Following an increase in violence in 2003 and 2004 in the Darfur Region in western Sudan, an arms embargo was imposed on non-state actors (SLM/A, JEM, Janjaweed militias, etc.) operating in the region (UNSCR 1556, 30 July 2004). UNSCR 1564 (18 September 2004) demanded all parties to cease hostilities, urged the parties to conclude a comprehensive peace agreement, and explicitly threatened petroleum sector and individual sanctions. On 9 November 2004, the Abuja Humanitarian and Security Protocols were signed (assuring access and protecting humanitarian relief workers in the western Sudan).
Sudan’s 21-year second civil war, relating to the North/South conflict within Sudan, was finally brought to an end on 9 January 2005 with the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in Nairobi.
Coerce the government to disarm the Janjaweed militia.
Sonstrain all non-governmental entities and individuals operating in Darfur (including the government-sponsored Janjaweed militias).
Send a signal to the government about its complicity in gross violations of human rights under its domain.
Arms imports embargo on non-governmental entities (territorially confined to Darfur).
No Sanctions Committee or sanctions monitoring mechanism in place. Enforcement authorities not specified.
The Government of Sudan outlined steps to disarm the Janjaweed (June 2004), but did not carry them out during the episode.
The agreement for disarmament took place before the sanctions were imposed.
No discernible constraints observed (particularly on the Janjaweed militias), and local production of arms increased.
Janjaweed militias were strengthened by being incorporated into the police and legitimated by being brought into the state (which is not a targeted party).
The norm was poorly articulated (due to the complexity of the negotiations underway in the southern Sudan conflict and to clear divisions on UNSC), but there is some evidence of stigmatization of the Government of Sudan.
Other measures (negotiations, ongoing diplomacy, and intensifying NGO pressure) appear to have been more significant than sanctions.
Strengthening of political factions, resource diversion, decline in the credibility and/or legitimacy of UN Security Council.