In response to increased use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by Al-Shabaab and conclusive evidence reported by the Panel of Experts in September 2019 that the group “had been manufacturing its own home-made explosives since at least July 2017”, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 2498 (15 November 2019) to impose a conditional ban on the import of components used to manufacture IEDs. In the resolution, Security Council also called on Member States to exercise vigilance regarding the sale, supply, or transfer of explosive precursors and materials that could be used to manufacture explosive devices to Somalia, further calling on them to keep records of such transactions and share information regarding suspicious transactions involving such items.
As of 2020, the Somali Federal Government had made some progress in its security-related objectives with the support of AMISOM and US forces, but the state-building process was complicated by difficulties in the dialogue between the Federal Government and States, especially in relation to the National Security Architecture and the transition of security responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali security forces.
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Constrain Al-Shabaab from challenging the Federal Government of Somalia.
Signal support for a peaceful resolution to the conflict, and subsidiary concerns such as the transitional government and process, good governance, anti-terrorism, anti-piracy, among others.
Ongoing arms imports embargo on all parties to the conflict (with conditional government exemptions) and designated individuals and entities, travel ban and asset freeze on listed individuals/entities (including rebel factions), and charcoal exports ban from Somalia.
Newly imposed conditional ban on the import of items that can be used for the manufacture of explosive devices to Somalia (from November 2019).
All secondary sanctions on Eritrea were lifted at the beginning of the episode.
Travel ban:
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/751/exemptions/travel-ban
Travel ban exemptions in effect:
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/751/exemptions/travel-exemptions
Asset freeze:
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/751/exemptions/arms-embargo/assetsfreeze
Carve out provisions for humanitarian actors apply, as specified in UNSCR 2664 (2022).
Arms embargo:
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/751/exemptions/arms-embargo
IED components ban:
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/751/exemptions/arms-embargo/ied-component-ban
Current and maximum number of designees during the episode: 20 individuals and 1 entity.
Current list of sanctions designees:
UN sanctions can have some non-discriminating impact on the general population, since they include arms embargoes, diplomatic sanctions, and/or restrictions on the conduct of particular activities or the export of specific commodities.
Sanctions Committee in place. The Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group was terminated at the start of the episode and replaced with a Panel of Experts on Somalia. Designation criteria were specified and targets designated. Enforcement authorities specified (AMISOM).
Implementation assistance notices:
Panel of Experts reports:
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/751/work-and-mandate/reports
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Al-Shabaab has been able to maintain a diverse source of revenue (mainly extorsion/taxation of economic activity) and has continued to be able to engage in violence, in particular through IEDs. The 2019 Panel of Experts report stated that money was not a limiting factor for Al-Shabaab.
While there has been a decline in charcoal exports from Al-Shabaab, the group has been able to establish new sources of revenue. The use of military force by the Federal Government, AMISOM and its international allies have been the most significant for constraining Al-Shabaab forces.
The lifting of sanctions on Eritrea narrowed the focus of the sanctions regime, although the broad set of objectives related to the regime,from piracy to the presence of Al-Shabaab and the state-building process, weakens the signal and stigmatization of targets.
The continued presence of AMISOM and other forces, and diplomatic efforts are more significant for the signaling.
Strengthening security apparatus of sending states, increase in international enforcement capability, resource diversion, humanitarian consequences.