Taliban - EP 1

On 17 June 2011, the Al-Qaida and associates sanctions regime was divided into two inter-related committees, one focused on Al-Qaida (UNSCR 1989) – which was added as Episode 4 to the original Al-Qaida and associates case – and the other focused on the Taliban (UNSCR 1988). Resolution 1988 created a new Afghanistan Sanctions Committee targeting the Taliban as a threat to peace, stability and security of Afghanistan. The original AQ Monitoring Team provides support and recommendations for both the Taliban committee as well as the 1267 Committee. However, individuals designated under the Taliban Committee do not have recourse to the Ombudsperson, only to the Focal Point Mechanism, as in the case of other sanctions committees.

While the 2001 NATO and Afghan military action had some success in containing the Taliban insurgency, territorial gains were reversible, and led to renewed Council consensus that the Afghan-led reconciliation process should remain the primary objective. However, talks with the Taliban remained sporadic and attacks continued; the November 2012 Karzai 5-step Peace Process Roadmap to 2015 was intended to encourage resumption of talks through the release of prisoners and selective removal from sanctions lists.

As the United States under the Obama administration decided to engage in negotiations with the Taliban in 2010, two parallel series of meetings were facilitated; one by the Germans in Munich and the other by the Qataris in Doha. Moves to open a Taliban office in Qatar, exchanges of prisoners by the Taliban with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and of Guantanamo prisoners held by the United States appeared to advance talks, as the Taliban indicated an initial openness to power-sharing in Afghanistan.

UNSCR 2082, adopted on 17 December 2012, allowed for temporary exemptions that would make it easier for listed Taliban individuals (many of whom live outside Afghanistan) to travel to participate in peace and reconciliation talks. The Afghan government pressed for even greater flexibility to approve exemptions and allow additional time for consideration of listing/de-listing decisions in order to facilitate greater Afghan ownership of the peace process. Travel sanctions exemptions, in particular, were an important instrument in the incipient reconciliation process, although there were numerous reports of evasion.

While at the peak of the negotiations in 2011 and 2012 there were up to 12 different indirect channels of communication between the United States and the Taliban, the peace process did not advance further at that stage. In 2013, there were important setbacks: increased levels of violence against military and civilians (to levels not seen since 2010) and the Taliban’s public declaration in August 2013 that it would not participate in 2014 elections and would continue to wage war. The group made intensive efforts to disrupt the presidential elections, including assassination of candidates, and the frequency of armed attacks increased substantially in the period leading up to and immediately after the elections.

In spite of the Taliban’s efforts, the 2014 elections were relatively successful and had a higher turnout than previous ones. Following a period of uncertainty about the results after the second round of voting, Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai became President and Abdullah Abdullah was named Chief Executive in a power sharing arrangement negotiated by US Secretary of State, John Kerry. At the end of 2014, Afghan forces became fully responsible for security in the country as ISAF (established by UNSCR 1386 on 12 December 2001) left the country. A new, smaller non-combat NATO mission remained in place.

While there was no appreciable territorial gain (or loss) by the Taliban, according to the 2015 Monitoring Team report, the continued flow of revenue from the Taliban’s longstanding association with criminal networks, including narco-traffickers, remained a challenge to the fragile security situation in Afghanistan. The arms embargo was of limited utility, as most arms remained available to the Taliban within Afghanistan, where a violent insurgency with the presence of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) continued to take place.

On 7 July 2015, a new round of peace-talks began with the participation of China, Pakistan, and the United States, an initiative that proved to be divisive within the Taliban. Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, was declared dead by Afghanistan on 29 July 2015, after a statement supporting peace talks attributed to Omar was denounced by one of the factions within the Taliban, which opposed the negotiation, by arguing that the leader had been dead since 2013. Talks were suspended after the announcement, as the new Taliban leader Mullah Mansour rejected direct negotiations with the government (but allowed the Taliban political commission in Doha to pursue negotiations “in their own capacity”).

