Libya II - EP 5

On 9 October 2015, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 2240, condemning the acts of migrant smuggling and human trafficking into, via, and from the Libyan territory. Urging all governments and regional organizations to be vigilant with regards to such acts and cooperate with the Libyan government in addressing the issue, it authorized the use of all commensurate measures, including inspection and seizure, against vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya suspected of being used for migrant smuggling and human trafficking (originally for 1 year, renewed periodically thereafter). This presented a significant change in the Council’s approach to Libya, which was previously focused exclusively on domestic developments with regards to the political transition.

On the political front, the Security Council on 9 October 2015 welcomed the announcement of the proposed names for the Presidency Council of the future national unity government and commended the dialogue participants on finalizing the political agreement (SC/12074), the draft version of which was signed in July 2015 in Skhirat, Morocco. However, hardliners on both sides, including General Haftar (aligned with HoR), rejected the document and both governments delayed its adoption. In defiance of the UN-mediated process, the HoR unilaterally extended its mandate beyond 20 October 2015 and the GNC launched an alternative negotiation in Tunis in November. The new SRSG Martin Kobler, who was named in November 2015, refused to change the October text and following a substantial degree of international pressure – including through a 13 December 2015 Rome Communiqué that effectively denounced parallel negotiation efforts by objecting GNC and HoR leaders – members of both governments signed the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) on 17 December 2015. The LPA, which became the roadmap for the subsequent political transition in Libya, envisaged the creation of a Presidency Council and a Government of National Accord (GNA), and the co-existence of two legislative bodies – HoR and a consultative High Council of State (comprised mostly of GNC members). UNSCR 2259 (23 December 2015) welcomed the signing of the LPA, endorsed the Rome Communiqué supporting GNA as the sole legitimate government of Libya, and called upon Member States to “cease support to and official contact with parallel institutions that claim to be the legitimate authority but are outside of the Agreement.”

2016

The Presidency Council headed by Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj arrived in Tripoli on 30 March 2016. However, the HoR did not formally endorse the GNA, which had been nominated by the Presidency Council, maintaining reservations regarding the transfer of military power under Article 8 of the LPA that would see General Haftar lose his position as commander of Libyan armed forces. The following day, on 31 March 2016, UNSCR 2278 renewed provisions regarding illicit crude oil exports and requested the appointment of two GNA focal points, one for oil exports and another for communication regarding its security forces. After the HoR approved the exports of crude oil from Tobruk on 26 April 2016, the GNA demanded the first designation of a vessel illegally exporting Libyan crude oil, which led to its listing, interception, and subsequent delisting upon compliance. In May 2016, western-based pro-GNA armed groups and eastern-based anti-GNA factions mobilized (separately) to retake Sirte from ISIL and 20 Foreign Ministers met in Vienna to reiterate their support for the LPA and PM Serraj, encouraging him to continue setting up the GNA. UNSCR 2292 (14 June 2016) authorized the inspection of vessels suspected of arms imports and exports embargo violations and UNSCR 2298 (22 July 2016) authorized Member States’ assistance in eliminating Libya’s chemical weapons stockpile at Libya’s request.

The Presidency Council and the GNA, however, continued to be opposed by both elements of the HoR and former GNC. The HoR President called on HoR members to stop collaborating with the GNA Presidency Council-controlled ministries in September 2016, while forces loyal to the former GNC Prime Minister took over the buildings of the High Council of State in October. Armed clashes between pro- and anti-GNA militias and division of financial and economic institutions continued throughout 2016, despite the SRSG’s attempts to overcome the political deadlock as well as mediation efforts by a number of international actors, including the US. In October 2016, UNSMIL drafted a new roadmap to amend the LPA, which was endorsed by the Quartet (UN, EU, AU, and the Arab League) in March 2017. A regional initiative between Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt was launched at the beginning of 2017 and an Egypt-led process to integrate Libya’s military forces followed.

