Aviation sanctions were authorized (e.g. more than threatened) in UNSCR 1070 (16 August 1996), but given a 90-day delay in implementation. Before the period was up, the SG's Special Envoy issued a report on 14 November 1996, indicating that aviation sanctions would hurt the civilian population. The Council delayed the decision to choose a date of imposition of the aviation embargo for a month and then never revisited the issue until UNSCR 1372 (28 September 2001), which terminated the sanctions (following Sudan's commitment to assist the US after 11 September 2001).
Coerce government of Sudan to hand over suspects in Mubarak assassination attempt.
N/A.
Signal support for the norm against state-sponsored terrorism. The US had concerns about Sudan's harboring of suspected terrorists, including Usama Bin Laden, who left the Sudan 19 May 1996.
Ongoing diplomatic sanctions (limit travel and number of diplomatic personnel).
Newly authorized aviation ban (never in effect).
No individual sanctions imposed.
UN sanctions can have some non-discriminating impact on the general population, since they include arms embargoes, diplomatic sanctions, and/or restrictions on the conduct of particular activities or the export of specific commodities.
Aviation ban implementation deliberately delayed (date of entry to be determined in 90 days) and then never implemented due to concern over likely negative humanitarian effects. No Sanctions Committee or sanctions monitoring mechanism in place. Enforcement authorities not specified.
Suspects were never handed over (Sudan possibly assisted the flight of one of them before the authorization of the aviation ban), but it is unclear whether the suspects remained in Sudan; there was no evident increase in state sponsorship of terrorism; indeed, some evidence that Sudan was reducing its involvement in state-sponsored terrorism during this period.
OAU and bilateral negotiations also continued during the episode; US unilateral measures against harboring of bin Laden (who left in May 1996) and its cruise missile attacks on pharmaceutical complex in August 1998 also probably played an important role.
N/A.
N/A.
Authorizing and then not imposing a sanction is not a strong signal; reduction in evidence of stigmatization by OAU and non-aligned members of the UNSC over the course of the episode.
Authorizing and then not imposing a sanction is not a strong signal; reduction in evidence of stigmatization by OAU and non-aligned members of the UNSC over the course of the episode.
No unintended consequences of sanctions observed.