UNSCR 2255, adopted on 22 December 2015, emphasized the threat to peace posed by Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan and decided states should enhance vigilance over their nationals and individuals under their jurisdiction who engage with materials relevant to their production. It also specified that the use of proceeds derived from crimes, including the illicit cultivation, production and trafficking of narcotic drugs originating in and transiting through Afghanistan and trafficking of precursors into Afghanistan, travel of listed individuals, provision of Internet hosting or related services, and ransom payments were also subject to the sanction measures.

While peace negotiations with the Taliban had made little progress, the national unity government reached an agreement with the Hezb-i-Islami militant group on 18 May 2016, whose leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar had been designated for sanctions (in the 1267/1989 sanctions regime) in 2003. At the time, Hekmatyar was under financial pressure due to the implementation of UN and US sanctions in Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey. The deal was formally signed in September 2016 and Hekmatyar, once called the “butcher of Kabul,” was delisted on 3 February 2017.

Following the death of Taliban leader Mullah Mansour in May 2016 by a US drone strike, the group appointed Haibattulah Akhhundzada to the leadership position. While the new leader was questioned over his capacity to lead the fractured Taliban, the group largely maintained its military capabilities and funding. The Taliban continued to have a diverse revenue stream, generated primarily from narcotics, mining, extortion, ransom payments, and external donations, with the Taliban’s involvement with the narcotics economy accounting for up to 50% of the group’s revenue. The Taliban also continued to obtain new weapons and military technology, and remained militarily active in the country.

In 2018, the fighting season saw a significant increase in violence and assaults on provincial capitals. Although there had been strains between Al-Qaida and the Taliban in the past, according to the Monitoring Team, “Al-Qaida remains closely allied with and embedded within the Taliban. The Taliban provide an umbrella group and operating space for about 20 terrorist groups broadly aligned with Al-Qaida and Taliban objectives.” In contrast, ISIL has an adversarial relationship with the Taliban, and was largely funded by its core operation in Syria and Iraq. The Monitoring Team estimated that between 10,000 and 15,000 foreign terrorist fighters were part of the various groups operating in Afghanistan.

In February 2018 Ashraf Ghani, the President of Afghanistan, extended an offer of peace talks with the Taliban, suggesting the group could be recognized as a political party if it rejected the use of violence and engaged in negotiations. The Taliban remained reluctant to negotiate, although there may have been internal debates on the issue. In June 2018, the Afghan government and the Taliban agreed on a cease-fire over the three-day Eid al-Fitr festival. The truce was respected and widely welcomed in the country, but a suggestion to extend it indefinitely was rejected by the Taliban.

In July 2018, the United States and the Taliban kicked off a new round of direct peace negotiations, which, following numerous iterations, led to an agreement in principle on the gradual withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in exchange for a commitment from the Taliban to stop attacks against US targets and its allies. In September 2019, the signing of the agreement at a planned Camp David summit was delayed by the United States due to the Taliban being allegedly responsible for the killing of an American soldier and 11 others in a car bomb attack.

In September 2019, Afghan presidential elections were held successfully, but with a very low turn-out. Although no mass casualty incidents were registered, hundreds of attacks led to 277 civilian casualties, in a wave of violence almost entirely attributed to the Taliban. On 18 February 2020, Ashraf Ghani was announced the winner of the elections, and reached an agreement with the opposition for the recognition of his reelection.

On 29 February 2020, the long-negotiated US-Taliban agreement was signed by the parties. The document established a timeline for the reduction of US troops in Afghanistan in exchange for a pledge by the Taliban not to enable groups targeting the US or its allies in Afghanistan. On that same day, the United States and the Government of Afghanistan issued a joint declaration laying out principles for a comprehensive peace agreement in the country. Intra-Afghan peace negotiations, a requirement first laid out at the start of negotiations, were to be initiated as soon as possible.

