Somalia / Al-Shabaab - EP 5

In response to increased use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by Al-Shabaab and conclusive evidence reported by the Panel of Experts in September 2019 that the group “had been manufacturing its own home-made explosives since at least July 2017”, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 2498 (15 November 2019) to impose a conditional ban on the import of components used to manufacture IEDs. In the resolution, Security Council also called on Member States to exercise vigilance regarding the sale, supply, or transfer of explosive precursors and materials that could be used to manufacture explosive devices to Somalia, and to keep records of such transactions and share information regarding suspicious transactions involving such items. To facilitate implementation of the IED components ban, the Sanctions Committee issued an implementation assistance notice on 3 August 2020.

UNSCR 2551 (12 November 2020) welcomed progress on weapons and ammunition management and renewed the arms imports embargo exemption for the development of the Somali National Security Forces or Somali security sector institutions, removing the time limitation and notification requirement introduced in UNSCR 2498. The resolution also adjusted the list of items subject to UNSCR 2498 IED components ban, extended the UNSCR 2182 authorization for maritime interdiction of arms and charcoal by inspecting vessels coming to and from Somalia, and removed the time limitation for exempting humanitarian assistance from UNSCR 1844 asset freeze (which was replaced on 9 December 2022 by the standing humanitarian exemption introduced in UNSCR 2664 across all UN sanctions regimes). IED components ban violations were added to the authorization for maritime interdiction on 15 November 2021 in UNSCR 2607 and the extended authorization was subsequently renewed in UNSCR 2661 and UNSCR 2711.

In contrast, the authorization to enter into and take all necessary measures for suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea in Somalia, which was introduced in 2008 in UNSCR 1846 and UNSCR 1851, lapsed on 3 March 2022. The latest authorization in UNSCR 2608 (3 December 2021) was not extended upon Somalia’s request, following a significant reduction in piracy-related incidents, two years with no recorded incidents off the coast of Somalia, and almost 15 years of anti-piracy efforts by the international community, the shipping industry, and the Federal Government of Somalia.

The Security Council further adjusted the arms imports embargo to Somalia in November 2022, when it welcomed the Secretary-General’s technical assessment of the weapons and ammunition management capability of Somalia and the proposed benchmarks and recommendations (S/2022/698). Noting with concern Al-Shabaab’s ability to generate revenue and launder, store and transfer resources, carry out terrorism, and destabilize Somalia and the region, UNSCR 2662 (17 November 2022) adopted a new arms imports embargo wording and exempted Somalia’s security and police institutions at the national and local level (except for items in Annexes A and B, for which no-objection and prior notification were required, respectively). To facilitate the arms imports embargo implementation, an updated information assistance notice summarizing the notification requirements and the no-objection process was issued on 26 May 2023.

On 7 September 2023, UNSCR 2696 authorized a one-off export of charcoal stockpile by the Federal Government of Somalia. This followed a recommendation from October 2022 by the Panel of Experts and the publication of an updated implementation assistance notice regarding recommendations on procedures and notification requirements related to inspection of vessels suspected of carrying charcoal from Somalia and the seizure of charcoal suspected to originate in Somalia on 18 May 2023. Overall, the Panel found only one major export of charcoal from Somalia during the episode, in 2022. This was largely due to the efforts by the Federal Government of Somalia, political pressure on both the import and export side, and monitoring of the charcoal trade at sea by international actors.

During the episode, the Somali Federal Government made significant progress in its security-related objectives with the support of AMISOM/ATMIS and US forces, including adherence to the February 2021 Somali transition plan and the conduct of military offensives against Al-Shabaab. However, the state-building process was complicated by disagreements between the Federal Government and federal Member States and between the President Farmaajo and the Prime Minister Roble, especially in relation to the National Security Architecture, the transition of security responsibilities to Somali security forces, and the elections.

In late 2020 and early 2021, political tensions flared regarding the holding of elections, which were due to take place in 2020. Owing to the logistical difficulties in organizing the first direct elections since 1969 on time, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, the leaders of Somalia’s Member States and the Federal Government reached a political agreement on 17 September 2020 to organize the parliamentary and presidential elections under a modified indirect system that would continue to make use of clan delegates. Amidst election delays, violent protests erupted as President Farmaajo unilaterally extended his mandate and subsequently signed a law extending his and the lower house’s mandate for two years to allow sufficient time for direct, “one-person, one-vote” elections. Under intense domestic and international pressure, he reversed his decision on 27 April 2021. Having previously expressed concern over the ongoing electoral disagreements (SC/14503), Security Council members welcomed an agreement reached on the implementation of the 17 September 2020 electoral model between the President and the Prime Minister of Somalia (SC/14537). However, significant delays continued, and the elections were not completed until 15 May 2022, when Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (Somalia’s President from 2012 to 2017) was elected President. A peaceful transfer of power from former President Farmaajo took place on 23 May 2022. The legislative elections concluded in November 2021.

Under the new Somali leadership, relations with federal Member States improved (though continued to flare up over unilateral extensions of political mandates amidst prolonged discussions of electoral reform and a conflict in Las Anod) and the fight against Al-Shabaab intensified. The new military offensive led by the Somali National Army was supported by the AU Transition Mission to Somalia (ATMIS), which took over from AMISOM on 1 April 2022 (in line with UNSCR 2628), and US troops deployment approved in May 2022. The concerted efforts resulted in the largest territorial gains against Al-Shabaab since mid-2010s, primarily in central Somalia.

However, Al-Shabaab, which the Panel of Experts in 2022 estimated to have between 5,000 to 10,000 fighters, continued to pose the primary security threat in Somalia. Not only did it continue to control large areas within the country, but the group also managed to maintain its ability to conduct attacks in areas not under its control, including in the capital Mogadishu, and fund its activities through an elaborate system of extortion methods (including the illicit taxation of agriculture, vehicles, goods and livestock documented by the Panel of Experts). Reaffirming its regional ambitions, Al-Shabaab also engaged in cross-border attacks in Ethiopia and Kenya. Despite the conditional restrictions in place, the group continued to make use of improvised explosive devices within Somalia, with the number of casualties from IED attacks rising since 2020.

The main Government challenge at the end of the episode was maintaining and further expanding the gains against Al-Shabaab, while proceeding with the gradual handover of security responsibilities from ATMIS to the Somali National Army, in line with the Somali Transitional Plan. To this end, the Somali Federal Member States agreed in March and August 2023 to increase the number of military and police personnel and unify their military operations against Al-Shabaab, while accelerating the preparations for the second phase of the offensive, targeting areas in Southern Somalia. In response to requests by the Federal Government of Somalia and ATMIS contributing countries, the Security Council adjusted the drawdown plan of ATMIS in UNSCR 2670 (21 December 2022), UNSCR 2687 (27 June 2023), and UNSCR 2710 (15 November 2023), while maintaining the planned exit of ATMIS from Somalia by December 2024.

Mandatory

Ongoing arms imports embargo on all parties to the conflict (with conditional government exemptions) and designated individuals and entities, travel ban and asset freeze on listed individuals/entities (including rebel factions), and charcoal exports ban from Somalia.

Newly imposed conditional ban on the import of items that can be used for the manufacture of explosive devices to Somalia.

Maximum number of designees during the episode: 20 individuals and 1 entity.

Current list of sanctions designees:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/751/materials

Sanctions Committee and Panel of Experts in place. Designation criteria were specified and targets designated. Enforcement authorities specified (AMISOM, from 31 March 2022 ATMIS).