2017

Pro-GNA forces, supported by US airstrikes, liberated Sirte from ISIL control in December 2016, and, in March 2017, GNC forces were drawn out of Tripoli. Despite the successes, internal divisions within the Presidency Council, as well as tensions with the south, increased in 2017. After one of its southern members resigned in January 2017, declaring that the Council had “failed,” violence in the south flared up in April. In July 2017, Haftar’s Libyan National Army declared Benghazi “liberated” from terrorism and began focusing on Derna. Although ISIL ceased to hold territory in Libya in mid-2017, it remained active in the country.

In December 2016, UNSMIL and OHCHR published a joint report on human rights abuses against migrants in Libya, calling the situation a “human rights crisis” and, in February 2017, Libyan PM Serraj and Italian PM Gentiloni signed a memorandum of understanding on stemming the flow of migrants to Europe, which included the training and equipment of security forces and coast guard, building migrant holding centers, and improving the technological security of the southern Libyan border.

After years of inaction, the ICC unsealed an arrest warrant against a former head of the Libyan Internal Security Agency in April 2017 and issued a new arrest warrant against a commander close to General Haftar in August 2017 (a second arrest warrant followed in July 2018). On 9 June 2017, after an amnesty issued by the HoR, Saif al-Islam Qadhafi was released by the Zintan militias holding him despite a pending ICC arrest warrant and a 2015 death sentence issued in absentia by a court in Tripoli. All three remain at large. The admissibility of Saif al-Islam Qadhafi’s case, which was repeatedly challenged by his lawyer, was confirmed by the ICC in April 2019 and March 2020.

On 26 June 2017, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 2362, expanding the UNSCR 2146 illicit crude oil exports ban and the related vessels port entry, bunkering services, financial transactions ban, and inspection authorization to all illicit petroleum exports, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, subject to periodic renewal. It also welcomed the appointment of the UNSCR 2146 GNA focal point, making it a common channel of communication regarding all illicit petroleum exports information. Two listings of vessels were subsequently made in July and August 2017 (both were delisted in April 2018).

Martin Kobler was replaced as SRSG on 22 June 2017 by Ghassan Salamé and a new round of mediation efforts by a range of actors tried to address the Libyan political deadlock. On 25 July 2017, Serraj and Haftar met in Paris, issuing a 10-point declaration including a ceasefire and a commitment on working towards elections and securing the Libyan territory against terrorism and trafficking. The Security Council welcomed the meeting and the joint declaration two days later (SC/12933), but it remained largely unimplemented. On 20 September 2017, SRSG Salamé unveiled a new UN Action Plan, endorsed by the Security Council in its 10 October 2017 Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2017/19). The Plan’s four-step sequence included (1) the adoption of amendments to the LPA, (2) the organization of a national conference, (3) an agreement on a constitution, and (4) the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections. Although the HoR approved the UN Action Plan in November, the High Council of State (comprised mostly of GNC members) as well as General Haftar (military supporter of the HoR) rejected it, with the former claiming that the LPA ceases to be effective on 17 December 2017, two years following its signing. In response, the Security Council adopted a Presidential Statement on 14 December 2017 (S/PRST/2017/26) emphasizing “the continuity of the LPA throughout Libya’s transitional period” and declaring it the “only viable framework to end the Libyan political crisis.”

2018

Although there was little progress on amending the LPA, a February 2018 Libyan supreme court decision removed legal challenges against the 29 July 2017 constitution adopted by the Libyan Constitution Drafting Assembly (rejected by HoR) and the first phase of the inclusive national conference took place in April 2018. On 29 May 2018, leaders of the Presidential Council, the HoR, the High Council of State, and General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) attended an international conference hosted by French President Macron in Paris under UN auspices. Although they did not sign a common document, they declared their commitment to adopt election legislation by 16 September 2018, hold parliamentary and presidential elections by 10 December 2018, and unite the country’s financial and security institutions that have been split since 2014. The momentum generated by the conference, as well as the commitments of the parties of the Paris Declaration, were welcomed by the Security Council in a Presidential Statement on 6 June 2018 (S/PRST/2018/11). The Statement also welcomed the conclusion of the first phase of the National Conference, launched by SRSG Salamé in line with his 2017 UN Action Plan. When the deadlines set in the 29 May 2018 Paris declaration passed without progress, further international conferences were convened in November 2018 in Palermo and in February 2019 in Abu Dhabi.

