Sudan II - EP 1

Duration: 30-Jul-2004 to 29-Mar-2005

Following an increase in violence in 2003 and 2004 in the Darfur Region in western Sudan, an arms embargo was imposed on non-state actors (SLM/A, JEM, Janjaweed militias, etc.) operating in the region (UNSCR 1556, 30 July 2004). UNSCR 1564 (18 September 2004) demanded all parties to cease hostilities, urged the parties to conclude a comprehensive peace agreement, and explicitly threatened petroleum sector and individual sanctions. On 9 November 2004, the Abuja Humanitarian and Security Protocols were signed (assuring access and protecting humanitarian relief workers in the western Sudan).

Sudan’s 21-year second civil war, relating to the North/South conflict within Sudan, was finally brought to an end on 9 January 2005 with the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in Nairobi.


Coerce

Coerce the government to disarm the Janjaweed militia.

Constrain

Sonstrain all non-governmental entities and individuals operating in Darfur (including the government-sponsored Janjaweed militias).

Signal

Send a signal to the government about its complicity in gross violations of human rights under its domain.


Mandatory

Arms imports embargo on non-governmental entities (territorially confined to Darfur).


No Sanctions Committee or sanctions monitoring mechanism in place. Enforcement authorities not specified.


Coercion

Ineffective

Policy outcome

The Government of Sudan outlined steps to disarm the Janjaweed (June 2004), but did not carry them out during the episode.

Sanctions contribution

The agreement for disarmament took place before the sanctions were imposed.

Constraint

Ineffective

Policy outcome

No discernible constraints observed (particularly on the Janjaweed militias), and local production of arms increased.

Sanctions contribution

Janjaweed militias were strengthened by being incorporated into the police and legitimated by being brought into the state (which is not a targeted party).

Signaling

Ineffective

Policy outcome

The norm was poorly articulated (due to the complexity of the negotiations underway in the southern Sudan conflict and to clear divisions on UNSC), but there is some evidence of stigmatization of the Government of Sudan.

Sanctions contribution

Other measures (negotiations, ongoing diplomacy, and intensifying NGO pressure) appear to have been more significant than sanctions.


Strengthening of political factions, resource diversion, decline in the credibility and/or legitimacy of UN Security Council.


30-07-2004

Substantive

  • Imposes arms imports embargo on non-governmental entities and individuals operating in the states of North, South and West Darfur, including provision of technical training and assistance related to provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such items.
  • Specifies exemptions for verification and peace support operations authorized by the UN or operating with consent of relevant parties; non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian, human rights monitoring or protective use; and protective clothing for personal use of UN personnel, human rights monitors, media, humanitarian and development workers, and associated personnel.

Procedural

  • Extends UNSCR 1547 special political mission (90 days).

18-09-2004

Substantive

  • Requests Secretary-General to establish International Commission of Inquiry to investigate human rights and humanitarian law violations in Darfur.

24-03-2005

Substantive

  • Authorizes UNMIS to take necessary action to protect UN personnel, facilities, installations, and equipment, ensuring security and freedom of movement of UN and evaluation commission personnel, humanitarian workers, civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.
  • Requests Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to achieve UNMIS compliance with UN zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse.

Procedural

  • Establishes UNMIS (6 months) and specifies its mandate.