South Sudan - EP 2

Despite progress in negotiations during June 2018, during which the two main protagonists met for the first time in two years and signed the Khartoum Declaration on 27 June 2018 declaring a permanent ceasefire, the UN Security Council narrowly passed UNSCR 2428 on 13 July 2018, following up on its previous threats to apply an arms imports embargo on all parties to the conflict in South Sudan. The Council also listed two additional individuals, both on the government side, with detailed descriptions of the reasons for their designations spelled out in an Annex to the resolution. It did not follow through on designations of the three senior government ministers threatened with targeted sanctions when UNSCR 2418 was passed on 31 May 2018.

UNSCR 2428, tabled by the US as pen-holder, was contested by other members of the Council, again passing with the bare minimum of nine votes necessary for a substantive resolution, with six abstentions (including China, Russia, and Ethiopia). Ethiopia argued that the restrictive measures would be counter-productive and could jeopardize the mediation efforts still underway. The US countered that it had lost patience with the protagonists to the conflict and their previous assurances of a ceasefire and that given the continued violence committed against civilians in the preceding months, the continuation of the status quo in South Sudan was “unacceptable.”

Despite concerns regarding the impact of the new sanctions on the conflict dynamics, negotiations continued throughout July 2018 under the tutelage of Sudan’s President Bashir, and Kiir and Machar signed an Agreement on Outstanding Issues of Governance and Responsibility Sharing in Khartoum on 5 August 2018. The South Sudan Opposition Alliance and Former Detainees also signed the agreement, which called for the reinstatement of Machar as first Vice President and the creation of an independent boundaries commission to address the number of states and their boundaries. A “final” agreement addressing the distribution of ministerial posts, humanitarian issues, and justice and reconciliation issues was reached on 12 September 2018, when the two sides signed the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa. According to some South Sudan specialists, the renewed impetus for a rapprochement was driven by the desire of Kiir and Machar to avoid targeted individual sanctions from the US government for their role in the continuing cycles of violence.

According to the November 2019 Panel of Experts report, selective implementation and inconsistent international support for the R-ARCSS agreement led to a stalemate in 2019. The report argued that “the incumbent Government has demonstrated limited willingness to compromise over issues related to the transitional security arrangements, the reunification of the army and the number of states and their boundaries.” The Panel report also criticized governments in the region for failing to support detailed mediation efforts, concentrating instead on high-level meetings between Kiir and Machar, therefore leaving a number of difficult security issues unresolved. Strong disagreements over transitional security arrangements and the allocation of governorships continued, and in November 2019, a tripartite summit of Heads of State of Uganda, Sudan, and South Sudan agreed to extend the transitional period to February 2020. The US threatened high-level individual sanctions and then applied them on Vice President Gai, a close ally of Kiir, in January 2020. On 22 February 2020, a revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) was formally established, laying out a 36-month transition period prior to national elections in accordance with the 2018 R-ARCSS. President Kiir stated that “This signifies the end of war. Peace has come, and it has come to stay.” Kiir publicly asked Machar for forgiveness, and Machar pledged to work with Kiir.

The general level of violence declined in South Sudan following the signing of the September 2018 R-ARCSS, but outbreaks of violence continued. Some members of the opposition previously aligned with SPLM/A-IO remain outside of the agreement and engage in sporadic clashes with government and peacekeeping forces. Communal violence is ongoing, often triggered by limited access to water, cattle raids, or traditional clashes between farmers and herders. Four million people remained displaced in the country, refugee camps became incubators for COVID-19 infections, and humanitarian aid workers were ambushed, triggering additional US sanctions, this time under the Magnitsky Act.

Despite the general reduction in political violence since the signing of the 2018 agreement, the Security Council agreed to extend the existing sanctions regime in UNSCR 2521 (29 May 2020). Russia, China, and South Africa abstained, despite the fact that the resolution contained language calling for a formal review of the continuation of all three types of sanctions in place (individual asset freezes, travel bans, and an arms imports embargo) by the middle of December 2020 and for articulation of options for the elaboration of benchmarks for the assessment of the arms embargo. Significantly, the resolution acknowledged the positive role played by IGAD, despite concerns expressed in the Panel reports about lack of regional enforcement of the sanctions.

The April 2020 Panel of Experts report described the February 2020 agreement as “a political milestone,” yet expressed caution regarding the continued implementation of the agreement, particularly with regard to the transitional security arrangements. Units like the National Security Service remained outside the framework, and some separate militias with linkages to the government were formed. With regard to the implementation of the sanctions regime, the report emphasized lack of regional commitment to implementation of the arms embargo, especially from Sudan and Uganda, and it singled out lack of enforcement of the asset freeze by Kenya and Uganda. However, travel ban exemptions were requested, and granted by the Sanctions Committee, to enable targeted individuals to participate in mediation activities in Germany.