On 7 June 2018, the Sanctions Committee designated 6 individuals for serious human rights abuses against migrants and refugees in Libya (4 Libyan and 2 Eritrean nationals). Four were leaders of transnational trafficking networks, one head of the Patrol Refinery Guard, and one commander of the Regional Coast Guard in the north-western part of the country. The listing presented the first additions since 2011 and the first ever listings for human trafficking. The designations followed UNSCR 2240 from 9 October 2015, in which the Security Council condemned the acts of migrant smuggling and human trafficking into, via, and from the Libyan territory. However, they invoked more general human rights abuses listing criteria from UNSCR 1970, 2174, and 2213 rather than extend the criteria specifically to migrant smuggling and human trafficking. Besides being responsible for human rights violations, the 2018 Panel of Experts report indicated that trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants also represented a significant source of income for armed groups, which provide protection services and extract passage taxes from existing smuggling and trafficking networks.

Two more designees were added in 2018. On 11 September 2018, the Sanctions Committee designated an individual for attempting an illicit export of oil, as well as for his role in recruiting foreign fighters and participation in repeated attacks on the country’s oil installations, which resulted in significant losses for the Libyan economy. The need for an exclusive control over Libya’s oil resources, which is regularly challenged by armed groups (including General Haftar’s LNA), under the GNA-controlled National Oil Company, as well as the need to bring other economic and financial institutions under GNA oversight, was stressed by the Security Council in July 2018 (SC/13429). A second individual travel ban and asset freeze designation, targeting a senior commander of an anti-GNA armed group responsible for attacks against civilians and repeated attempts to remove GNA from power, was added on 16 November 2018. Expanding the UN sanctions regime on Libya, UNSCR 2441 from 5 November 2018 added a new designation criterion, enabling the imposition of sanctions for sexual and gender-based violence. Introduced by the Netherlands and Sweden, it was opposed by Russia and China, who abstained during the adoption of the resolution.

2019

Following months of military escalation over the control of oil fields and key strategic locations in the south of Libya, the situation in the country was profoundly transformed by the launch of a military offensive on Tripoli by General Khalifa Haftar on 4 April 2019. Targeting the internationally recognized GNA, the LNA military operation was initiated during the Secretary General’s visit to Libya ahead of the UN-organized National Conference planned for mid-April 2019. Amidst ongoing fighting, the conference was cancelled and progress on the political track stalled, with both parties being intransigent by making maximalist demands and preferring to advance their positions militarily.

The outbreak of a military conflict between General Haftar’s LNA and Tripoli-based GNA, headed by Prime Minister Serraj, led to the re-alignment of various Libyan armed groups. Although Haftar expected a swift victory, the alignment of Misrata militias and local Tripoli-based militias with the GNA led to months of military stalemate, with the LNA at the outskirts of Tripoli. Both sides received external supplies of arms, technical support, and non-Libyan fighters in violation of the UN arms embargo, which fueled the conflict and strengthened its proxy character. According to the 2019 Panel of Experts report, which called the arms embargo violations “repeated and sometimes blatant,” the majority of transfers to LNA came from Jordan and the UAE, while Turkey openly acknowledged militarily supporting the GNA. Armed groups from Chad and Sudan operated on both sides, but most Sudanese groups were affiliated with LNA, while the majority of fighters from Chad were on the side of the GNA. A strong UNSC response to the renewed fighting was difficult due to internal divisions. Although all P5 members recognized the GNA as the legitimate government of Libya, France, Russia, and the US tended to support General Haftar politically (regionally, Haftar enjoyed the support of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt). Partly as a result, an attempt by the UK, the penholder on Libya, to adopt a resolution calling for a ceasefire failed in mid-April 2019. The UNSC did agree, however, on press elements stressing the need to de-escalate the situation, commit to a ceasefire, and return to UN political mediation in July 2019 (SC/13873), with further reiterations in August and December 2019.