UNSCR 2513 (10 March 2020) endorsed the US-Taliban agreement and the joint US-Afghan declaration. Following consultations within the Council, the text stated the Council’s readiness to review the status of designated individuals under the 1988 regime with a view to support the peace process once intra-Afghanistan negotiations were initiated. The delisting of individuals designated on UN sanctions lists were not, therefore, a part of the US-Taliban negotiations, but rather were expected to play a role in support of the broader Afghan peace negotiations. In September 2020, the first round of intra-Afghan negotiations was held in Doha.

The intra-Afghan talks stalled in October 2020, and the Taliban launched a major attack on Helmand Province’s provincial capital. They expanded their attacks to include areas around Kandahar in November, and the US Trump administration announced plans for future troop withdrawals commencing 1 May 2021. Intra-Afghan talks resumed again in January 2022, despite continued attacks on Afghan government security forces.

In February 2021, the new US administration announced it was reviewing the Trump administration’s policy on withdrawing US forces by 1 May, and the Taliban issued an open letter calling upon the US to honor the Trump agreement, even though it continued deadly attacks on Afghan government security forces. The US proposed a new peace plan in March 2021, calling for a power-sharing agreement between the Taliban and the Afghan government. The Taliban rejected a US-proposed summit on 13 April 2021, and the following day, the Biden administration announced that the US would begin withdrawing its forces beginning in May, with a full withdrawal to be completed by the symbolic date of 11 September 2021, twenty years after the attacks that spawned the US-led intervention in the country in 2001.

The Taliban intensified their attacks on Afghan government forces in May 2021 and launched a major offensive across the country in July 2021. NATO’s Mission concluded on 12 July 2021. The Afghan government collapsed on 15 August 2021, President Ghani fled the country, and the Taliban regained control over most of Afghanistan. The US exit was chaotic, and ISIS-K claimed credit for a major bombing outside Kabul Airport that killed more than 200 people while they were trying to flee the country, including 13 members of the US forces overseeing their departure. The US froze Afghan Central Bank reserves held in the US, and the IMF and IBRD suspended payments to Afghanistan.

Over the ensuing months, the Taliban made efforts to consolidate their power, facing threats from ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) fighters and from residual hold-outs loosely affiliated with the previous government in the northern regions of the country. The Taliban also faced increased challenges from the humanitarian crisis facing the country in the wake of the collapse of the Ghani government and the foreign assistance it was receiving before its overthrow. This prompted the UN Security Council to pass UNSCR 2615 (22 December 2021), declaring that humanitarian assistance and other activities that support basic human needs are not a violation of its previous asset freeze resolutions, particularly UNSCR 2255 from 21 December 2015. Resolution 2615 also responded to some of the growing criticisms of the unintended humanitarian consequences of UN (and other) sanctions regimes and presaged the passage of UNSCR 2664 a year later (on 19 December 2022), that created a permanent carve out for humanitarian actors and activities in countries sanctioned by the UN.

In February 2022, the US tabled proposals for a partial unfreezing of frozen Afghan reserves, but the Taliban’s reversal of its pledge to support girls’ education in March, followed by further restrictions on women’s rights in May 2022, made diplomatic progress difficult. The US attempted to use a resumption of financial assistance to support humanitarian activities, but the Taliban rejected US conditions for the full unfreezing of its assets in September 2022. It later placed a ban on women’s admission to universities and declared its refusal to work with women in NGOs in December of 2022. As a result, the issue of women’s rights under the Taliban increasingly displaced concerns about the humanitarian crisis in the country, despite its deepening throughout 2022.

Concerns about women’s rights under the Taliban prompted the passage of UNSCR 2681 on 27 April 2023 that explicitly condemned the Taliban’s decision to ban women from working for the UN in Afghanistan and called upon the government to reverse its policies and practices that restrict women’s and girls’ human rights. The resolution passed unanimously, though not without going through multiple drafts spurred by disagreements among the P5. It was not a sanctions resolution, however, and the core purposes of the sanctions resolutions passed under Chapter VII remained vaguely concerned with the fact that the listed individuals, most of whom were originally designated in 2000 and 2001 due to their association with Al-Qaida, constituted a threat to the peace, stability, and security of Afghanistan.

