Eritrea’s support of armed opposition groups (both the United Islamic Courts during EP2 and its Al-Shabaab splinter group in EP3), and official rejection of the Djibouti Agreement, combined with an attempt to resolve militarily a border dispute with Djibouti, led to the imposition of secondary sanctions (an arms imports and exports embargo, travel ban, and asset freeze) on Eritrea in UNSCR 1907 (23 December 2009) and the assumption of the responsibility for their monitoring by the Somalia Committee and its Monitoring Group. UNSCR 2023 (5 December 2011), imposed sanctions on the coercive collection of Eritrean diaspora tax, and suggested that States exercise vigilance with regard to the use of proceeds from the mining sector of Eritrea.
In April 2010, the Somalia Sanctions Committee made its first designations. The process was led by the United States and targeted primarily individuals associated with Al-Shabaab. In October 2011, Kenya intervened in the conflict in Somalia against Al-Shabaab and in support of the TFG. The operation, coordinated with the Somali military, was motivated by the activities of Al-Shabaab in and across the border with Kenya, including the kidnapping of foreign tourists and aid workers in the country.
Coerce Eritrea to support the Djibouti Peace Process on Somalia, cease interference in the affairs of neighboring states, and withdraw its forces from territory disputed with Djibouti as outlined in UNSCR 1862 (2009).
Constrain Al-Shabaab from being able to challenge the TFG (and the 2008 Djibouti Peace Agreement).
Signal disapproval of Eritrean support of Al-Shabaab and wider interference in the region.
Ongoing arms imports embargo on all parties (with conditional government exemptions) and designated individuals / entities, travel ban, and asset freeze on listed individuals / entities (including rebel factions).
Newly imposed secondary sanctions on arms imports (government forces, individuals / entities) and exports embargo, travel ban, asset freeze (individual / entity and government), and a ban on the coercive collection of diaspora tax (from December 2011).
Sanctions Committee and Monitoring Group in place. Designation criteria were specified and Somalia sanctions regime targets designated (maximum number of designees during the episode – 11 individual designees, 1 entity). Enforcement authorities not specified.
The Monitoring Group reported that Eritrea found no evidence of direct support to Al-Shabaab from Eritrea between July 2011 and the end of the episode. In June 2010, Eritrea withdrew troops from the border with Djibouti and agreed to a mediation by Qatar, but the dispute continues.
There is evidence that a portion of the Eritrean air force was grounded due to the sanctions, but there was also strong diplomatic pressure from IGAD; Eritrea fall-out with a faction of the leadership of Al-Shabaab.
Arms continued to be available in the region and Al-Shabaab gained both territory and popular support in the territory it controlled in Somalia during the first half of the episode (even after individual designations were made in 2010).
Territorial gains early in the episode enabled Al-Shabaab to find alternative financial sources of support, particularly from charcoal exports; AMISOM was present, but given no authorization to enforce the arms embargo; military reversals from the October 2011 Kenyan invasion were significant toward the end of the episode.
Secondary sanctions were unusual but sent a strong signal; Eritrea denied that it was interfering in the conflict, but it was widely recognized as heavily involved.
Secondary sanctions sent a strong stigmatizing signal, and the UNSCR was unusually explicit in its condemnation of Eritrea’s role; there was also diplomatic pressure on Eritrea from IGAD.
Strengthening security apparatus of sending states, increase in international enforcement capability, resource diversion, humanitarian consequences, decline in credibility/legitimacy of the UN Security Council.