In response to the ongoing conflict, SRSG Ghassan Salamé proposed a new 3 steps plan in July 2019, involving a truce, a high-level international conference, and a meeting with influential Libyan personalities. A set of meetings subsequently took place in Berlin, but external support for both sides of the conflict continued. Most notably, on 27 November 2019, the GNA and Turkey signed two cooperation agreements, one on military and security, another on maritime boundary delineations.

2020

Following a request from the GNA and the signing of a security and military cooperation agreement in November 2019, Turkey sent troops to Libya on 5 January 2020, openly intervening on the side of the GNA. Turkey and Russia subsequently tried to organize a ceasefire between the warring parties, but General Haftar refused to sign and his supporters blocked oil facilities in mid-January 2020, which had a significant impact on the GNA’s revenue stream (translating into a loss of around USD 10 billion until production returned to normal in December 2020).

On 19 January 2020, another international conference took place in Berlin. The participating states, many of whom supported one of the two sides, adopted conclusions on six areas related to the conflict (i.e. political, economic and financial, security, arms embargo, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law) and committed to refrain from interfering in Libya’s armed conflict and internal affairs. The conference also led to the establishment of a military “5+5 committee” (composed of 5 representatives nominated by Serraj and 5 by Haftar) and an international follow-up committee. The Security Council endorsed the outcomes of the Berlin Conference in UNSCR 2510 (12 February 2020), demanding that member states not intervene in the conflict. Two rounds of indirect talks took place in Geneva in February 2020, but failed to produce an agreement. SRSG Salamé resigned on 2 March 2020, citing stress-related health issues, and external interference in the Libyan conflict continued.

Despite the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in March 2020, neither UNSMIL’s call for a humanitarian ceasefire, nor the Secretary-General’s call for a global ceasefire held. Instead, the conflict intensified and the military situation in the country changed significantly. In early April 2020, the GNA military coalition started to make advances against Haftar’s LNA forces, in large part due to significant Turkish support. On 27 April 2020, General Haftar announced his intention to set up alternative political institutions, declaring “the end” of the UN-mediated agreement signed in 2015. However, all LNA positions in greater Tripoli were retaken by the GNA in June 2020. Egypt’s subsequent ceasefire proposal was rejected by the GNA, which was turning the tide of the conflict militarily in its favor. The Egyptian Parliament authorized a military intervention in July 2020, which was welcomed by the LNA-affiliated HoR. However, Turkish involvement on the side of the GNA had turned the tide. LNA forces (now renamed Libyan Arab Armed Forced, LAAF), supported by the UAE and Wagner mercenaries, were pushed out of Tripoli and its surroundings.

The changed fortunes on the battlefield allowed negotiations between Haftar and the GNA to succeed in October 2020. The 5+5 Joint Military Commission signed a ceasefire agreement on 23 October 2020 and the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum unanimously agreed to hold presidential and parliamentary elections in Libya on 24 December 2021.

During the 2019-2020 violent clashes, the Panel noted that human trafficking and migrant smuggling “all but collapsed” in comparison with the pre-2018 period, decreasing by almost 90 percent since its peak in 2016. Smuggling of petroleum products by both land and sea, while continuing at significant levels, also decreased. Several attempts to export crude oil illicitly were thwarted, and the GNA appointed a new focal point for UNSCR 2146. No new vessels were designated, however, and the focal point mechanism continued to face serious implementation issues, not least because of the continued existence of rival institutions and limited control of GNA over the country’s oil infrastructure.

Verification of the implementation of the arms embargo through vessel inspections was de facto suspended between March 2019 and April 2020 due to internal divisions within the EU that stripped EUNAVFOR MED Operation SOPHIA of its naval assets. Maritime controls resumed under the follow-up Operation IRINI, which acts under both UN Security Council authorizations. On 14 October 2021, the GNA announced that it arrested Abd al Rahman al-Milad, who was sanctioned by the Council on 7 June 2018 for his involvement in trafficking and smuggling of migrants and related human rights violations.