Throughout 2023, the Taliban regime faced recurring attacks from ISIS and border clashes with Iran in May 2023 (that followed similar confrontations with Pakistan in August 2022). Tensions with Pakistan increased toward the end of 2023, resulting in the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Afghans in November 2023. Their forced return exacerbated the ongoing humanitarian crisis in the country. The UN also slashed its aid budget to Afghanistan in June 2023, following the increasingly draconian restrictions on women in the country. Two years after the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, the International Crisis Group described the level of countrywide violence as at an historic low, but that it was facing a worsening humanitarian crisis. The Security Council reaffirmed its continuing sanctions on individuals associated with the Taliban in resolutions passed at the end of 2022 (UNSCR 2665) and again at the end of 2023 (UNSCR 2716).

2024 brought some initial steps toward a partial diplomatic engagement with the Taliban. China received a Taliban envoy in January 2024. In February 2024, UN Secretary-General Guterres convened key international players in Doha, but the Taliban withdrew when they were not recognized as the sole representative of Afghanistan. The UN reneged, and the Taliban participated in a meeting in Doha in June 2024, but only after excluding Afghan women from the session and removing consideration of the treatment Afghan women from the agenda.

Disagreements over how to engage with the Taliban occasioned a growing split between Afghanistan’s regional neighbors and Western governments, leaving the UN in an ambiguous and difficult position. Mawlawi Badreddin Haqqani visited the UAE in June 2024, and in August 2024, the Uzbek Prime Minister visited Kabul and the Kazakh government agreed to host a Taliban representative. The Afghan embassies in Oman and Uzbekistan reopened in September 2024, while the UK and Norway agreed to close the embassies of Afghanistan still staffed by representatives of the Ghani government. In October 2024, Russia removed the Taliban from its list of terrorist entities and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov called for the lifting of “Western” unilateral sanctions on Afghanistan, but omitted reference to the continuing UN sanctions on many of the Taliban leaders.

In January 2025, the ICC Prosecutor sought arrest warrants for key Taliban leaders, adding to the mix of actors and policy instruments applied to the regime. The following months, US-inspired cuts to foreign assistance began to hit Afghanistan, though the US engaged in a limited diplomatic engagement, removing the bounty on Haqqani in exchange for the release of a US hostage. The US Secretary of State announced in May 2025 that the US designation of the Taliban as a Foreign Terrorist Organization was also under review.

In June and July 2025, Iran expelled hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees during its war with Israel, adding to the humanitarian crisis in the country. Russia broke diplomatic ranks with the rest of the major powers (including China) by formally recognizing the Taliban as the official government of Afghanistan on 3 July 2025. Less than a week later, on 8 July 2025, the ICC issued arrest warrants for the leader of the Taliban, Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada, and Chief Justice, Abdul Hakim Haqqani, for crimes against humanity related to the persecution of women in the country.

Mandatory

Arms imports embargo (individual / entity), asset freeze (individual / entity), and travel ban (individual) on Taliban and associates.

Travel ban: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1988/exemptions/travel-ban

Asset freeze: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1988/exemptions/assets-freeze

Carve out provisions for humanitarian actors apply, as specified in UNSCR 2664 (2022).

Maximum number of designees during the episode: 136 individuals and 5 entities, currently remaining on 135 individuals and 5 entities.

Current list of sanctions designees:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1988/materials

New Sanctions Committee was created (when the Taliban sanctions regime was split from the Al-Qaida and associates sanctions regime on 17 June 2011), monitoring team in place (common to Al-Qaida and associates and Taliban). Designation criteria were specified and targets designated. Enforcement authorities specified.

Monitoring Team reports:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1988/monitoring-team/reports