South Sudan - EP 2

Despite progress in negotiations during June 2018, during which the two main protagonists met for the first time in two years and signed the Khartoum Declaration declaring a permanent ceasefire, the UN Security Council narrowly passed UNSCR 2428 on 13 July 2018, following up on its previous threats to apply an arms imports embargo on all parties to the conflict in South Sudan. The Council also listed two additional individuals, both on the government side, with detailed descriptions of the reasons for their designations spelled out in an Annex to the resolution. It did not follow through on designations of the three senior government ministers threatened with targeted sanctions when UNSCR 2418 was passed on 31 May 2018.

UNSCR 2428, tabled by the US as pen-holder, was contested by other members of the Council, again passing with the bare minimum of nine votes necessary for a substantive resolution, with six abstentions (including China, Russia, and Ethiopia). Ethiopia argued that the restrictive measures would be counter-productive and could jeopardize the mediation efforts still underway. The US countered that it had lost patience with the protagonists to the conflict and their previous assurances of a ceasefire and that given the continued violence committed against civilians in the preceding months, the continuation of the status quo in South Sudan was “unacceptable.”

Despite concerns regarding the impact of the new sanctions on the conflict dynamics, negotiations continued throughout July 2018 under the tutelage of Sudan’s President Bashir, and Kiir and Machar signed an Agreement on Outstanding Issues of Governance and Responsibility Sharing in Khartoum on 5 August 2018. The South Sudan Opposition Alliance and Former Detainees also signed the agreement, which called for the reinstatement of Machar as first Vice President and the creation of an independent boundaries commission to address the number of states and their boundaries. A “final” agreement addressing the distribution of ministerial posts, humanitarian issues, and justice and reconciliation issues was reached in September 2018, when the two sides signed the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa. According to some South Sudan specialists, the renewed impetus for a rapprochement was driven by the desire of Kiir and Machar to avoid targeted individual sanctions from the US government for their role in the continuing cycles of violence.

According to the November 2019 Panel of Experts report, selective implementation and inconsistent international support for the R-ARCSS agreement led to a stalemate in 2019. The report argued that “the incumbent Government has demonstrated limited willingness to compromise over issues related to the transitional security arrangements, the reunification of the army and the number of states and their boundaries.” The panel report also criticized governments in the region for failing to support detailed mediation efforts, concentrating instead on high-level meetings between Kiir and Machar, therefore leaving a number of difficult security issues unresolved. Strong disagreements over transitional security arrangements and the allocation of governorships continued, and in November 2019, a tripartite summit of Heads of State of Uganda, Sudan, and South Sudan agreed to extend the transitional period to February 2020. The US threatened high-level individual sanctions and then applied them on Vice President Gai, a close ally of Kiir, in January 2020. On 22 February 2020, a revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) was formally established, laying out a 36 month transition period prior to national elections in accordance with the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). President Kiir stated that “This signifies the end of war. Peace has come, and it has come to stay.” Kiir publicly asked Machar for forgiveness, and Machar pledged to work with Kiir.

The general level of violence declined in South Sudan following the signing of the September 2018 R-ARCSS, but outbreaks of violence continue to this day. Some members of the opposition previously aligned with SPLA-IO remain outside of the agreement and engage in sporadic clashes with government and peacekeeping forces. Communal violence is ongoing, often triggered by limited access to water, cattle raids, or traditional clashes between farmers and herders. Four million people remain displaced in the country, refugee camps have become incubators for COVID-19 infections, and humanitarian aid workers have been ambushed, triggering additional US sanctions, this time under the Magnitsky Act.

Despite the general reduction in political violence since the signing of the 2018 agreement, the Security Council agreed to extend the existing sanctions regime in UNSCR 2521 (29 May 2020). Russia, China, and South Africa abstained, despite the fact that the resolution contained language calling for a formal review of the continuation of all three types of sanctions in place (individual asset freezes, travel bans, and an arms embargo) by the middle of December 2020 and for articulation of options for the elaboration of benchmarks for the assessment of the arms embargo. Significantly, the resolution consistently acknowledges the positive role played by IGAD, despite concerns expressed in the Panel reports about lack of regional enforcement of the sanctions.

The April 2020 Panel of Experts report described the February 2020 agreement as “a political milestone,” yet expressed caution regarding the continued implementation of the agreement, particularly with regard to the transitional security arrangements. Units like the National Security Service remained outside the framework, and some separate militias with linkages to the government were formed. With regard to the implementation of the sanctions regime, the report emphasized lack of regional commitment to implementation of the arms embargo, especially from Sudan and Uganda, and it singled out lack of enforcement of the asset freeze by Kenya and Uganda. However, travel ban exemptions were requested, and granted by the Sanctions Committee, to enable targeted individuals to participate in mediation activities in Germany.