2021

In March 2021, the Government of National Unity (GNU) was formed to unite the former GNA and the Haftar-backed government in the east, with the HoR electing Abdul Hamid Dabeiba as Prime Minister and Mohamed al-Menfi as Chairman of the Presidential Council of the GNU. The Security Council welcomed the appointments in a statement on 12 March 2021 (S/PRST/2021/6) and Fayez al-Serraj transferred his powers on 15 March 2021.

However, simmering tensions between the GNU and the Haftar-backed HoR bloc in Tobruk undermined the implementation of the 2020 ceasefire agreement and political transition, by delaying the organization of elections, the withdrawal of foreign fighters and mercenaries, and the reopening of the strategically important Sirta-Misrata road. Moreover, the disputes over national budgets, as well as Central Bank appointments and policy, continued. In September 2021, the eastern HoR bloc withdrew its support for the unity government, although the UN continued to recognize the GNU as the only legitimate government of Libya. The HoR subsequently issued laws for presidential and parliamentary elections, respectively, in both cases without the appropriate procedures or consultations with rival political factions.

In November 2021, UN Special Envoy and UNSMIL head Ján Kubiš (appointed in January 2021) resigned following criticisms of his endorsement of HoR election laws. The UN Secretary-General called on Libyans to agree on a common legal framework for the elections and appointed Stephanie Williams to replace Kubiš. On 17 November 2021, the UN Security Council threatened sanctions against those “obstructing or undermining the elections” (S/2021/958), but contentions over candidates and laws continued, ushering in decision of the High National Electoral Commission (HNEC) on 22 December 2021 to postpone the elections that were scheduled for 24 December 2021, first by one month but eventually indefinitely. The decision was internationally received with deep disappointment, including by the UN, the US, and the EU. Arms shipments to both the GNU and the LAAF continued, including by Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Russia, and the UAE, leading the PoE in its 2022 report to speak of “a totally ineffective arms embargo.”

2022

Internal political divisions in Libya deepened further in 2022. On 17 January 2022, HoR Speaker Aguila Saleh stated that Dabeiba’s mandate as GNU Prime Minister had expired and called for the establishment of a unity government and constitutional drafting process. In February 2022, the HoR appointed former GNA Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha as Prime Minister, after he had made an agreement with his erstwhile opponent Khalifa Haftar. In March 2022, the new Tobruk-based Government of National Stability (GNS) was sworn in, appointing Haftar allies for cabinet positions and increasing funds to his military forces. GNU Prime Minister Dabaiba denounced the HoR’s appointment of a rival GNS government under Bashagha and vowed to remain in office until national elections were held.

In April 2022, the five Khalifa-appointed military officers withdrew from the UN-backed 5+5 Joint Military Commission amidst the ongoing dispute over competing national budgets and the decision of the National Oil Corporation (NOC) to transfer oil revenues to the Tripoli-based central bank under internationally recognized GNU PM Dabeiba’s control. In response, Haftar’s forces blocked oil and gas fields as well as an export terminal, cutting the country’s crude oil exports by one third until the reopening of export terminals in July 2022.

In May 2022, HoR Speaker Aghela Saleh (supporting the GNS) and head of Tripoli-based High State Council (HSC) Khaled al-Meshri (supporting the GNU) discussed in Egypt a possible “third way” that would replace the governments of both Dabeiba and Bashagha. In July 2022, a series of popular demonstrations against the political deadlock and economic crisis spread across the country. On 8 July 2022, HoR-appointed GNS Prime Minister Bashagha encouraged armed groups to support his bid for taking over the GNU, leading to armed confrontations in Tripoli in July and August 2022 that, however, failed to overthrow the Dabeiba government. In November 2022, newly appointed UN Special Envoy and head of UNSMIL Abdoulaye Bathily called for legislative and presidential elections. Instead, infighting between HCS Chair Khaled al-Meshri and GNU Prime Minister Dabeiba, who opposed al-Meshri’s negotiations with the HoR, led to tensions in Tripoli, with Dabeiba’s forces temporarily encircling HCS headquarters in a show of force. Reflecting on developments in 2022, the 2023 PoE report noted continued arms embargo violations, limited withdrawal of Syrian and Russian mercenaries, and resurgence in ISIL attacks.

