Libya II - EP 4

After a DPRK-flagged vessel exporting Libyan oil from a rebel-held port of Sidra in eastern Libya was intercepted off the coast of Cyprus on 8 March 2014 upon the request of the internationally-recognized Libyan government, the General National Congress (GNC), UNSCR 2146 (19 March 2014) imposed a ban on illicit crude oil exports from Libya, as well as related financial transactions, vessels port entry, and provision of bunkering services, in an effort to thwart the financing of non-state actors. To this end, it requested the establishment of a Government focal point to identify vessels for designation and authorized MS inspections of those vessels.

Operating with the backing of Zintana-based militias, General Haftar launched Operation Dignity (Karama) in May 2014, challenging the authority of the GNC and targeting “terrorist” groups in the country. Islamist and Misrata-based militias reacted with the launch of Operation Libya Dawn (Fajr) in July. Initial clashes over control of Tripoli, which fell into the hands of the Libya Dawn coalition in August 2014, later spread to other parts of the country. Both coalitions faced challenges from more radical, Al-Qaida and ISIL-affiliated Islamist groups operating around the country, which were increasingly becoming prominent actors on their own. The warring factions were fighting for control over the country’s oil infrastructure and financial institutions and by mid-2014, Libya descended into a civil war. UN staff, including UNSMIL, was evacuated in mid-July and Ansar al-Sharia, Al-Qaida affiliate whose Derna and Benghazi branches were designated by the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee on 19 November 2014, proclaimed the establishment of an emirate in Benghazi on 31 July 2014.

The situation was complicated further after the Operation Dignity and Libya Dawn coalitions took sides in the institutional crisis that erupted between the GNC and its elected successor, the House of Representatives (HoR), in August 2014. The GNC refused to hand over power to HoR after the body decided to convene in the eastern city of Tobruk instead of Benghazi. The two parliaments appointed rival governments and accused each other of procedural irregularities and illegality. The Tripoli-based GNC was supported by the Libya Dawn coalition, while the Tobruk-based HoR was backed by General Haftar’s forces which were subsequently integrated into the Libyan national army. In the fighting that erupted between the two rival governments, the GNC took over a number of administrative buildings, oil facilities, ports, and airports. Despite its limited control over much of Libya’s territory and borders, the newly elected HoR became internationally recognized as the legitimate government of Libya. Regionally, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Chad, and Saudi Arabia supported the HoR, while Qatar, Turkey, Algeria, Sudan, and Niger supported the GNC.

On 27 August 2014, the Security Council reacted to the situation by re-imposing the requirement for Committee approval of arms imports to the Libyan government (UNSCR 2174). The resolution also broadened the sanctions designation criteria to include those “engaging in or providing support for other acts that threaten the peace, stability or security of Libya, or obstruct or undermine the successful completion of its political transition.” The Special Representative and head of UNSMIL, Bernardino León, subsequently launched mediation efforts to bring both parties to engage in a political dialogue and reach a consensus about the next steps in Libya’s political transition.

Although UNSCR 2174 allowed for designations of leaders of militias from both sides of the conflict and León repeatedly stressed their potential usefulness in containing spoilers to the political process, balanced designations were blocked by disagreements among the P5, most notably in June 2015. Although the HoR was implicitly recognized by the UNSC as the de facto legitimate Government of Libya, no government arms imports embargo exemptions were authorized by the Sanctions Committee (despite numerous calls by HoR, the Arab League, and Jordan). A two-way arms embargo notwithstanding, Libya remained not only the destination but also the main source of illicit arms in the region. The Panel of Experts stressed that post-2011 transfers of arms to Libya, as well as the widespread practice of hiring militias by the two rival governments, further exacerbated the internal security problem and urged suspension of all military materiel transfers rather than lifting of the restrictions. Disagreement between Libya and the ICC persisted over the case of Saif al-Islam Qadhafi whom Libya refused to hand over to the ICC, proceeding instead with its own in absentia trial in which he was sentenced to death in July 2015. Responding to the ICC’s demands, Libyan authorities stressed that Qadhafi’s sentence was not yet final and he could not be surrendered because he was not in the Government’s custody.