The Secretary-General’s report at the end of 2020 described “incremental progress” toward the implementation of the R-ARCSS and a December briefing on the report indicated that the ceasefire continued to hold in most of the country. The Transitional National Legislative Assembly was reconstituted in May 2021, but there were delays in establishing a unified command structure and both training and deployment of the transitional Necessary Unified Forces (NUF). The mandate for UNMISS and the existing sanctions regime were extended for another year in March and May of 2021 respectively, but the sanctions regime was increasingly contested. The text of UNSCR 2577 (28 May 2021) stated the readiness of the Council to review the arms embargo, but noted that the review would be conditional on progress on five benchmarks related to SSR, DDR, and management of weapons stocks.

The Secretary-General’s September 2021 report indicated that localized communal violence persisted, internal disputes and infighting within the SPLA-IO emerged, and aid workers were fatally attacked. A briefing at the end of the year reported delays in the deployment of the Necessary Unified Force, as well as delays in preparation for elections. China first called for the lifting of sanctions on the country in September 2021.

The mandate UNMISS was renewed in March 2022, and the sanctions regime renewal came up in May. The April 2022 Panel of Experts report stated that nearly every component of the transitional arrangement was “now hostage to the political calculations of the country’s military and security elites,” and that the situation was “gridlocked by political disputes between its principal signatories.” The Secretary-General’s report in May 2022 concluded that there had been “limited progress” on the achievement of all five benchmarks identified in UNSCR 2577(28 May 2021). Meanwhile intercommunal violence continued.

In the debate over the continuation of the sanctions regime in May 2022, the three African members of the Security Council (A3) argued that South Sudan lacked the capacity to fulfill the benchmarks established in 2021 and joined China in asking for a suspension of the sanctions. The US as penholder adjusted the terms of the arms embargo to allow the importation of non-lethal military equipment into South Sudan, and UNSCR 2633 extending the sanctions regime for another year was passed on 26 May 2022 with ten votes in favor and five abstentions (from China, Russia, India, Gabon and Kenya).

The UN Peacebuilding Commission became involved in South Sudan for the first time in October 2022. In November 2023, the Transitional National Legislative Assembly extended the transition period, originally scheduled to conclude in 2023, to February 2025. Despite ongoing inter-communal and sub-national violence, an UNMISS human rights report described a decline in violent incidents in the country.

During deliberations over the extension of the UNMISS mandate in March 2023, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNMISS Nicholas Haysom described “some progress” in the implementation of the NUF and the constitution and noted favorably the government’s request for electoral assistance. At the same time, there were some delays in implementation of the transitional arrangements and an increase in civilian casualties, reversing the previous year’s trend.

The Panel of Experts report in April 2023 stated that the implementation of the roadmap for the transition remained behind schedule and that “efforts to weaken opposition groups, continued reliance on local youth militias, and delays in the formation of a unified national army have fragmented the security landscape, compounded by the free flow of weapons between civilians and the military.” The April 2023 Secretary-General report on benchmarks reported some progress on three of the five benchmarks, but agreed with the Panel that progress on DDR and the management of arms and arms stockpiles was lacking.

When the sanctions regime came up for renewal in May 2023, the pattern of contestation over their continuation, particularly regarding the arms embargo, continued. In February 2023, the AU Peace and Security Council had called for the lifting of “all punitive measures” on South Sudan. After contentious negotiations, UNSCR 2683 was adopted on 30 May 2023, containing a renewed commitment to review the arms embargo (linked to progress on benchmarks) and lifting of the notification requirement for the import of non-lethal equipment, with ten votes and five abstentions (China, Russia, and the A3).

Mandatory

Ongoing individual/entity asset freeze and individual travel ban (on those whose actions and policies have the purpose or effect of expanding or extending the conflict in South Sudan or obstructing reconciliation or peace talks or processes, including breaches of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, and the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan).

Newly imposed arms imports embargo on all parties to the conflict.

Travel ban:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2206/exemptions/travel-ban

Travel ban exemptions in effect:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2206/exemptions/arms_embargo/travel-ban-exemptions-effect

Asset freeze:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2206/exemptions/assets-freeze

Carve out provisions for humanitarian actors apply, as specified in UNSCR 2664 (2022).

Arms embargo:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2206/exemptions/arms_embargo

Arms embargo exemptions in effect:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2206/exemptions/arms_embargo/arms-embargo-exemptions-effect

Current and maximum number of designees during the episode: 8 individuals (on both sides of the conflict, 5 associated with the SPLA, 3 with the SPLA-IO).

Current list of sanctions designees:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2206/materials

Sanctions imposed for a limited time period (1 year) and renewed periodically. Sanctions Committee and Panel of Experts in place. Designation criteria specified and targets designated. Enforcement authorities not specified, but benchmarks for lifting the arms imports embargo introduced in 2020.

Panel of Experts reports:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2206/panel-of-experts/reports