Following six and a half years of inaction, the UNSC became re-engaged with Somalia in 2002, with the passage of two resolutions that created a Somalia Panel of Experts for the first time (UNSCR 1407, 3 May 2002 and UNSCR 1425, 22 July 2002). There was a growing concern during this episode that highly fragmented states like Somalia could become havens for a variety of different transnational threats, not only within the region, but also including international terrorism. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (or IGAD) composed of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya and Somalia played an important role in the creation of the Transitional National Government in 2000 and sponsored the Eldoret Declaration, signed in Kenya in October 2002, which provided the basis for a larger political settlement and specifically referenced concerns about terrorism (in Article 5).
The Transitional National Government was replaced by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004, which was increasingly supported as the official government of Somalia by the international community via the UN. The conflict had morphed from one of civil war amongst clan-based factions in the 1990s to growing challenges to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) from the United Islamic Courts (UIC) starting in 2004. UIC was militarily defeated in 2006 when Ethiopia (with strong US backing) invaded the country. UNSCR 1744 (20 February 2007) authorized the creation of an AU peacekeeping force (AMISOM) to stabilize Somalia after the departure of Ethiopian troops. The conflict in Somalia increasingly became a proxy war between the TFG (backed by Ethiopia, among others) and the UIC (backed by Eritrea, among others).
Coerce challengers to the TFG (especially the UIC) to cease hostilities and accept a ceasefire.
Constrain all parties to the conflict from engaging in hostilities.
Signal disapproval of the interference of neighboring states in the conflict.
Ongoing arms imports embargo on all parties to the conflict (conditional government exemptions from February 2007).
Sanctions Committee in place, Panel of Experts created, later replaced by Monitoring Group. Enforcement authorities not specified.
The UIC was not coerced to cease hostilities or agree to a ceasefire.
Although the UNSC had re-engaged with Somalia, the Ethiopian invasion and military defeat of the UIC was the single most important factor.
Evidence that the flow of weapons into Somalia increased during the episode.
The proxy war increased the flow of arms into the region, AMISOM given no authorization to enforce the arms embargo.
Degree of external interference increased during the episode; Somalia was invaded by one neighbor, and proxy war broke out within the region.
Re-engagement of the UNSC initially supported the signal, but sanctions remained essentially unchanged; other measures (US backing for Ethiopia) and the lack of UNSC response following the invasion weakened the signal.
Increase in corruption and criminality, resource diversion, decline in the credibility and/or legitimacy of UN Security Council.