UN-brokered talks between representatives of HoR and GNC, as well as a broad range of other domestic actors, continued throughout 2015. Although local conflicts with tribal, criminal, and terrorist groups continued and ISIL significantly expanded its control over Libyan territory, fighting between the two coalitions stopped in April 2015. A preliminary political agreement providing for a ceasefire and the creation of a national unity government was signed by a number of participants in Skhirat, Morocco on 11 July 2015. While elements within the Libya Dawn coalition publicly supported the dialogue, the GNC did not endorse the text. UNSMIL presented a final version of the document (which incorporated some of GNC’s objections) in October 2015. Hardliners on both sides, including General Haftar (aligned with HoR), rejected the document and both governments delayed its adoption. In defiance of the UN-mediated process, HoR unilaterally extended its mandate beyond 20 October 2015 and GNC launched an alternative negotiation in Tunis in November. The new SRSG Martin Kobler, who was named in November 2015, refused to change the October text and following a substantial degree of international pressure – including through a 13 December 2015 Rome Communiqué that effectively denounced parallel negotiation efforts by objecting GNC and HoR leaders – members of both governments signed the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) on 17 December 2015. The LPA, which became the roadmap for the subsequent political transition in Libya, envisaged the creation of a Presidency Council and a Government of National Accord (GNA), and the co-existence of two legislative bodies – HoR and a consultative High Council of State (comprised mostly of GNC members). UNSCR 2259 (23 December 2015) welcomed the signing of the LPA, endorsed the Rome Communiqué supporting GNA as the sole legitimate government of Libya, and called upon Member States to “cease support to and official contact with parallel institutions that claim to be the legitimate authority but are outside of the Agreement.”

The Presidency Council headed by Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj arrived in Tripoli on 30 March 2016. However, HoR did not formally endorse the GNA, which had been nominated by the Presidency Council, maintaining reservations regarding the transfer of military power under Article 8 of the LPA that would see General Haftar lose his position as commander of Libyan armed forces. The following day, on 31 March 2016, UNSCR 2278 renewed provisions regarding illicit crude oil exports and requested the appointment of two GNA focal points, one for oil exports and another for communication regarding its security forces. After HoR approved the exports of crude oil from Tobruk on 26 April 2016, the GNA demanded the first designation of a vessel illegally exporting Libyan crude oil, which led to its listing, interception, and subsequent delisting upon compliance. In May 2016, western-based pro-GNA armed groups and eastern-based anti-GNA factions mobilized (separately) to retake Sirte from ISIL and 20 Foreign Ministers met in Vienna to reiterate their support for LPA and PM Serraj, encouraging him to continue setting up the GNA. UNSCR 2292 (14 June 2016) authorized inspection of vessels suspected of arms imports and exports embargo violations and UNSCR 2298 (22 July 2016) authorized Member States’ assistance in eliminating Libya’s chemical weapons stockpile at Libya’s request.

The Presidency Council and the GNA, however, continued to be opposed by both elements of HoR and former GNC. The HoR President called on HoR members to stop collaborating with the GNA Presidency Council-controlled ministries in September 2016, while forces loyal to the former GNC Prime Minister took over the buildings of the High Council of State in October. Armed clashes between pro- and anti-GNA militias and division of financial and economic institutions continued throughout 2016, despite the SRSG’s attempts to overcome the political deadlock as well as mediation efforts by a number of international actors, including the US. In October 2016, UNSMIL drafted a new roadmap to amend the LPA, which was endorsed by the Quartet (UN, EU, AU, and the Arab League) in March 2017. A regional initiative between Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt was launched at the beginning of 2017 and an Egypt-led process to integrate Libya’s military forces followed.

Pro-GNA forces, supported by US airstrikes, liberated Sirte from ISIL control in December 2016, and, in March 2017, GNC forces were drawn out of Tripoli. Despite the successes, internal divisions within the Presidency Council, as well as tensions with the south, increased in 2017. After one of its southern members resigned in January 2017, declaring that the Council had “failed,” violence in the south flared up in April. In July 2017, Haftar’s Libyan National Army declared Benghazi “liberated” from terrorism and began focusing on Derna. Although ISIL ceased to hold territory in Libya in mid-2017, it continues being active in the country. After years of inaction, the ICC unsealed an arrest warrant against a former head of the Libyan Internal Security Agency in April 2017 and issued a new arrest warrant against a commander close to General Haftar in August 2017 (a second arrest warrant followed in July 2018). On 9 June 2017, after an amnesty issued by HoR, Saif al-Islam Qadhafi was released by the Zintan militias holding him despite a pending ICC arrest warrant and a 2015 death sentence issued in absentia by a court in Tripoli. All three remain at large. The admissibility of Saif al-Islam Qadhafi’s case, which was repeatedly challenged by his lawyer, was confirmed by the ICC in April 2019 and March 2020.

