significantly expanded its control over Libyan territory, fighting between the two coalitions stopped in April 2015. On the political front, a preliminary political agreement providing for a ceasefire and the creation of a national unity government was signed by a number of participants in Skhirat, Morocco on 11 July 2015. While elements within the Libya Dawn coalition publicly supported the dialogue, the GNC did not endorse the text and new rounds of talks were held in the hope to reach a final agreement before the expiration of HoR term in October 2015. SR León subsequently presented a final version of the agreement, which incorporated some of GNC’s objections, and the parties agreed on the proposed composition of the future presidency council on 8 October 2015.

Mandatory

Ongoing arms imports (all parties, conditional Government exemptions for security, disarmament, and counter-terrorism) and arms exports embargo, travel ban, individual/entity and political entity (government) asset freeze, and financial sector restrictions (sovereign wealth funds asset freeze).

Newly imposed ban on illicit crude oil exports and related vessels port entry, provision of bunkering services, and financial transactions.