2023

In January 2023, talks between HoR speaker Saleh and HSC speaker al-Meshri in Cairo led to further talks that also involved Khalifa Haftar as well as GNU Presidential Council chief Mohamed Menfi. However, Saleh declined to sign an agreement between HoR and HSC and instead declared the HoR yet again Libya’s only legitimate legislative that did not require HSC approval. Special Envoy Bathily announced on 11 March 2023 that the HoR and HSC had agreed to form a joint committee to draft electoral laws and plan national elections for later in the year. However, disputes over the share of oil revenues, central bank appointments, election laws, and the transition roadmap undermined efforts for a political transition, and negotiations over elections remained stalled.

In addition, tensions between different factions ran high in Tripoli, undermining political stability within the GNU area of control. In August 2023, the HSC elected Mohamed Tekala as its new leader, replacing al-Meshri. In the east, the HoR in May 2023 replaced Prime Minister Bashagha by Osama Hammad, a close ally of Khalifa Haftar, and Haftar further extended his personal hold on the LAAF.

Assessing developments in 2023, the PoE 2024 report noted, armed groups had overall further increased their sway over national politics as well as expanded their capacity to act with impunity in large swaths of the country, including large-scale oil and migrant smuggling around Tripoli. The PoE also highlighted continuous violations of the arms embargo, including by various member states supporting one or the other rival government with sophisticated weapons, equipment, training, and remaining foreign auxiliary forces.

2024

Despite diplomatic initiatives and support by the US, UN, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Arab League for the ongoing talks between HoR and HSC representatives in Cairo in early 2024, the political deadlock could not be ended. As a result, Bathily filed his resignation as UN special envoy in April 2024.

Rising oil revenues mitigated the economic fallout from the fragmented Central Bank, rival budgets, and extensive government spending. However, the US alleged that the Russian state currency-printing company Goznak had issued counterfeit Libyan currency worth USD 1 billion, heightening worries about financial stability and currency devaluation. In October 2024, the GNU and GNS agreed on a shared board of the central bank, an agreement which provoked hopes for political transition. Municipal elections were successfully held in November 2024. However, no concrete agreement on national elections could be reached, despite attempts by UNSMIL acting head Stephanie Koury to revitalize discussions.

At the same time, political rivalry and armed group activity in Tripoli further undermined the unity and overall control of the GNU. In the HSC, a series of contested votes for the position of the speaker resulted in a deadlock between two candidates, later politicized by the GNU and the HoR.

Moreover, the December 2024 UN PoE report noticed an increased Russian military presence in eastern Libya and weapons shipments, including of T72 tanks, part of which arrived in December following the partial withdrawal of Russian forces from Syria in that month. The LAAF had further seized two armed naval vessels in addition to acquiring through private companies dual-use vessels that were militarized after transfer. The Panel noted the continued presence of foreign fighters allied to the LAAF, and reported the failure of the arms embargo to prevent armed groups from obtaining weapons. Sophisticated military equipment was, for instance, acquired by armed groups in Misratah. In fact, “some Member States became more open about the type of military cooperation they had implemented with western and eastern armed actors,” Member States and financial institutions “were found in repeated non-compliance with the asset freeze” as well. Overall, the political instability, smuggling, diversion, arms imports, and connections to groups in other countries empowered various armed groups in Libya.

2025

On 24 January 2025, former Ghanaian FM Hanna Tetteh was appointed as UN Special Envoy and permanent chief of UNSMIL. The appointment came amidst rising concern over the security situation in Tripoli, as GNU Prime Minister Dabaiba continued to push for an increased sway over militias in the capital. Heavy fighting broke out in May 2025 between Dabeiba-allied forces linked to the defense ministry and militias supported by the ministry of interior, revealing a growing split between rival factions within the GNU and their allied armed groups. Insecurity persisted also in other parts of the country under nominal GNU control, while the LAAF consolidated its position in the east and the Haftar-backed government of Prime Minister Osama Hammad continued to conduct parallel spending with the eastern-based branch of the Central Bank.