On 26 June 2017, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 2362, expanding the UNSCR 2146 illicit crude oil exports ban and the related vessels port entry, bunkering services, financial transactions ban, and inspection authorization to all illicit petroleum exports, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, subject to periodic renewal. It also welcomed the appointment of UNSCR 2146 GNA focal point, making it a common channel of communication regarding all illicit petroleum exports information. Two listings of vessels were subsequently made in July and August 2017 (both were delisted in April 2018).

Martin Kobler was replaced as SRSG on 22 June 2017 by Ghassan Salamé and a new round of mediation efforts by a range of actors tried to address the Libyan political deadlock. On 25 July 2017, Serraj and Haftar met in Paris, issuing a 10-point declaration including a ceasefire and a commitment on working towards elections and securing the Libyan territory against terrorism and trafficking. The Security Council welcomed the meeting and the joint declaration two days later (SC/12933), but it remained largely unimplemented. On 20 September 2017, SRSG Salamé unveiled a new UN Action Plan, endorsed by the Security Council in its 10 October 2017 Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2017/19). The Plan’s four-step sequence included (1) adoption of amendments to LPA, (2) organization of a national conference, (3) agreement on a constitution, and (4) holding of parliamentary and presidential elections. Although HoR approved the UN Action Plan in November, the High Council of State (comprised mostly of GNC members) as well as General Haftar (military supporter of the HoR) rejected it, with the former claiming that the LPA ceases to be effective on 17 December 2017, two years following its signing. In response, the Security Council adopted a Presidential Statement on 14 December 2017 (S/PRST/2017/26) emphasizing “the continuity of the LPA throughout Libya’s transitional period” and declaring it the “only viable framework to end the Libyan political crisis.”

Although there has been little progress on amending the LPA, a February 2018 Libyan supreme court decision removed legal challenges against the 29 July 2017 constitution adopted by the Libyan Constitution Drafting Assembly (rejected by HoR) and the first phase of the inclusive national conference took place in April 2018. On 29 May 2018, leaders of the Presidential Council, HoR, High Council of State, and General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) attended an international conference hosted by French President Macron in Paris under UN auspices. Although they did not sign a common document, they declared their commitment to adopt election legislation by 16 September 2018, hold parliamentary and presidential elections by 10 December 2018, and unite the country’s financial and security institutions that have been split since 2014. The momentum generated by the conference, as well as the commitments of the parties of the Paris Declaration, were welcomed by the Security Council in a Presidential Statement on 6 June 2018 (S/PRST/2018/11). The Statement also welcomed the conclusion of the first phase of the National Conference, launched by SRSG Salamé in line with his 2017 UN Action Plan. When the deadlines set in the 29 May 2018 Paris declaration passed without progress, further international conferences were convened in November 2018 in Palermo and in February 2019 in Abu Dhabi.

On 7 June 2018, the Sanctions Committee designated 6 individuals for serious human rights abuses against migrants and refugees in Libya (4 Libyan and 2 Eritrean nationals). Four were leaders of transnational trafficking networks, one head of the Patrol Refinery Guard, and one commander of the Regional Coast Guard in the north-western part of the country. The listing presented the first additions to the Libyan sanctions list since 2011 and the first ever listings for human trafficking. The designations follow UNSCR 2240 from 9 October 2015, in which the Security Council condemned the acts of migrant smuggling and human trafficking into, via, and from the Libyan territory, but invoke more general human rights abuses listing criteria from UNSCR 1970, 2174, and 2213 rather than extend the criteria specifically to migrant smuggling and human trafficking. UNSCR 2240 also authorized the use of all commensurate measures, including inspection and seizure, against vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya suspected of being used for migrant smuggling and human trafficking (originally for 1 year, renewed periodically thereafter). Besides being responsible for human rights violations, the 2018 Panel of Experts report indicated that trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants also represented a significant source of income for armed groups, which provide protection services and extract passage taxes from existing smuggling and trafficking networks.