The Secretary-General’s report at the end of 2020 described “incremental progress” toward the implementation of the R-ARCSS and a December 2020 briefing on the report indicated that the ceasefire continued to hold in most of the country. The Transitional National Legislative Assembly was reconstituted in May 2021, but there were delays in establishing a unified command structure and both training and deployment of the transitional Necessary Unified Forces (NUF). The mandate for UNMISS and the existing sanctions regime were extended for another year in March and May 2021, respectively, but the sanctions regime was increasingly contested. The text of UNSCR 2577 (28 May 2021) stated the readiness of the Council to review the arms embargo, but noted that the review would be conditional on progress on five benchmarks related to SSR, DDR, and management of weapons stocks.

The Secretary-General’s September 2021 report indicated that localized communal violence persisted, internal disputes and infighting within the SPLM/A-IO emerged, and aid workers were fatally attacked. A briefing at the end of 2021 reported delays in the deployment of the Necessary Unified Force, as well as delays in preparation for elections. China first called for the lifting of sanctions on the country in September 2021.

The mandate of UNMISS was renewed in March 2022, and the sanctions regime renewal came up in May 2022. The April 2022 Panel of Experts report stated that nearly every component of the transitional arrangement was “now hostage to the political calculations of the country’s military and security elites,” and that the situation was “gridlocked by political disputes between its principal signatories.” The Secretary-General’s report in May 2022 concluded that there had been “limited progress” on the achievement of all five benchmarks identified in UNSCR 2577 (28 May 2021). Meanwhile intercommunal violence continued.

In the debate over the continuation of the sanctions regime in May 2022, the three African members of the Security Council (A3) argued that South Sudan lacked the capacity to fulfill the benchmarks established in 2021 and joined China in asking for a suspension of the sanctions. The US as penholder adjusted the terms of the arms embargo to allow the importation of non-lethal military equipment into South Sudan, and UNSCR 2633, extending the sanctions regime for another year, was passed on 26 May 2022 with ten votes in favor and five abstentions (from China, Russia, India, Gabon, and Kenya).

The UN Peacebuilding Commission became involved in South Sudan for the first time in October 2022. In November 2023, the Transitional National Legislative Assembly extended the transition period, originally scheduled to conclude in 2023, to February 2025. Despite ongoing inter-communal and sub-national violence, an UNMISS human rights report described a decline in violent incidents in the country.

During deliberations over the extension of the UNMISS mandate in March 2023, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNMISS Nicholas Haysom described “some progress” in the implementation of the NUF and the constitution and noted favorably the government’s request for electoral assistance. At the same time, there were some delays in implementation of the transitional arrangements and an increase in civilian casualties, reversing the previous year’s trend.

The Panel of Experts report in April 2023 stated that the implementation of the roadmap for the transition remained behind schedule and that “efforts to weaken opposition groups, continued reliance on local youth militias, and delays in the formation of a unified national army have fragmented the security landscape, compounded by the free flow of weapons between civilians and the military.” The April 2023 Secretary-General report on benchmarks reported some progress on three of the five benchmarks, but agreed with the Panel that progress on DDR and the management of arms and arms stockpiles was lacking.

When the sanctions regime came up for renewal in May 2023, the pattern of contestation over their continuation, particularly regarding the arms embargo, continued. In February 2023, the AU Peace and Security Council had called for the lifting of “all punitive measures” on South Sudan. After contentious negotiations, UNSCR 2683 was adopted on 30 May 2023, containing a renewed commitment to review the arms embargo (linked to progress on benchmarks) and lifting of the notification requirement for the import of non-lethal equipment, with ten votes and five abstentions (China, Russia, and the A3).

The Panel of Experts Interim report from 28 November 2023 listed several challenges that undermined the transition process and security sector reform in particular. These included delays in training of the NUF, superficial integration of opposition militias into the SPLA, which was renamed in 2018 the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF), poor discipline and illegal activities – including arms trafficking – in the SSPDF, and the ill-conceived civilian disarmament campaign of the government that some local communities rejected as biased.

In March 2024, the Panel of Experts reported that the deployment of a first batch of the NUF signaled some progress in the transition process, but it also noted ongoing clashes between government troops of the SSPDF and the SPLM/A-IO. Defections of opposition leaders and the ongoing recruitment of fighters were further destabilizing factors. The report emphasized that the delays in the transition and the high stakes of the elections scheduled for December 2024 rendered the security situation particularly volatile.

On 5 March 2024, two South Sudanese opposition activists were arrested in the United States of America on charges of conspiring against the arms embargo by trying to export “substantial quantities of weapons” to South Sudan. The two suspects reportedly had plans to smuggle weapons into South Sudan and use them in an effort to advance “non-democratic” regime change. The Panel of Experts also reported that SSPDF imported a high number of unarmed military vehicles which were subsequently equipped with weapons and, in some cases, used by SSPDF or proxy forces in clashes with the SPLM/A-IO. New information also indicated that the government had imported armored personnel carriers in 2020 and 2022, before the easing of the arms embargo in May 2023.

