Proscribed activities / Recommended

Proliferation


(a) Travel

Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems…

UNSCR 1803 (2008), Paragraph 3

(b) Diplomatic personnel

Calls upon States to exercise enhanced vigilance over DPRK diplomatic personnel so as to prevent such individuals from contributing to the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;

UNSCR 2094 (2013), Paragraph 24

(c) Imports

Requires all Member States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to exercise vigilance and prevent missile and missile-related items, materials, goods and technology being transferred to DPRK’s missile or WMD programmes;

UNSCR 1695 (2006), Paragraph 3

(d) Exports

Requires all Member States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to exercise vigilance and prevent the procurement of missiles or missile related-items, materials, goods and technology from the DPRK, and the transfer of any financial resources in relation to DPRK’s missile or WMD programmes;

UNSCR 1695 (2006), Paragraph 4

(e) Imports and exports

Calls upon and allows all States to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to or from the DPRK or its nationals, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories of any item if the State determines that such item could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, and directs the Committee to issue an Implementation Assistance Notice regarding the proper implementation of this provision;

UNSCR 2094 (2013), Paragraph 22

(f) Training

Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and prevent specialized teaching or training of Iranian nationals, within their territories or by their nationals, of disciplines which would contribute to Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

UNSCR 1737 (2006), Paragraph 17

(g) Transactions

Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance over those transactions involving the IRGC that could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

UNSCR 1929 (2010), Paragraph 12

(i) Revenue

Expresses concern that DPRK nationals are sent to work in other States for the purpose of earning hard currency that the DPRK uses for its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, and calls upon States to exercise vigilance over this practice;

UNSCR 2321 (2016), Paragraph 34

This section includes only recommendations adopted by the UN Security Council in specific sanctions regimes-related resolutions invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Additional recommendations by the Security Council regarding this issue domain can be found in the 1540 regime. For more information, see UNSCR 1540 (2004) and subsequent resolutions dealing with the issue of proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery. The resolution recognized States' non-proliferation commitments and binding legal treaty obligations and decided that none of the obligations under the 1540 regime shall conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) or alter the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization for the Protection of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).