Two more designees were added in 2018. On 11 September 2018, the Sanctions Committee designated an individual for attempting an illicit export of oil, as well as for his role in recruiting foreign fighters and participation in repeated attacks on the country’s oil installations, which resulted in significant losses for the Libyan economy. The need for an exclusive control over Libya’s oil resources, which is regularly challenged by armed groups (including General Haftar’s LNA), under the GNA-controlled National Oil Company, as well as the need to bring other economic and financial institutions under GNA oversight, was stressed by the Security Council in July 2018 (SC/13429). A second individual travel ban and asset freeze designation, targeting a senior commander of an anti-GNA armed group responsible for attacks against civilians and repeated attempts to remove GNA from power, was added on 16 November 2018. Expanding the UN sanctions regime on Libya, UNSCR 2441 from 5 November 2018 added a new designation criterion, enabling the imposition of sanctions for sexual and gender-based violence. Introduced by the Netherlands and Sweden, it was opposed by Russia and China, who abstained during the adoption of the resolution.

Following months of military escalation over the control of oil fields and key strategic locations in the south of Libya, the situation in the country was profoundly transformed by the launch of a military offensive on Tripoli by General Khalifa Haftar on 4 April 2019. Targeting the internationally recognized GNA, the LNA military operation was initiated during the Secretary General’s visit to Libya ahead of the UN-organized National Conference planned for mid-April. Amidst ongoing fighting, the conference was cancelled and progress on the political track stalled, with both parties being intransigent by making maximalist demands and preferring to advance their positions militarily.

The outbreak of a military conflict between General Haftar’s LNA and Tripoli-based GNA, headed by Prime Minister Serraj, led to the re-alignment of various Libyan armed groups with either of the two sides. Although Haftar expected a swift victory, the alignment of Misrata militias and local Tripoli-based militias with the GNA led to months of military stalemate, with the LNA at the outskirts of Tripoli. Both sides received external supplies of arms, technical support, and non-Libyan fighters in violation of the UN arms embargo, which fueled the conflict and strengthened its proxy character. According to the 2019 Panel of Experts report, which called the arms embargo violations “repeated and sometimes blatant,” the majority of transfers to LNA came from Jordan and the UAE, while Turkey openly acknowledged militarily supporting the GNA. Armed groups from Chad and Sudan operated on both sides, but most Sudanese groups were affiliated with LNA, while the majority of fighters from Chad were on the side of the GNA. A strong UNSC response to the renewed fighting has been difficult due to internal divisions. Although all P5 members recognize the GNA as the legitimate government of Libya, France, Russia, and the US tend to support General Haftar politically (regionally, Haftar enjoys the support of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt). Partly as a result, an attempt by the UK, the penholder on Libya, to adopt a resolution calling for a ceasefire failed in mid-April 2019. The UNSC did agree, however, on press elements stressing the need to de-escalate the situation, commit to a ceasefire, and return to UN political mediation in July 2019 (SC/13873), with further reiterations in August and December 2019.

In response to the ongoing conflict, SRSG Ghassan Salamé proposed a new 3 steps plan in July 2019, involving a truce, a high-level international conference, and a meeting with influential Libyan personalities. A set of meetings subsequently took place in Berlin, but external support for both sides of the conflict continued. Most notably, on 27 November 2019, the GNA and Turkey signed two cooperation agreements, one on military and security, another on maritime boundary delineations. Following a request from the GNA, Turkey sent troops to Libya on 5 January 2020, openly intervening on the side of the GNA. Turkey and Russia subsequently tried to organize a ceasefire between the warring parties, but General Haftar refused to sign and his supporters proceeded to block oil facilities in mid-January, which has had a significant impact on the GNA’s revenue stream. On 19 January 2020, another international conference took place in Berlin. The participating states, many of whom support one of the two sides, adopted conclusions on six areas related to the conflict (i.e. political, economic and financial, security, arms embargo, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law) and committed to refrain from interfering in Libya’s armed conflict and internal affairs. The conference also led to the establishment of a military “5+5 committee” (composed of 5 representatives nominated by Serraj and 5 by Haftar) and an international follow-up committee. The Security Council endorsed the outcomes of the Berlin Conference in UNSCR 2510 (12 February 2020), demanding that member states not intervene in the conflict. Two rounds of indirect talks took place in Geneva in February 2020, but failed to produce an agreement. SRSG Salamé resigned on 2 March 2020, citing stress-related health issues, and external interference in the Libyan conflict continued.