Overall, the focus on migrant smuggling and human trafficking, which characterized the start of the episode, waned after the last related listing in October 2021. This additional objective was essentially terminated after UNSCR 2693 of 29 September 2023, which condemned migrant smuggling and human trafficking and extended UNSCR 2240 authorization to “inspect, seize, and use all commensurate measures regarding vessels used for migrant smuggling or human trafficking” on the high seas off the coast of Libya, was not renewed in 2024. However, the related listings have been maintained and the EUNAVFOR MED IRINI, which was the only regional operation implementing the authorization, continued to implement a separate authorization to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya in case of reasonable doubts that they are violating the Libya arms imports and exports embargo.

In late 2023 and early 2024, with the support of the Libyan authorities, the Libya Sanctions Committee decided to remove the travel ban of Muammar Qadhafi’s wife, Safia Farkash Al-Barassi, and daughter, Aicha Qadhafi. Both remained subject to the UN asset freeze provisions.

Following years of reiterating existing measures, renewing illicit petroleum-related measures imposed for a limited time period, expressing concern about the continued arms embargo violations, and calling on all Libyan parties to implement the 23 October 2020 ceasefire agreement and on Member States not to intervene in the conflict or take measures that exacerbate it, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2769 on 16 January 2025. The resolution added arms imports embargo exceptions for technical assistance and training to promote the process of reunification of Libyan military and security institutions and expressed readiness to consider the sale, supply or transfer of military equipment for the reunified and joint military units (under the auspices of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission and the two Chiefs of Staff) once their formation was complete. It also expanded the travel ban and asset freeze designation criteria by targeting the provision of support to armed groups or criminal networks through illicit exploitation in and illicit export of crude oil or refined petroleum from Libya and eased the asset freeze restrictions on the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA). To this end, The Security Council allowed, under specific conditions, the investment of frozen cash reserves in low-risk time deposits and fixed income instruments, in line with Panel of Experts recommendations.

Mandatory

Ongoing arms imports (all parties, conditional Government exemptions for security, disarmament, and counter-terrorism) and arms exports embargo, travel ban, individual/entity and political entity (government) asset freeze, and financial sector restrictions (sovereign wealth funds asset freeze).

Newly imposed ban on illicit crude oil exports and related vessels port entry, provision of bunkering services, and financial transactions (expanded to all illicit petroleum exports in June 2017).

Travel ban: https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1970/exemptions_measures/travel_exemptions

Asset freeze: https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1970/exemptions_measures/assets-freeze

Carve out provisions for humanitarian actors apply, as specified in UNSCR 2664 (2022).

Arms embargo: https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1970/exemptions_measures

Illicit petroleum exports: https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1970/exemptions_measures/illicit-crude-oil-exports

Current and maximum number of designees during the episode – 28 individual travel ban and 23 individual asset freeze designees (including members of former regime and individuals engaged in migrant smuggling and human trafficking) and 2 entity asset freeze designees (Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio and Libyan Investment Authority). 3 vessels were designated during the episode for varying periods of time (none remains listed).

Current list of sanctions designees:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1970/materials

New sanctions (illicit crude oil exports ban and related financial transactions, vessels port entry, and provision of bunkering services, from June 2017 on all illicit petroleum products) imposed for a limited time period (1 year) and renewed periodically. Ongoing sanctions in place indefinitely. Sanctions Committee and Panel of Experts in place. Designation criteria were specified and targets designated. Enforcement authorities specified.

Implementation assistance notices:

• Subsidiaries of LIA and LAIP
• Arms embargo
• Arms embargo violations, reporting, and disposal
• Travel ban
• Asset freeze (management fees)
• Asset freeze (interest and other earnings)
• Asset freeze (humanitarian exemption)

Panel of Experts reports:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1970/panel-experts/reports