The April 2024 report of the Secretary-General (S/2024/309) specified that the transitional government had made “some progress against two of the five key benchmarks”, but “no progress” against the remaining three. A particular challenge remained the absence of support and funding for the DDR process, which the report highlighted in connection with concerns about the planned elections in December 2024.

On 30 May 2024, UNSCR 2731 was passed with a vote of nine in favor and six abstentions (A3 plus China, Guyana, and Russia). The resolution renewed travel restrictions and asset freezes, as well as the arms embargo, including the removal of notification requirements for “the supply, sale or transfer of non-lethal military equipment, solely in support of the implementation of the terms of the peace.” The text further echoed concerns over the “delayed implementation” of the transition agreements in light of the scheduled elections, as well as the “continued intensification of violence, including intercommunal violence.”

In September 2024, the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity announced that it would extend the two-year transition period for an additional two years and postpone the scheduled elections until December 2026, citing a delay in the integration of security forces, preparations of elections, and drafting of a permanent constitution. The government also claimed that limited international funding and the arms embargo hampered the integration of forces and security sector reform.

As the July 2025 Panel of Experts Report observed, however, following the announcement of the extension, President Kiir reshuffled senior cabinet and military positions in an effort to consolidate his own grip on power. He dismissed two out of five Deputy Presidents, as well as the SPLA/M-IO-appointed Governor of Western Equatoria, which the SPLM/A-IO decried as a violation of the terms of the 2018 R-ARCSS. Fighting between SSPDF and SPLA-IO forces flared up again and spilled over into local conflicts in several states, including with Nuer youth and White Army forces in Upper Nile. In Juba, opposition members have been detained and, in March 2025, First Deputy President Machar was put under house arrest.

On 30 May 2025, UNSCR 2781 was adopted with 9 votes in favor and 5 abstentions (by Algeria, China, Pakistan, Russia, and Somalia). It expressed concern over the new two-year extension of the transitional political arrangement and the delayed implementation of the R-ARCSS, as well as the renewed violence between SSPDF, SPLA-IO, and local forces in different regions. It also renewed the arms embargo and targeted sanctions for another year, urging member states to take action to identify and prevent any arms embargo violations.

In its July 2025 report, the Panel of Experts mentioned a number of possible violations of the arms embargo. South Sudanese security forces seized from civilians sophisticated rifles and scopes likely imported from the Sudan and previously used by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) there. The SSPDF used two military helicopters whose crews include foreign nationals and whose maintenance raises suspicion due to the ban of spare parts imports. The SSPDF also fielded new heavy weapons, while South Sudan police forces participated in training exercises in Rwanda, also using new weapons. According to an assessment of the International Crisis Group, however, the arms embargo had some success in rendering the access to heavy weapons more difficult.

Overall, UN sanctions designations have not led to significant changes in behavior, as notably indicated by the prominent role that sanctioned individuals play in senior positions in both the government and opposition. As the Panel of Experts noted, Santino Deng Wol (SSi.004) was removed as the SSPDF Chief of Defence Forces in December 2024 in the wake of Kiir’s reshuffling of government positions, but became Undersecretary of Veteran Affairs instead, while James Koang Chuol (SSi.003) has assumed new responsibilities in the leadership of the SSPDF. In February 2025, the government also struck an agreement with opposition SPLA-IO defector Simon Gatwech Dual (SSi.002), who was then residing in Sudan, promising him a deputy position in the SSPDF and the integration of his forces. Meanwhile, in January 2025, sanctioned individual Paul Malong Awan (SSi.008) was appointed as deputy leader of the newly formed United People’s Alliance (UPA) that is composed of opposition groups not part of the R-ARCSS and seeks a separate agreement with the South Sudanese government under Kenyan mediation. Negotiations in Nairobi, were Paul Malong Awan resides, were halted by Kiir in early 2025, unrelated to the sanctions designation.

Mandatory

Ongoing individual/entity asset freeze and individual travel ban (on those responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, actions or policies that threaten the peace, security or stability of South Sudan).

Newly imposed arms imports embargo on all parties to the conflict added at the start of the episode.

Travel ban:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2206/exemptions/travel-ban

Travel ban exemptions in effect:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2206/exemptions/arms_embargo/travel-ban-exemptions-effect

Asset freeze:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2206/exemptions/assets-freeze

Carve out provisions for humanitarian actors apply, as specified in UNSCR 2664 (2022).

Arms embargo:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2206/exemptions/arms_embargo

Arms embargo exemptions in effect:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2206/exemptions/arms_embargo/arms-embargo-exemptions-effect

Current and maximum number of designees during the episode: 8 individuals (on both sides of the conflict, 5 associated with the SPLA/SSPDF/Government, 3 with the SPLM/A-IO).

Current list of sanctions designees:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2206/materials

Sanctions imposed for a limited time period (1 year) and renewed periodically. Sanctions Committee and Panel of Experts in place. Designation criteria specified and targets designated. Enforcement authorities not specified, but benchmarks for lifting the arms imports embargo introduced in 2020.

Panel of Experts reports:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2206/panel-of-experts/reports