Despite the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in March 2020, neither UNSMIL’s call for a humanitarian ceasefire, nor the SG’s call for a global ceasefire held, and the conflict intensified. In early April 2020, the GNA military coalition started to make military advances against Haftar’s LNA forces, in large part due to significant Turkish support. On 27 April 2020, General Haftar announced his intention to set up alternative political institutions, declaring “the end” of the UN-mediated agreement signed in 2015. However, all LNA positions in greater Tripoli were retaken by the GNA in June 2020. Egypt’s subsequent ceasefire proposal was rejected by the GNA, which was turning the tide of the conflict militarily. The Egyptian Parliament authorized a military intervention in July 2020, which was welcomed by the LNA-affiliated HoR.

Amidst the latest resurgence of violence, UNSMIL, the SG, as well as the Panel of Experts repeatedly denounced increases in arms embargo violations. However, in the tense situation caused by renewed fighting and various attempts to secure foreign funding by preventing the flow of migrants to Europe, the Panel noted that human trafficking and migrant smuggling “all but collapsed” in comparison with the pre-2018 period, decreasing by almost 90 percent since its peak in 2016. Smuggling of petroleum products by both land and sea, while continuing at significant levels, also decreased. Several attempts to export crude oil illicitly were thwarted, and the GNA appointed a new focal point for UNSCR 2146. No new vessels were designated, however, and the focal point mechanism continued to face serious implementation issues, not least because of the continued existence of rival institutions and limited control of GNA over the country’s oil infrastructure.

The UNSC also continued to extend the UNSCR 2362 sanctions restrictions on the illicit exports of petroleum products, as well as UNSCR 2240 human trafficking and UNSCR 2292 arms embargo related vessel inspection authorizations. However, verification of the implementation of the arms embargo through vessel inspections was de facto suspended between March 2019 and April 2020 due to internal divisions within the EU that stripped EUNAVFOR MED Operation SOPHIA of its naval assets. Maritime controls resumed under the follow-up Operation IRINI, which acts under both UNSC authorizations.

Mandatory

Ongoing arms imports (all parties, conditional Government exemptions for security, disarmament, and counter-terrorism) and arms exports embargo, travel ban, individual/entity and political entity (government) asset freeze, and financial sector restrictions (sovereign wealth funds asset freeze).

Newly imposed ban on illicit crude oil exports and related vessels port entry, provision of bunkering services, and financial transactions (expanded to all illicit petroleum exports in June 2017).

Travel ban:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1970/exemptions_measures/travel-ban

Travel ban exemptions in effect:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1970/exemptions_measures/arms-embargo/travel-exemptions

Asset freeze:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1970/exemptions_measures/assets-freeze

Carve out provisions for humanitarian actors apply, as specified in UNSCR 2664 (2022).

Arms embargo:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1970/exemptions_measures/arms-embargo

Illicit petroleum exports:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1970/exemptions_measures/illicit-crude-oil-exports

Current and maximum number of designees during the episode – 28 individual travel ban and 23 individual asset freeze designees (including members of former regime and individuals engaged in migrant smuggling and human trafficking) and 2 entity asset freeze designees (Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio and Libyan Investment Authority). 3 vessels were designated during the episode for varying periods of time (none remains listed).

Current list of sanctions designees:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1970/materials

New sanctions (illicit crude oil exports ban and related financial transactions, vessels port entry, and provision of bunkering services, from June 2017 on all illicit petroleum products) imposed for a limited time period (1 year) and renewed periodically. Ongoing sanctions in place indefinitely. Sanctions Committee and Panel of Experts in place. Designation criteria were specified and targets designated. Enforcement authorities specified.

Implementation assistance notices:

• Subsidiaries of LIA and LAIP
• Arms embargo
• Arms embargo violations, reporting, and disposal
• Travel ban
• Asset freeze (management fees)
• Asset freeze (interest and other earnings)

Panel of Experts reports:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1970/panel-experts/reports